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Author Disclosure Conditions

Created: 2026-10-27. Revised: 2026-10-28.

Based on: P013 domain map.

Status: proposed post-MVP feature; no runtime claim. This section owns the feature and its tracker. The acceptance scenario is the author disclosure condition variant of Story 014.

Summary

An author may make wider disclosure of a rumor conditional: "do not show this content beyond the correlators and counting authority I chose until at least N other qualified sources report the same matter". The condition is part of the author's consent. It is bound by a separately nym-signed release manifest and referenced by the protected rumor. It binds every admitted holder; it is not a hint to a server.

Four separations carry the design:

  1. Same matter is a context. Reports count together only when they share a topic/class and a signal/similarity-key derived by a versioned grouping rule from a correlation descriptor that the author approved. The counter compares identifiers; it does not interpret meaning.
  2. Sources, not copies. Counting uses P015 contextual sources per epoch. Copies, forwards and republications by one source count once.
  3. Release is verifiable. A release publishes a payload that was redacted for the release audience when the rumor was authored. It requires a release commit accepted by the admitted counting authority, which orders it against withdrawal and counts sources at that point, and, by default, the author's final confirmation.
  4. Disclosure is not coordination. The disclosure condition answers "when may this content be shown?". The coordination threshold of section 5 answers "when should joint action be proposed?". The two never imply each other.

Context and Problem

  • Fact. Section 5 defines a coordination threshold that leads to an association-room proposal, and section 6 an explicit consent gate. Neither lets an author define when content may reach wider audiences.
  • Fact. Whisper implementation Layer 7 resolved that whisper-durable.v1 carries aggregates and a content-addressed reference, and that text redacted under one scope is never re-published under another.
  • Fact. P015 counts council-admitted participant sources per context and epoch. source/ref is derived per participant, context and epoch, so distinctness is defined only within one epoch, and contributions stop counting after revocation or epoch end.
  • Inference. A number alone is not a condition. Without an exact criterion of which reports count together, a node could reach the threshold by widening the matter. If a semantic similarity score could move a report into a group, it would change when a consent executes, not only how well search works.

Roles and Payloads

Role Holds before release May Must not
Author node Protected signal, release payload, control key (the case continuity key) Narrow or withdraw the condition, confirm or decline a release —
Correlator (custodian) Correlation payload; the release payload only in held custody Match locally, propose context joins, pass the descriptor to the counting authority Disclose protected material outside the correlation scope
Counting authority Protected signal and condition; signals of the context Count sources, attest, and order case events including release commits, as the case status authority Count anything other than the condition's context, or accept a commit out of order
Recipient Released record Verify the release offline Treat the count as evidence of truth

The material is split into two payloads and an independently verifiable manifest:

  • Correlation payload. The protected v2 signal with disclosure/scope = private-correlation, the correlation descriptor and the manifest digest. Authorized holders are exactly the author-named correlators union the named counting authority, including when these are different nodes. Each holder has a role-specific use, delivery grant and retention obligation. Hop/forwarding budgets bound transport; they never grant recipient authority.
  • Release payload. whisper-release-payload.v1, redacted through Story 005 for the declared release audience at authoring. It has no signature of its own; its digest is committed in the manifest. Custody is withheld (author node) or held-under-obligation (a named custodian). This honours S011's prohibition on reusing text under a different disclosure scope.
  • Release manifest. whisper-embargo-manifest.v1 carries the original whisper-embargo-condition.v1, the release-payload digest, the case continuity public-key commitment, case/not-after, the counting/status authority and the approved public metadata policy (count/proof required, rendered criterion optional). A nym signature covers its domain-separated canonical bytes. Its auxiliary signing use must be explicitly permitted by the P015-005 profile; possession of a nym key alone does not permit it.

The manifest is created first. It includes neither the protected signal's body nor its record id: the signal then commits the signed manifest's digest, and P035-019's detached admission receipt binds the digest of the exact signed author bytes and the manifest digest after verifying the complete private publication. The private record/id excludes the signature and is forbidden in the public receipt, URLs, logs, metric labels and traces: it would allow a dictionary to confirm guessed low-entropy content. There is no reverse manifest-to-signal hash dependency and no field-stripping from a signed Agora envelope. The receiver can verify the author's manifest and the authority's claim about admission without seeing the protected body; it cannot independently verify that hidden body's signature or semantics. The construction order is acyclic:

flowchart LR
    Payload[Release payload] --> Manifest[Nym-signed manifest]
    Manifest --> Signal[Protected signal]
    Manifest --> Admission[Admission receipt]
    Signal --> Admission
    Manifest --> Intent[Immutable release intent]
    Admission --> Intent
    Intent --> Commit[Authority commit receipt]
    Intent --> Envelope[Final release envelope]
    Commit --> Envelope
    Envelope --> AD[AD hand-over]

Arrows mean "must exist before constructing", not permission to disclose. The protected signal is absent from the recipient package. The final envelope does not influence the commit receipt's preimage.

The public form of the condition must itself be safe for the consented audience: private facets stay in the correlation payload, with only authorized opaque commitments and a redacted criterion in the manifest. A plain hash of a low-entropy private descriptor is not confidentiality; it must not be exported as a supposed redaction. ADC-001 must freeze the bounded public proof fields and their privacy review before runtime work.

The control key is the case continuity key, owned by P013-LLR-006 and stored by S026. One fresh key per case signs amendments, withdrawal, confirmations and case-bound succession. The anchor and manifest must commit the same key, authority and case lifetime. P035-019's admission profile verifies that equality before attesting the binding; a receipt over two digests alone must not imply that an unchecked case binding was verified. The manifest and that receipt can then serve as the detached anchor proof in LLR's portable succession profile, when their disclosure is permitted to that audience. This reuses existing ADC material; it neither requires an embargo for every case nor exposes the private signal. The key does not identify the participant; its uses can link actions inside the case. All such actions follow the case state contract.

In v1 one case anchor has zero or one original embargo condition. If present, the anchor binds it at creation and its counting authority is the case status authority. Narrowing amendments keep the original condition digest and its release slots. A wider condition needs a new protected anchor and a new case, with new consent and no automatic public link; it neither withdraws the old condition nor inherits its permissions. Adding an embargo to a previously unconditioned case likewise requires a new anchor. The editor shows both cases and offers a separate withdrawal of the old one.

Same Matter: Descriptor, Grouping Rule and Key

The author approves a whisper-correlation-descriptor.v1: a grouping rule plus typed, normalized fields, rendered as a sentence the author can judge. An illustrative descriptor, not a frozen field list:

Field Value
Grouping rule contest-assessment/v1
Organizer Organizer O, identified by its website domain
Event Contest K, identified by its canonical page URL
Edition 2026
Issue kind assessment-integrity-doubt
Rendering "Doubts about how entries were assessed in the 2026 edition of contest K organized by O."

Grouping rules live in the decorrelation vocabulary document beside its terms (P013-DFR-001) and reach nodes the same way: a factory JSON source with local P091 layers. Each rule has an id, a version, applicable terms, a closed field list with admissible identifier types (domain, canonical URL, registry id, normalized text, closed enums), the canonicalization and a rendering template. A local rule produces keys that other nodes do not derive, and the UI says so.

