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DIA Swarm-Economy Sufficiency and Common-Circulation Specification

Document Status

Field Value
policy-id DIA-SUFF-001
type Implementing act (Level 3 of the normative hierarchy)
version 0.1.0-draft
basis Art. VIII.4-8, XII.5-13, XIV of the DIA Constitution; doc/normative/30-core-values/CORE-VALUES.md section "Sufficiency Over Accumulation"
mechanism status data model and compliance tests are normative; reward functions may be parameterized by federations within this document's limits

1. Purpose of the Document

The Constitution prohibits converting economic advantage into lasting constitutional dominance and requires surpluses above the sufficiency threshold to return to common circulation. What is still missing is the minimal specification: how a federation defines the sufficiency threshold, which concentration brakes are mandatory, and how redistribution is audited.

This document defines:

  • the minimal concepts and data model of economic policy,
  • the compliance test for the sufficiency threshold,
  • permissible classes of reward curves,
  • the mandatory circulation of surpluses,
  • the ban on converting economic reward into procedural power,
  • minimum federation audit metrics,
  • the relation to constitutional exceptions.

2. General Rule

  1. Swarm economics serves the maintenance of the capacity to act of people, nodes, and the community, not endless accumulation.
  2. Voluntary contractual exchange among participants is an admissible mode of reciprocity alongside gift, but its economic traces may not by themselves act as a shortcut to reputational, procedural, or constitutional force.
  3. A federation MUST design rewards so that, once sufficiency is reached, further gain is diminishing or automatically redirected into common circulation.
  4. No economic mechanism may make compensation depend primarily on the inflow of new participants instead of auditable use, impact, maintenance of value, or real protective/helpful action.
  5. Economic reward is not a path for bypassing rules of procedural reputation, routing, quorum, exceptions, or eligibility for high-stakes roles; this also applies to balance, exchange history, and the mere fact of entering into or performing a contract.
  6. Verified personhood in the network may by itself be a sufficient basis for a non-withdrawable minimum of compute resources for communication, orientation, and emergency/care modes, regardless of temporary reputation or economic contribution.

3. Core Terms

Term Meaning
sufficiency_threshold the level of resources or reward flow sufficient for safe and stable upkeep of the node and its operator
sufficiency_band a tolerance band around the sufficiency threshold within which the system may smooth reward behavior instead of applying a hard step
surplus the part of reward exceeding sufficiency_threshold after taking sufficiency_band into account
common_circulation common circulation of surpluses according to explicit federation rules
infrastructural_function a function of high communal value that need not generate high reputational or market return
conversion_barrier a rule forbidding translation of economic reward into procedural or constitutional advantage
universal_basic_compute a non-withdrawable minimum of compute guaranteed to a verified person for communication, orientation, and protective modes

The sufficiency threshold may be defined as:

  • an amount per period,
  • a cost budget per node,
  • a multi-factor resource band,
  • or another functionally equivalent model.

A federation MUST NOT define the threshold in a purely narrative way. There must be an operational model that can be audited and reviewed.

4. Minimal Data Model of Economic Policy

Any federation that activates reward or token mechanisms MUST publish at least:

swarm_economy_policy:
  policy_id: "DIA-SUFF-001"
  federation_id: "[federation]"
  version: "0.1.0"
  reward_unit: "[token / credit / point / other unit]"
  measurement_period: "P30D"
  sufficiency_threshold:
    model_type: "fixed" # fixed | indexed | cost_profile | mixed
    value: "[value or formula]"
    review_period: "P90D"
    basis_ref: "[public rationale or index]"
  sufficiency_band:
    lower: 0.9
    upper: 1.1
  reward_curve:
    type: "piecewise_sublinear"
    parameters: {}
  universal_basic_compute:
    enabled: true
    eligibility_basis: "proof_of_personhood"
    non_withdrawable: true
    guaranteed_modes:
      - "emergency"
      - "care"
    funding_sources:
      - "business_nodes"
      - "high_margin_instances"
      - "surplus_recirculation"
      - "voluntary_operator_surplus"
  surplus_policy:
    destination_classes:
      - "basic_survival_floor"
      - "bootstrap"
      - "weaker_links"
      - "temporary_harm"
      - "infrastructure"
    allocation_rule: "[public rule or formula]"
    settlement_period: "P30D"
  conversion_barriers:
    governance_weight_from_rewards: false
    privileged_routing_from_rewards: false
    exception_access_from_rewards: false
    oracle_power_from_rewards: false
  audit_metrics:
    - "top_1_share"
    - "top_5_share"
    - "surplus_recirculation_rate"
    - "coverage_ratio"
    - "infrastructure_share"

Absence of a public swarm_economy_policy means the federation does not meet the minimum standard for exchangeable or quasi-exchangeable mechanisms.