The similarity key is the domain-separated digest of the normalized descriptor:

signal/similarity-key = "gk1:" || base64url(sha256(JCS([
  "orbiplex.whisper.grouping.v1", rule-id, rule-version, normalized-fields
])))

Changing a rule's normalization or field set requires a new version. The condition binds the rule id, version and digest, so no node can substitute a broader rule.

Breadth is the author's decision. contest/v1 counts any report about the contest; contest-assessment/v1 counts only doubts about assessment, and excludes, for example, payout or form problems. The key is the outcome of agreeing on meaning, not a mechanism that discovers it: two different descriptors remain different after hashing.

Ambiguous Reports: Proposals, Not Merges

People describe one event differently: an official name, a colloquial name, or no name at all. Correlators may look for such candidates, and a model may help, but its output is a proposal:

  1. When the condition's join policy is keyed-and-confirmed-joins, a correlator may send a content-free whisper-context-join-proposal.v1 to the candidate's author through that signal's reply path. It shows only the rendered target descriptor, never other rumors.
  2. The candidate's author accepts by authoring a related signal in the target context (P013-DFR-004). The keyed counting rule then counts it.

No node merges contexts on its own, and no similarity score opens an embargo. Under the default join policy keyed-only, only reports that derive the same key count.

Counting Rule

For each epoch e of the window, the counting authority computes the number of distinct source/ref values among admitted signals that:

  • carry the condition's context digest and were admitted in epoch e;
  • had certificates valid at their authenticated publication time (P015);
  • belong to sources that are not revoked under a status no older than 300 seconds.

Copies, forwards and republications of one source count once. Counts of different epochs are never summed.

  • N means other sources. In the protected signal's epoch, the author's source/ref is known from the protected signal's certificate and is excluded exactly; the requirement is N. In each later epoch of the window the author's source cannot be excluded reliably, so the requirement is N + 1 even if the author never publishes in that epoch. This conservative rule can therefore require one extra genuinely other source. The UI shows both N and this effective threshold. Succession does not change the counter: it proves consent of key holders, not participant-source equivalence. A possible handover of the case is a separate reason not to infer that equivalence from succession, not the reason for the N + 1 bound. Exact exclusion would need a source-equivalence attestation from the issuer, which remains open (P013-LLR-005).
  • Window. count/window-epochs whole epochs starting with the protected signal's epoch. The proposed bound is 13 epochs, about 91 days under the production seven-day profile.
  • Limitation. Reports that trickle in across epochs do not satisfy the condition unless one epoch alone reaches the requirement. Longer counting needs a longer-epoch profile (the issuer then retains bindings longer) or a cryptographic cross-epoch linkage.
  • Meaning. Distinct sources are a consent trigger. They do not show that the reports are true.

Attestation and Verification

The condition names exactly one counting authority in v1: the projection authority that federation policy admits for the contextual profile and context (the P015 role C). Committees with quorum proofs may follow, as section 5 already anticipates.

whisper-embargo-attestation.v1 is a private threshold proposal from the pinned authority to an authenticated eligible executor. It binds the case, original commitment, exact single-audience manifest, release ID, executor, effective mode, epoch and counting basis (author-epoch-exact or later-epoch-conservative). It carries threshold-met, the finite signed observation window, effective release deadline and an opaque trigger tied to the complete admitted membership. The owner retains exact counts, status revisions and inventory evidence separately from the proposal and public commit statement.

Verification has two entry paths sharing the same bounded verifier library:

  1. A protected holder verifies the complete signal, nym signature, contextual certificate and publication/admission proof, including the signal-to-manifest binding. A recipient instead verifies the separately signed manifest, its explicit P015 scope and the admitted authority's receipt binding it to the protected publication. No retrieval of the protected signal is required.
  2. Both verify the original condition, key commitment and any accepted narrowing amendments needed to establish consent at the commit point. Requests and acceptances included in the public package use closed, content-free bodies; private status/contact data cannot be smuggled into this proof chain.
  3. The triggering attestation binds the condition/context, authority and an epoch inside the window. It may prompt the author while no older than attestation/max-age-seconds (proposed at most 900), but never authorizes publication alone.
  4. In confirm mode, the accepted author's confirmation binds the exact audience, original condition and triggering attestation and was unexpired at commit.
  5. The signed commit receipt binds the immutable release-intent digest, logical release id, canonical audience digest, executor, hand-over deadline, commit revision, observed count and source-status revision. It attests that consent and the count passed at that point.
  6. The intent's payload matches the manifest commitment; its audience is an explicitly consented descriptor, no wider than the current condition. The final Agora envelope verifies normally, including its content-addressed id.

Recipients need no current case status to verify an already committed release. This proves a historical authorization at commit, not current authority or the truth of the rumors. Missing required proof prevents successful verification rather than fetching private text as a fallback. Certificates and proof references must be supplied inline or in the authorized offline package within declared limits.

Freshness and consent are measured at one named point, the commit point: the case authority's acceptance of the release commit. The authority counts at that moment under a source status no older than 300 seconds, so the source basis of a release is at most 300 seconds old at its commit point, not counting the five-second skew tolerance of P015. A revocation that has not yet reached that status may not stop the release, and the acceptance claims are bounded accordingly. The bound concerns the commit point only. When the bytes later reach AD the basis may be older; the hand-over deadline limits that gap without a recount, and a withdrawal accepted after the commit does not cancel the committed release.

Evidence that recipients can re-verify without trusting the counting authority remains to be designed in P013-ADC-004.

Release

The case authority commits one logical act of disclosure. Artifact Delivery carries out its delivery and never decides domain consent/counts again. The commit is not an INAC capability: AD still enforces its recipient, transport authority, expiry and budget contracts. A delivery refusal neither cancels the accepted commit nor frees its slot.

  • Modes. confirm is the default. The author node retrieves the attestation by condition id through the private exchange path it used to submit the protected signal, so the authority stores no route to the author. The author sees a prompt and signs whisper-embargo-confirmation.v1 with the control key, or declines. The confirmation is a case event that binds the condition, the audience, the triggering attestation and a short confirmation/not-after. In pre-authorized mode there is no prompt: the condition itself authorizes commits until release/not-after, and the author is notified afterwards.
  • Commit point. The executor, which is the releasing party, prepares the immutable whisper-embargo-release-intent.v1 and submits a whisper-release-commit.v1 request with a fresh request/id to the case authority. For a case with a disclosure condition that authority must be the counting authority. The request binds:

  • the release-intent digest, covering the exact payload and recipient proof package prepared so far, excluding the future commit receipt and final Agora envelope/signature;

  • the canonical audience descriptor and its digest, not only its class;
  • the executor's identity and frozen delivery route;
  • commit/hand-over-by, a short deadline for the first hand-over to AD (proposed at most 15 minutes and never after release/not-after).

The authority accepts the request in one durable transaction only if the case and condition are active, no earlier commit holds the slot for (original condition digest, canonical audience descriptor digest), the confirmation is accepted and unexpired (in confirm mode), neither the counting window nor release/not-after has ended, and its own count under a source status no older than 300 seconds meets the requirement. Its acceptance is the commit receipt. Refusal never reactivates a withdrawn or expired condition. A retryable refusal leaves an otherwise active condition active; confirm mode needs a new confirmation for a later triggering attestation. - Withdrawal versus release. The order of durable acceptance by the case authority decides. A withdrawal accepted before a commit refuses that commit. A withdrawal accepted after a commit does not cancel the committed release for its audience, even while its bytes have not yet been handed to AD; otherwise consent would have to be checked again between commit and hand-over. It ends every other and every later release. A withdrawal takes effect when the authority accepts it, not when it is signed, and the author's editor shows that point. - Record. whisper-embargo-release.v1 contains the immutable intent and commit receipt, with the releasing node's normal Agora signature. The receipt commits the intent, not the final receipt-bearing envelope, avoiding a hash cycle. Its release/id is a domain-separated digest of the original condition digest and canonical audience digest; it is distinct from Agora's content-addressed record/id. The executor freezes and journals the final envelope bytes before the first AD submission and reuses them on every retry. All final-envelope metadata except the receipt is fixed in the intent; its construction from the stored intent and receipt is deterministic in Phase 1. A crash before journal completion cannot choose a fresh timestamp/nonce or different payload when recovering that envelope. - Audiences. Closed classes are association-room (P070), federation-scoped and cross-federation. The canonical descriptor names the concrete room plus consented history-access policy revision, or exact federation/topic/access scope. It excludes delivery routes. Two routes to the same room consume one slot; two rooms have separate slots only if consent permits both descriptors. Executor and route are frozen separately in the intent. Membership alone cannot widen the audience or historical access. Agora audiences require registering the record kind and content schema. - Releasing party. The author node in withheld custody, the custodian in held custody. A counting authority that is also the custodian concentrates trust; confirm mode keeps the author's final word. - Irreversibility. A release cannot be recalled. Revocations after a release change the current annotation, as P015 does for first emissions, but not the released record.

The executor journals each execution phase, including the intent and the deterministic AD delivery id before submission, as P035-001 requires. Recovery after a crash depends on the phase reached:

Phase Recovery
Commit requested, outcome unknown Read the outcome by request/id or resubmit the same request. An accepted commit is recovered unchanged, even if a withdrawal was accepted after it; the authority neither counts again nor reserves a second slot. A refused request may be followed by a new request with a new id
Commit accepted Hand the committed bytes to AD with the frozen delivery id before commit/hand-over-by, without a new domain-consent/count decision or different bytes; ordinary AD admission still applies. If the deadline passes and AD confirms that no submission exists, request release-abandoned; the slot stays consumed, and a later disclosure to that audience needs a new condition
Released for delivery, outcome unknown Keep the bytes and the delivery id, and reconcile the same operation through AD status and readback as in P035-001; never prepare an alternative publication
Delivery confirmed Retries only repeat the same, already executed operation

Release for delivery is the moment from which AD may start sending on its own, that is, AD's durable acceptance of the submission. It is a conservative boundary of control over the disclosure, not proof that any recipient has read the content. Execution therefore keeps three states: commit accepted, released for delivery and delivery confirmed. The local journal is transactional-withheld; the commit is irreversible-external toward the case authority, because it fixes consent and the release slot; release for delivery is irreversible-external toward the audience. A recipient that sees two different intents or final envelopes for one logical release/id treats them as equivocation: it keeps the first and flags the conflict. Under the one-slot rule this indicates a faulty or malicious executor.

The closed release surface is the approved pre-redacted payload, the explicitly approved criterion/count metadata and the minimal verification package described above. Participant identity, private facets, source lists, original attachments and contact routes are excluded. Proof metadata can still link a nym or case, so the editor previews that disclosure too. Every additional field needs explicit consent and a contract-level privacy review; an evidence digest is not a license to publish its private preimage.

Amendments and Withdrawal

whisper-embargo-amendment.v1 is signed with the control key and can only narrow the condition: raise N, shorten the window, narrow the audience, switch pre-authorized to confirm, or withdraw. A wider condition requires a new condition on a new anchor and a new case under the one-anchor rule above. It does not implicitly withdraw the old condition. Amendments and withdrawal are case requests, and the case authority's acceptance gives them their place in the order (case state). A withdrawal takes effect when the authority durably accepts it and is ordered against release commits as described under Release; it erases unused held payload copies. Already committed execution bytes remain subject to their bounded journal/AD recovery obligations.

Custody Obligations

Every protected holder, including a separate counting authority, advertises the custody profile whisper-embargo-custody:v1. The author selects all protected holders from that admitted set. A custodian:

  • labels protected material through classification.v1, so the existing egress guards refuse it;
  • never includes it in Agora records, topic or subject query responses, aggregate notices, holder availability beacons, redistribution offers, room frames, notification previews, exports, logs or remote model egress;
  • uses it only for its admitted role: correlators match and propose joins; the counting authority admits and counts. AD/INAC checks the named holder set as well as transport budgets, including a separate correlator/authority fixture;
  • erases unused custody copies at release, withdrawal, expiry or release/not-after. Bytes already committed for execution are retained only until bounded hand-over/reconciliation completes; they cannot feed a new slot.

These are policy obligations backed by audit, not cryptography.

Coordination Independence

  • Disclosure conditions and coordination thresholds have separate state and separate artifacts. coordination/participation defaults to excluded: a protected signal then feeds no public threshold or proposal record. With allowed, a room proposal can form while the content stays embargoed for wider audiences, as in the Story 014 variant.
  • A room is a release audience only when the condition names it. Room membership alone grants nothing.
  • The author can always disclose their own material by a new, explicit act. The condition binds custodians and automation, not the author.

Optional Public Notice

With descriptor/visibility = public-notice, the author node publishes a content-free whisper-correlation-notice.v1, signed by the author's nym, in the vocabulary bucket of its topic/class. A notice is a publication of its own kind, so P015-005 must authorize its exact publication tuple explicitly (signature uses). It carries the rendered descriptor, the grouping rule, the similarity key, N and an expiry. Dormant-fact readers can then find the matter, and their authors can join by keyed derivation. The notice has a public record/id. Related authoring targets that id with target/kind = whisper-correlation-notice, never the hidden signal id. Matching uses the grouping key; no public reverse pointer to the protected signal is required or synthesized. The notice is itself a disclosure that the matter exists, and the author's editor says so. The default is correlators-only.

Confidentiality from Correlators

In the basic variant a correlator can read what it holds and is obliged not to disclose it. Withheld custody keeps the release payload at the author node until release, but needs that node at release time. A variant in which no node can read the protected material before N sources exist, for example threshold or escrow-style encryption, is a separate cryptographic mechanism (P013-ADC-009). Disclosure policy alone cannot provide it.

Condition, Proposal and Execution States

These are three different projections, not one persistent case enum. The condition is active, withdrawn or expired; the case status additionally handles closure/conflict under LLR. satisfied is a derived, temporary attestation predicate, not a stored whisper-case-status.v1 state or a reserved slot. A declined proposal ends only that prompt. The condition stays active, but the same proposal is durably suppressed across restart; another prompt requires an explicit author retry or a consented re-prompt policy with a new attestation and a bounded cooldown. Without that policy, no automatic re-prompt.