5. Sufficiency Threshold

5.1. Compliance Test

The sufficiency threshold MUST pass all three tests at once:

  1. Upkeep test: the threshold is enough for safe and stable upkeep of the node and its operator in ordinary operation.
  2. Non-domination test: the threshold may not be set so high that it effectively disables concentration brakes for a small privileged group.
  3. Transparency test: the method of setting the threshold can be described, recalculated, and challenged procedurally.

5.2. Minimum Rules

  1. The sufficiency threshold MUST be reviewed periodically.
  2. A change in the threshold MUST leave a decision trace, rationale, and effective date.
  3. A federation may use different cost profiles for different node classes, but it may not use them to covertly privilege its own operators or public-trust roles.

6. Reward Curves and Concentration Brakes

6.1. Permissible Classes of Mechanisms

After crossing sufficiency_threshold, a federation MUST apply at least one of the following classes of limits:

  1. diminishing gains (sublinear),
  2. a tapering plateau,
  3. a hard cap with surplus redirection,
  4. a hybrid of the above.

6.2. Impermissible Classes of Mechanisms

Impermissible are mechanisms that:

  1. retain linear or superlinear growth indefinitely,
  2. reward mainly for position in time,
  3. increase reward power faster than auditable contribution grows,
  4. hide concentration through side channels or opaque benefit classes.

6.3. Anti-Pyramid Test

An economic mechanism does NOT pass the constitutional test if any of the following holds:

  1. the dominant part of payouts for earlier participants comes from the inflow of new participants rather than auditable use or value,
  2. seniority by itself creates a lasting bonus without decay,
  3. loss of new-participant inflow causes structural collapse of baseline payouts.

7. Common Circulation of Surpluses

7.1. Destination Classes

At least the following classes MUST be served by surplus_policy:

  1. basic_survival_floor - the minimum allocation for verified persons without sufficient current reputational or economic contribution,
  2. bootstrap - new nodes and entry into the ecosystem,
  3. weaker_links - nodes with lower operational capacity,
  4. temporary_harm - nodes or operators temporarily harmed,
  5. infrastructure - functions of high communal value.

A federation may add other classes, but it may not remove all protective and infrastructural classes at once.

7.2. Minimum Redistribution Rules

  1. Surplus MUST be settled periodically, not ad hoc by sympathy.
  2. The allocation rule MUST be public or expressed as a public algorithm.
  3. Funds routed into common circulation may not return in the same round to the source beneficiary through a hidden channel.
  4. Redistribution MUST leave an auditable trace per period.

7.3. Minimal Settlement Record

surplus_settlement:
  settlement_id: "[unique identifier]"
  federation_id: "[federation]"
  period_start: "[timestamp]"
  period_end: "[timestamp]"
  source_node_id: "[source node]"
  gross_reward: 0
  retained_reward: 0
  surplus_amount: 0
  destination_class: "bootstrap"
  destination_ref: "[fund / pool / recipient]"
  policy_ref: "DIA-SUFF-001"
  created_at: "[timestamp]"

8. Barrier Against Conversion into Constitutional Power

  1. Token, credit, or other economic-reward balances may not be a direct input into calculation of voting weight, panel eligibility, oracle force, or access to exceptions.
  2. A federation may not sell or grant shortcuts into public-trust roles in exchange for economic reward.
  3. If the system uses both economic rewards and reputation, their accrual paths MUST be separated and auditable.
  4. Any attempt to circumvent the conversion barrier through an indirect benefit is treated as a constitutional violation, not as ordinary economic optimization.

9. Federation Health Metrics

A federation operating reward economics MUST measure at least:

  • top_1_share - the largest beneficiary's share of all payouts,
  • top_5_share - the top five beneficiaries' share,
  • surplus_recirculation_rate - the share of surplus that actually returned to common circulation,
  • coverage_ratio - the share of active nodes reaching the minimum upkeep level,
  • infrastructure_share - the share of redistribution allocated to infrastructural functions,
  • new_node_support_rate - the share of new nodes covered by bootstrap support.

Persistent growth of concentration together with low surplus_recirculation_rate is a signal of institutional pathology and should trigger review of economic policy.

10. Exceptions and Relation to Other Documents

  1. Bypassing concentration brakes may occur only through an exception compliant with EXCEPTION-POLICY.md.
  2. An exception may not suspend the barrier against converting economic reward into procedural power.
  3. Every exception concerning the sufficiency threshold or redistribution MUST specify: reason, expiry, owner, risk-level, and side-effect metrics.

Document relations:

  • Constitution Art. VIII.4: prohibition of pyramid-type economics and of converting economic advantage into power.
  • Constitution Art. XII.6-13: contractual exchange as an admissible mode of reciprocity, the purpose of economics, concentration brakes, common circulation of surpluses, and the conversion barrier.
  • EXCEPTION-POLICY.md: exception procedure for temporary departures.
  • PROCEDURAL-REPUTATION-SPEC.md: separation of procedural reputation from economic reward.