The diagram shows the proposal evaluation and one audience's execution. Before commit, withdrawal or expiry applies from every waiting state, also in pre-authorized mode. After commit, condition changes do not undo that slot.

stateDiagram-v2
    [*] --> active
    active --> satisfied: usable attestation (derived predicate)
    satisfied --> awaiting_confirmation: confirm mode
    satisfied --> committed: pre-authorized and authority accepts
    satisfied --> active: stale attestation or retryable refusal
    satisfied --> withdrawn: withdrawal accepted before commit
    satisfied --> expired: counting window or release deadline ends
    awaiting_confirmation --> committed: valid confirmation and authority accepts
    awaiting_confirmation --> active: stale confirmation or retryable refusal
    awaiting_confirmation --> declined: decline this proposal
    declined --> active: prompt suppressed; condition still active
    active --> withdrawn: withdrawal accepted
    active --> expired: counting window or release deadline ends
    awaiting_confirmation --> withdrawn: withdrawal accepted before commit
    awaiting_confirmation --> expired: counting window or release deadline ends
    committed --> released_for_delivery: AD accepts frozen bytes by hand-over deadline
    released_for_delivery --> delivery_confirmed: delivery confirmed
    committed --> abandoned: deadline passed and AD proves no submission

Invariants

  1. Before release, protected material leaves the author node only toward the named correlators and the counting authority.
  2. No correlator discloses protected material through any surface listed under custody obligations.
  3. Group membership follows the context digest only. No semantic score changes it.
  4. One source counts once per epoch; epochs are never summed.
  5. A release requires a commit accepted by the case authority, which counts at the commit point, and, in confirm mode, the author's confirmation. AD carries out the delivery of a committed release and never decides consent again.
  6. A release exposes only the pre-redacted payload, approved criterion/count metadata and minimal public verification package to its consented audience; neither correlation text nor private facets/source lists/contact routes leak.
  7. Amendments only narrow.
  8. Disclosure conditions and coordination thresholds are independent.
  9. Release records state that distinct sources are not evidence of truth.

Trade-offs

  • Per-epoch counting is exact and unlinkable, but misses reports that trickle in over several epochs. Later epochs require N + 1 even without the author; this deliberately trades recall for not accidentally counting the author.
  • Confirm mode preserves the author's agency, but an absent author blocks the release. Pre-authorized mode releases in the author's absence, but trusts custodians and the authority more.
  • Withheld custody exposes less, but needs the author node at release.
  • A single counting authority is a trust concentration. Evidence commitments, confirm mode and later committees reduce it.
  • Keyed-only counting avoids false merges, but reaches N more slowly than confirmed joins.
  • A public notice speeds discovery, but reveals that the matter exists.

Failure Modes and Mitigations

Failure Effect Mitigation
A correlator leaks protected material Disclosure without consent Custody profile, classification guards, audit; withheld custody; sealed variant later
A node widens the matter to reach N Early release Rule id, version and digest bound in the condition; joins need the candidate author's act
One source republishes or is forwarded Inflated count Distinct source/ref per epoch
The author republishes in a later epoch Self-triggered release N + 1 outside the author's epoch
Coordinated fake sources Release triggered by a group Council admission of sources (P015), an author-chosen N, confirm mode
The authority attests a false count Release on a false basis Evidence commitment and entries for the author and custodian; confirm mode; committees later
Release on an outdated count Release after revocations The authority counts at the commit point under a source status no older than 300 seconds; the residual staleness is stated
Withdrawal and release race Release against current consent The order of durable acceptance by the case authority decides; a later withdrawal does not cancel a committed release
Competing valid requests A valid case frozen as conflicted Requests are ordered by durable acceptance; only contradictory accepted histories are conflicts
The author is unreachable Release blocked Expiry; pre-authorized mode as an explicit choice
Crash, lost response or retry during release A second, stale or re-decided publication One commit slot per original condition and canonical audience digest; outcomes stored by request/id; recovery by phase: the same commit after a lost response, the same bytes and delivery id after the commit, reconciliation after release for delivery
A protected signal feeds a public threshold The matter is exposed coordination/participation defaults to excluded

Open Questions

  1. Multi-epoch accumulation: a longer-epoch profile with longer issuer retention, or a cryptographic cross-epoch linkage.
  2. Evidence that recipients can re-verify without trusting the counting authority, and committee attestation.
  3. Defaults and bounds: maximum N, window length, attestation age and the pre-authorized horizon.
  4. Bounded size and custody of the public verification package. In this v1 design the signed attestation/count and its fixed-size evidence commitment are required public proof; evidence entries remain private. A count-hiding proof would be a different, separately reviewed profile.
  5. How a confirm-mode author stays reachable without exposing a route to the counting authority, beyond pulling over the private exchange path.

Implementation Recommendations

Follow the shared-mechanism dispositions. The following are internal value shapes, not new wire schemas or completed APIs:

ContextEpoch = (profile_digest, issuer, context_digest, epoch)
Contribution = (context_epoch, source_ref, record_id,
                certificate_digest, admission_proof_digest)
CountBasis = (context_epoch, source_status_revision, source_status_digest,
              evaluated_at, eligible_sources, evidence_commitment)
ReleaseSlot = (original_condition_digest, canonical_audience_digest)
PreparedRelease = (release_id, intent_digest, commit_receipt_digest,
                   envelope_bytes, envelope_digest, delivery_id, hand_over_by)

Keep eligible_sources and its evidence private. One bounded map from source_ref to eligible contributions serves both contextual coordination and disclosure counting, within one ContextEpoch. Never count map entries from different epochs or issuers together. Evaluate admission evidence and the P015 current-source rules before deduplicating; repeated copies add no source, and natural certificate expiry does not erase a contribution admitted while valid. If one source has several eligible records, choose a deterministic representative for its evidence entry by canonical record-id ordering, without discarding the other retained evidence. A revoked or otherwise ineligible record cannot replace an eligible representative. Rebuild and incremental updates must agree.

evaluate_epoch_sources yields either a complete, revision-bound basis over its pinned locally admitted view or an explicit unavailable/incomplete result, never a guessed zero. Completeness here does not claim knowledge of all reports in the federation. Coordination uses its own participation filter and emission latch. evaluate_disclosure_condition uses the same source evaluator over the condition's admitted holder view, then excludes the exact author source in the original epoch, or compares the full later-epoch set against checked N + 1. The count supplies no publication right. The authority re-evaluates it at release commit under the same source-status revision fence as eligibility; the triggering attestation is not a cached permit.

Use two typed proof inputs: FullPrivateAnchor and DetachedManifestAdmission. They have different trust claims and meet only after their own signature, scope and binding checks. The shared tail checks the condition, accepted narrowing, confirmation if required, intent, commit receipt, audience and payload binding. The public path consumes only the bounded offline proof package and never calls a private-body loader. P035 owns the receipt carrier and verification adapter; ADC adds its manifest-binding profile rather than a second receipt format.

Release execution uses the LLR case owner: one acceptance reserves ReleaseSlot and binds the evaluated source basis and intent. The executor then freezes the final envelope and its delivery identity before AD hand-over. Recovery reads the saved phase: recover an unknown commit outcome by request id, finish the committed envelope once, or resubmit the saved bytes to AD. It never recounts to replace an accepted commit or reuses its slot. No cryptography, key-provider call or network I/O belongs inside the SQL write transaction; signature preparation and result exposure must preserve the atomic acceptance boundary and be covered by crash fixtures.

ADC-004/005 must exercise duplicate/forwarded records, representative replacement, source revocation, natural certificate expiry, missing status, both epoch bases, two consented rooms, one room over two routes, and commit/withdrawal in both orders. A permutation/replay fixture must produce the same eligible-source set and evidence commitment from the same admitted inputs. Historical M4 counting and ids stay unchanged.

Lean Release Model Before Durable ADC Enablement

Model gate qualified, 2026-11-16; ADC-005 remains todo. LLR-011 now has an implemented owner component with separately qualified source-pinned offline owner tests. The Node report pins 73 checked theorems, 35 executable vectors, 4,096 generated model steps and 18 existing Rust case-law tests. It uses the reviewed S027-009-06 discipline while preserving separate domain laws. The subsequent LLR-011 gate qualifies its implemented owner-decision subset and fenced writes; complete executor/AD composition, comparison and submission/readback remain ADC-005.

ADC-001/004's freeze for this model covers current authority/count/confirmation, canonical audience and exact request/head/intent identities, permitted narrowing and half-open deadlines. It does not close their schemas or runtime rows. The model's request capacity of 64 is a finite proof/test profile, not product policy. Historical qualifications, alpha scope and public readiness are unchanged.

Model and implementation boundary

Reuse the existing whisper-core::case transitions and ReleaseOrder as implementation references, and the LLR-008 owner/outcome store as the target integration seam. Model the full relevant composition, not only the two release flags: accepted head, original condition and permitted narrowing, confirmation, per-audience slots, immutable intents, exact request outcomes and the phase of AD hand-over. satisfied remains derived; condition, prompt and execution are separate state axes. Time, current source basis and authenticated commands are explicit inputs. No new wire schema, store, authority or delivery loop is implied.

The model must distinguish durable acceptance, lost reply, recovery and an unknown AD outcome. Define atomic acceptance and exact retained outcomes as explicit owner obligations, not claims that Lean has verified SQLite or the network. Counts consume ADC-004's scope-bound eligible-source contract; they do not prove source independence, truth or cryptographic security. Keep finite capacity, deadline and revision refusals visible. Persisted negative knowledge and terminal states cannot be replaced with an empty active case on recovery.

Required claims and acceptance

Claim Required proof or witness
Consent is checked at acceptance A fresh commit requires the currently applicable condition, count basis, authority, audience and timely confirmation when required. An earlier satisfied observation alone is insufficient.
Withdrawal has one order Accepted withdrawal before a fresh commit prevents that commit. Withdrawal after a commit preserves that exact accepted slot/outcome while preventing new releases. Both orders have reachable witnesses, including a lost commit reply.
Narrowing cannot widen consent Accepted amendments shrink the set of permitted fresh releases while preserving original condition identity and accepted slots. Raising N, shortening windows, narrowing audiences and switching to confirm are covered.
Slots belong to concrete audiences At most one intent is accepted per original-condition/canonical-audience pair. Two routes to one room share a slot; distinct consented rooms can have distinct slots; an unconsented room refuses.
Recovery preserves identity Matching request replay returns the same outcome without recounting or a second reservation; changed bytes under that request key refuse. Restart/response loss cannot choose another payload, envelope or delivery identity.
Handoff cannot manufacture a second disclosure A first hand-over requires a committed exact intent within its deadline and ordinary AD admission. Unknown outcome is not absence. Abandonment requires the specified evidence and leaves the slot consumed; retries preserve the accepted delivery identity.
Unrelated control does not replace the successor Amendment, withdrawal and release operations preserve the current successor; terminal/conflicted case state never silently returns to active.

P013-ADC-011 closes on checked claims over reachable histories, executable positive/refusal witnesses, explicit assumptions and a source/symbol/fixture map using the S027 pilot discipline. Cover confirm and pre-authorized modes, expiry between attestation and acceptance, both commit/withdrawal orders, two rooms/two routes, changed request bytes, lost responses and restart before AD hand-over. Use concrete counterexamples or distinguishing executable traces for removed audience, withdrawal and replay guards; proof-search failure alone is inconclusive. Do not force noncommuting operations into permutation-invariant laws.

Reuse existing Rust vectors for already implemented shared laws. Comparison with new Rust was outside this original model gate. LLR-011 subsequently qualified its fresh owner-decision subset and real fenced writes; ADC-005 execution/handoff comparison remains open. Their acceptance must compare the pinned model and Rust on bounded generated traces and inject crashes at the actual owner boundaries: before/after acceptance, before reply exposure and around AD submission/readback. All effect authorization and privacy gates remain in force. Neither proof of the model nor matching vectors qualify signature checks, storage atomicity, real delivery, metadata non-disclosure or social independence.

Freeze ADC-001/004 preconditions with this model before enabling durable control operations. LLR-011 then implements owner transitions; ADC-005 composes release execution and closes only after that owner integration. The formal gate depends on contract freezes, not completion of those downstream runtime tasks. This avoids an ADC-005/LLR-011 implementation cycle. S027-009-06 is a prior method review, not a new authority dependency. If the pilot cannot establish a useful bounded method, record a scoped decision before changing this sequence; never silently waive a proof gate or expand it to the whole protocol.

ADC-005 accepted continuation (2026-11-17)

Accepted design; implementation is in progress and ADC-005 remains todo. This continuation supersedes the earlier recipient-manifest, public commit receipt, AD delivery-id and abandonment descriptions where they conflict. The dated ADC-011/LLR-011 qualifications remain evidence for their pinned contracts, not qualification of these revised semantics.

Private origin, audience proof and public commit

The private manifest M retains all original audiences. Each audience A gets a separate author-signed M_A containing only its exact P070 descriptor, condition projection, admitted executors, continuity key, fixed counting authority and case horizon. M contains a secret random 256-bit nonce; its domain-separated hiding commitment C_M is the common original identity. Registration verifies a bijection between M's audience set and the prepared M_A set. S026 freezes all or none; the protected signal does not distribute M_A to every correlator.

One approved release payload has one separately salted commitment C_P, common to all audiences of this condition. The author or admitted custodian retains its opening until release. Different payloads require a new case. The public package opens C_P but not C_M. It carries neither other audiences nor their count, dictionary-testable aliases, private source identifiers or protected body.

The public intent binds C_M, C_P, M_A, the audience, executor, handover deadline, safe package digest and public envelope metadata. A hiding commitment binds the private execution descriptor (component, idempotency key, route and exact plan). Intent.proof must not be an ordinary digest of low-entropy count facts. Release identity is H(release-domain, C_M, canonical-audience-descriptor), independent of route and distinct from the final content-addressed Agora record id.

ADC-004 owns a separate public commit statement and signer domain. It binds the public intent and effective audience restrictions, reports satisfied and its time, and carries no case/source revision, exact observed count, private Acceptance or input digest. Private outcome and exact public bytes commit together; no candidate signature is disclosed before fence completion. The recipient verifies author consent for A directly, trusting the admitted counter for count, freshness, ordering and effective narrowing. Full history is not a portable completeness proof. Cross-room correlation through C_M and timing is an explicit residual disclosure.

M_A's counting authority equals the registered authority and commit signer for the complete case. A different configured signer is dependency loss, not a new domain decision. Ordinary key retirement must honor the case hold. Loss of the key prevents new signed decisions; it does not revoke historical commitments. Author/nym succession does not change this authority. Authority rotation or delegation is a separate proposal, outside ADC-005. Offline receivers cannot discover omitted revocations and assume uncompromised pinned-key custody.

Time, settlement and owner resources

Freeze 60 s minimum handoff, 60 s reply margin, 900 s settlement window, 5 s preparation budget and three stale cycles in the admitted case policy. Registration requires request TTL 125..900 s and release_end + 900 <= case/not-after. The executor selects min(request/not-after - 60, release_end); the prepared reply must survive handoverBy + 60. Static shortage is Never; a shorter available transport/preparer lease is dependency unavailability. Recheck owner time after guard acquisition. The core still requires now < handoverBy: the 60 s host policy only narrows admitted commits. Neither value guarantees delivery.

Each accepted commit reserves one further command result and finite physical resources for that slot's accepted abandonment, independently of ordinary quota and the first-withdrawal reserve. Bad claims cannot consume that reserve. The executor separately reserves its final-envelope and settlement journal space.

The source fence is a non-writing BEGIN IMMEDIATE guard implemented by the relay schema owner. Acquire within 250 ms, reread time, validate the exact pin and deadlines, commit the case through its final fence, then release. Pin scope is the admitted local index even for Synapse; ingestion delay consumes the signed 300 s freshness budget. A pin includes installation/file identity, scope, revision and status digest; copies, restore and file-replacing maintenance need readmission. No source acquisition, signing or sealing runs under this guard.

EvaluationStale is a transport deferral, not a case result. Durably invalidate the undisclosed candidate before reevaluating identical bytes. A bounded record retains request id/digest conflict binding and stale count across restart until request expiry plus replay margin. Each stale cycle charges operation_count but not max_commands_per_case; after the third, return exhausted without evaluation. New request ids still charge the shared operation budget. This deliberately revises the previous frozen-candidate recovery rule, never a committed result.

Executor and accountable abandonment

whisper-case-service::executor::ReleaseExecutor owns the local commit journal, using the existing fenced Store in role adc-executor and projections keyed by adc-execution:release-id. Prepared bytes use existing case object/event/blob mechanics and protected custody, not a second authority or transport retry loop. Owner slots become Committed or Abandoned; unknown, released, delivered and tombstoned are executor observations. Terminal executor outcomes include commit rejected, commit-outcome-lost and unresolved-at-closure. If the exact response lease is lost, do not mint another reply or guess the slot receipt.

The implemented commit stages bind one assessed M_A to the historical source anchor and the executor's signed request. The existing fenced Store holds the exact request, independently expiring response key and prepared PEX packet. The first commit handoff fences CommitUnknown and stores the local AD reservation before exposing any bytes. Replay returns the frozen packet through the reply lease. Verification of both owner signatures precedes recording an accepted result. An unsigned refusal remains diagnostic. An unrecovered reply becomes CommitOutcomeLost at expiry. Final release-envelope construction, AD handover and subsequent settlement still require native composition. These commit stages do not qualify a runtime matrix cell.

AD assigns its delivery id only at admission. Freeze (component, idempotency key) before commit. Before the deadline, exact KnownAbsent allows the same prepared bytes to be submitted; Unknown/Unavailable do not. At/after the deadline, one complete-history AD transaction serializes exact absence, deadline and tombstone against admission. Tombstones cannot be GC'd merely after deadline+skew: without a durable anti-rollback premise that would reopen the identity. Bounded capacity blocks new work; namespace retirement must continue refusing old submissions.

The AD component now reserves the local adc-executor identity with the exact intent digest and deadline in the complete SQLite ledger before domain commit. The executor retains the reservation with its prepared operation. AD serializes first admission and settlement and pins the reservation to the admitted file. The executor verifies domain acceptance and binds the exact release envelope. Component tests exercise restart, both writer orders, the expiry boundary, rollback and missing history. The native executor and runtime cells remain open. See node:artifact-delivery/README.md for custody and capacity limits.

Abandonment changes the owner core, not only host policy. An accepted claim requires Active, the slot's executor signature, exact intent/receipt/submission binding, owner time at/after handoverBy and a Committed slot. The owner trusts the executor's report after its local tombstone; it does not query the remote AD or counter. Extend the existing abandonment command/domain with those bindings, tombstone time and coverage marker. Journal its signed bytes before transmission. The claim promises no execution and reports local absence; it is not proof that nobody obtained the content. Slot consumption is irreversible.

Authentication, saved replay and id-conflict checks precede independent binding and phase checks. Only a sole early-time failure yields NotYetValid/retry-at, without signed case result or prepare entry. Bind the slot receipt, not current head: unrelated amendment and withdrawal preserve it. Closure freezes owner slots and new abandonment becomes Terminal/Never; local AD history can still resolve transport facts without reopening the case. Expired request bytes do not revive. Tombstone plus unknown settlement always replays the recorded claim, never hands the payload to AD.

The pre-enable request now carries only the accepted revision and event digest as the private slot receipt identity. The executor verifies the pinned owner's signature on the private acceptance and binds it to the exact prepared commit bytes before deriving that identity. The event binds the owner's evaluation commitment. Exact count and source observation time stay in the owner record. The public commit statement exposes neither the private receipt nor those facts. An owner regression derives the claim from the actual result and exercises settlement across both a withdrawal and an amendment.

Dependency and qualification ownership

P015-011 supplies finite prepared-output retention. A scoped child of P015-005 must qualify the required publication/manifest tuples and actual issuance, not silently close its whole parent. ADC-001 owns M/M_A, registration bijection and intent contracts; ADC-004 owns actual counting, attestation and public commit; ADC-003 owns holder obligations and every egress canary. ADC-005 consumes those gates, P070 descriptors, P035 admission and the revised ADC-011/LLR-011 model and owner. A schema or arithmetic helper alone closes none of these parents.

First complete a diagnostic end-to-end path, then a fresh pinned qualification. Retain separate evidence for model laws, real owners and the 2x2 matrix (Agora SQLite/Synapse by withheld/held-under-obligation). Compare model to actual Rust, with independent specification vectors, mutation witnesses and axiom audit. Measure commit-to-AD, settlement, guard hold and stale incidence. Model results prove neither cryptography nor filesystem crash recovery. No inference/VM, installation or pull; unavailable native Synapse means not-run and ADC-005 todo. full_candidate_qualified=false and release_ready=false throughout this slice.

ADC-001 protected source preparation checkpoint (2026-11-17)

The existing Node authoring owner now accepts explicit private case.disclosure input on its ordinary operator preview. It checks the exact M_A use in both profile and certificate, canonical payload/Room descriptors/nonweak keys and the default settlement horizon before case-key exposure. The finite encrypted authoring checkpoint reserves independent random origin/payload/audience openings before preview exposure. Case preparation binds C_M into that same source preview without replacing its original source nonce/time.

Explicit Sign prepares the entire signed M_A set and exact signed source in one checkpoint/fence before response. Replay retains bytes and openings; a partial signature failure produces no partial returned set. The public source readback contains neither M, payload/openings nor other audiences. An arbitrary caller-supplied C_M cannot substitute for complete source consent.

This is source-owner implementation/component coverage, not a new qualification. The disclosed component certificate is synthetic; actual issuance/native custody and the full runtime remain separate gates. The finite source checkpoint is not a promised full case-horizon hold or proof of transfer to S026. Complete-consent handoff, source/payload/key holds, public owner publication, executor and all four runtime cells remain open; ADC-001/003/004/005 remain todo. See the Node source contract. Historical qualification sources, bytes and scope are unchanged.

The existing Node original port now supplies the exact authenticated single-audience manifest set as well as its compact basis. Actual full/detached P035 admission and the complete M/M_A/certificate-use verifier precede freezing those bytes. The registration owner rechecks signature and basis consistency, then retains the canonical manifests and release-id/digest map in its existing fenced prepare/final blob graph. Raw signed manifests are not independent certificate/profile authority. Unsupported original adapters refuse before reserving a registration candidate.

Recovery uses the saved set without source acquisition or certificate renewal; exact replay and first withdrawal preserve it with live ports disabled. Private M, payload and secret openings are not copied into this public-consent storage. Owner inspection remains privileged, not a public inventory of other audiences. The experimental record marker changes to public-consent.v1; incompatible pre-enable records refuse rather than acquiring an invented legacy meaning.

This is development component coverage, not clean-source/runtime qualification. Public intent admission, protected execution openings, atomic retention/exposure of the public statement with the private result, source/key/payload holds, actual issuance, executor/cold receiver and all four runtime cells remain open. ADC-001/004/005 and global/public readiness are unchanged. See the Node owner contract. Historical qualification bytes and scope remain unchanged.

ADC-004 public statement contract checkpoint (2026-11-17)

whisper-release-commit-statement.v1 is now the bounded single-audience public contract, with its own reserved signer domain and prepared authority-control selector. It binds the public intent and effective restrictions; it does not export private Acceptance, source/owner revisions, exact counts or private proof identities. The same scalar narrowing law and independent audience binding preserve the author's restrictions. Canonical signed fixtures and actual host signer checks refuse changed authority, public/private field substitution, generic signing and external callers. No authority rotation or default grant is introduced.

See node:whisper-core/DISCLOSURE.md and node:whisper-case-service/ADC.md. These are contract/crypto/signing component checks. Frozen public input admission, atomic public/private result retention and post-fence exposure/replay remain open; a signed candidate alone proves no owner commit, author admission or count truth. The existing prototype intent/receipt must not be exported. ADC-004/005 stay todo, with custody, release executor/AD closure, cold receiver and all four runtime cells still unqualified. Historical model/runtime evidence is unchanged.

ADC-004 local source-count component checkpoint (2026-11-17)

The explicitly adopted node:whisper-intake::adc::LocalAdcCounter now composes actual contextual SQLite admission/complete inventory with the existing shared contribution evaluator and real case-owner source barrier. It excludes the exact original source only in its original epoch, applies the existing conservative N+1 decision later, and retains historical certificate admission. Missing/future/ stale evidence never becomes a guessed zero or a new freshness clock.

The owner now also has a trusted-host proposal port using this same count. It checks current case scope, eligible executor, withdrawal, slot and time before signing a separate private whisper-embargo-attestation.v1 under the restricted signer domain. Source preparation checks it against retained consent and owned executor. The source retrieves a proposal over relayed PEX v1 or offered direct PEX v2 using whisper-adc-proposal-request.v1, which signs the exact exchange and reply key. The signed attestation binds the request digest and returns in a private whisper-case-result.v1 with outcome proposed. Read budget, bounded exact reply replay and the case fence are shared with existing owners. The proposal leaves the case head and slot unchanged. A component history uses the private PEX reply in release commit, with an independent explicit confirmation. Direct preparation requires the already persisted v2 exchange and its live authority-signed offer. The authority processes the exact carried query through its ordered inbox. The source accepts the result from the authenticated authority on the same exchange and carrier.

The canonical private whisper-adc-source-evaluation.local.v1 descriptor freezes exact request/facts, evidence, scope/epoch, finite validity and installed source pin. It is bounded to 4096 bytes and passes Schema Gate; it is neither a public count proof nor a portable authority token. Recovered owner candidates revalidate that pin without recounting. Actual full/detached component histories cover publication races, saved preparation/reopen and unchanged final replay.

See node:whisper-intake/ADC.md for ownership, boundaries and refusal cases. These are development checks under synthetic credential/clock policy, not a clean-source campaign or full ADC-004 qualification. Actual auxiliary issuance, source/key/payload holds and runtime egress, public count/commit statement, AD closure, executor/cold receiver and all four runtime cells remain open. ADC-004 and ADC-005 stay todo; historical evidence and readiness are unchanged.

Counter recovery from committed registration

The ordered owner can reconstitute the original counting identity from the fenced registration and its exact retained profile, certificate, basis and M_A set. A composing host selects the admitted local relay. Authenticated release continuation can recover its counter without private M or a new original admission. A prepared candidate still uses its saved pin, and fresh evaluations still require current source evidence. Completed replay and author controls do not depend on counter recovery. Full/detached development tests cover this boundary, including missing retained material and recovery without recounting. Native adoption, finite custody and the four runtime cells remain open.

ADC atomic public commit component (2026-11-18)

Development component, not full runtime qualification. Executor-signed private release requests now carry the public intent and its private execution opening; these bind the exact retained M_A before a source count is evaluated. The existing owner candidate fixes public statement inputs and effective restrictions. Restricted P037 signing, private result, public bytes, head/slot and settlement hold use one final Store/fence commit. No signed candidate is exposed; failure/reopen preserves the same public preimage, and completed replay does not sign or seal. An accepted release result requires its separate public statement; old private-only outcomes are not upgraded by a default. Controls and abandonment cannot attach the opening.

The control cap remains 4096 B; the derived result cap becomes 11414 B, below the existing 16-KiB CaseResult PEX profile. No Synapse limit is increased. The component reuses exact manifests, the actual local counter/guard and existing owner persistence, not another journal or receipt protocol. Complete safe-public proof production, authority/source/payload holds, executor/AD closure, cold receiver and all four runtime cells remain open. ADC-004/005 stay todo. See node:whisper-core/DISCLOSURE.md and node:whisper-case-service/ADC.md; historical qualifications remain unchanged.

ADC private registration carrier component (2026-11-18)

The private command v1/v2 carries original M and the complete signed M_A set in closed adc/consent, with its canonical digest bound by the continuity-signed registration. Other command families refuse it. Payload and opening remain in the protected source hold and are not registration material. This extends the pre-enable contract in place; ordinary registrations omit both optional fields and retain their bytes. Existing control and transport budgets are unchanged.

The source uses its existing encrypted S026 hold and exact PEX preparation. The ordered service requires explicit composition adoption, independently verifies P035 evidence/source certificate/complete consent and freezes the existing per-case basis, manifests and policy. It does not replace a global original provider. Completed exact replay and first withdrawal remain available without live count/original ports after reopen. Signature budgets include both manifest checks and reconstruction of the scoped certificate.

Development packet/dispatcher tests cover actual encryption/opening, exact binding, default refusal, missing/changed material, bad child signature, no partial case/signature, reopen and immutable handoff. This does not install the native daemon adoption, finite authority/source/payload holds, per-case counter, executor or cold receiver. ADC-001/004/005 and the four runtime cells retain their open status; historical evidence and readiness claims are unchanged. Implementation details: node:whisper-case-service/ADC.md.

ADC source author-control workflow component (2026-11-18)

Implementation component; ADC-005 remains todo. The existing S026 author workflow now freezes and prepares amendment, withdrawal and confirmation with its original finite request interval, exact packet replay and ordered result verification. The operator v1/v2 prepare-adc-author-control action resolves the actual bound case key/anchor/authority/horizon and rechecks custody at handoff. It does not renew a nym certificate, consult a live count, sign an executor command or create another queue. Remote acceptance remains with the case authority; AD custody is not a result. Development checks pass all 292 service tests (one existing exporter ignored), 11 local Schema Gate tests and a native three-control V1/V2 history. V2 requires independent direct adoption plus a signed recipient offer; missing adoption is measured as a refusal. Minimal-trace inspection remains redacted, and synthetic anchor/registration inputs are explicit. These component tests do not close authority-key holds, public/private commit publication, the release executor/AD closure, cold receiver or any full SQLite/Synapse by custody runtime cell. See node:whisper-case-service/ADC.md and node:daemon/docs/RELAY-DELIVERY.md.

ADC author continuity signing component (2026-11-18)

Implementation component; ADC-005 remains todo. S026's existing case-key owner now accepts only a closed prepared author amendment, withdrawal or confirmation. It checks the bound author-byte anchor, actual case public key, original horizon, clock, erasure and fence before returning a signature, independently of a live source certificate or count. Release-commit and abandonment remain executor operations. The ordered case owner still determines effective consent and accepts or refuses the control. No host route, authority-key hold, release execution, runtime cell or historical qualification is established by this component. See node:case-key-service/README.md for tests and convergence boundaries.

ADC explicit source transfer component (2026-11-18)

The existing operator case workflow adds retain-adc-consent with only adopted source profile, certification and authoring-operation references. The host resolves protected source material and local verified status independently; it transfers exact complete consent and approved payload/opening into the existing S026 fenced owner, without a private-material JSON export, fetch or signature. The saved encrypted source-operation binding governs exact retry even when the source's shorter preparation is unavailable. Current actor/root/disclosure and adopted-profile checks remain required; acknowledgement creates no release right.

The source checkpoint and target have separate durability owners. Retained target state resolves a lost response and must never be recreated from current source labels. Actual native key holds, complete egress composition, public statement publication, executor/AD closure and all runtime cells remain open. Development component tests do not promote ADC-001/003/004/005 or historical qualification.

ADC approved-payload retention component (2026-11-17)

The existing S026 consent blob now retains the exact approved release payload and its independent C_P opening together with M/M_A. The pure original verifier checks exact bytes, bounded size and distinct opening before retention and after decode. The source read gate and scoped protection key still control access; these private exports are not a counter projection or permission to release. Replay preserves the first ciphertext and horizon. Missing pre-enable fields refuse instead of synthesizing material. Requester expiry does not erase the longer existing consent hold; the case/replay horizon does not renew itself.

This component does not establish actual protected-source transfer, native payload/key holds, public commit publication, executor/AD closure or runtime qualification. ADC-001/003/004/005 remain todo. Historical evidence is unchanged.

The existing S026 AuthorWorkflow now retains complete M/M_A consent in one bounded, purpose-separated encrypted blob and one fenced owner update. The operation checks the actual source signature/certificate/scope, original binding, case authority/horizon and complete audience bijection. Exact retry preserves first bytes and original time; historical read grants no current release right. Blob references survive actual PEX registration preparation and short requester expiry. Wrong scope/gate, changed consent, failed writes and missing material refuse without substituting a new set. No source body or public hold receipt is introduced. See node:whisper-case-service/ADC.md for the component contract.

These are development component checks, not a new retained campaign. Actual vault/operational leases, protected source/payload holds, atomic source signing, runtime egress composition, real P015 issuance, ADC-004 count/public statement, AD closure, executor and all four runtime cells remain open. ADC-001/003/004/005 stay todo; no historical qualification or public readiness is renewed.

ADC-001/005 private/public contract development checkpoint (2026-11-17)

The new whisper-embargo-original.v1 contains private M; the separate signed whisper-embargo-audience-manifest.v1 carries one M_A. These do not change the qualified P035/LLR whisper-embargo-manifest.v1 contract or signing preimage. Closed whisper-release-execution.v1 and whisper-release-intent.v1 separate private execution identity/route/plan from public release evidence. P070 owns room-release-audience.v1: room identity plus an exact history-policy digest, without routes. The nested consumers share its schema and Rust descriptor.

Domain-separated commitments bind private origin, exact payload and execution using independent 256-bit openings; public intent has no unsalted private proof alias. M_A has its own nonce and signature domain. Complete registration checks require every consented audience exactly once, exact common/header/condition bindings, actual signatures and P015 scope. Current revocations, original-anchor verification, protected preparation and durable registration remain separate. The wrappers do not make those missing facts true by parsing.

A new exact auxiliary use must occur in both profile and certificate: (whisper-release, whisper-embargo-audience-manifest.v1, exact topic/key, single-audience, embargo-audience-manifest). No default gains that tuple. The actual authoring function checks current signing window, fresh status, revocations and signer before signing, then verifies the returned signature. Old manifest and publication grants cannot substitute. P015-005-ADC retains the real issuer composition and qualification gate; the whole P015-005 is not closed here.

Canonical schemas/mirrors and refusal fixtures cover private-field injection, unknown routes, scope, signature/domain, nonce, bijection and identity bindings. See node:whisper-core/DISCLOSURE.md for exact preimages, caps and reproduction. This component does not replace the current owner's private prototype intent, install a real ADC-004 evaluator, freeze an atomic S026 output, or qualify public commit attestation, custody, AD closure, executor/cold receiver or any runtime matrix cell. ADC-001/004/005 remain todo; historical evidence is unchanged.

ADC-004/005 real relay barrier development checkpoint (2026-11-17)

The file-backed SQLite relay provides explicit host source adoption, a durable private inventory pin and an RAII IMMEDIATE writer barrier. The pin binds the adopted instance/installation, actual file, scope revision and status digest. It shares the complete inventory and existing revision check; it grants neither count authority, inventory completeness nor a renewed signed status lease. The one acquisition budget (at most 250 ms) covers mutex and SQLite waiting, with current-pin checks afterwards. The composing case owner samples its final time only after acquisition and retains the token through commit/fence.

Relay schema 7 preserves one installation identity and refuses missing/corrupt metadata rather than reminting it. Verified reopen requires fresh explicit host adoption; unchanged files can retain their pin. Copy/restore or maintenance by file/directory replacement requires readmission. This local mechanism assumes cooperating maintenance, not protection from privileged in-place full DB rollback. It fences the local index for both Agora carriers, not the Synapse homeserver.

Development signed-source tests pass 69 contextual SQLite cases, with one controlled child helper ignored by the ordinary runner; external writers, WAL readers, timeout/cleanup, replacement, restart and process death are covered. Relay migration/descriptor suites and all-target Clippy pass. Owner ADC fixtures still use a synthetic evaluator. Actual ADC-004 count/original composition, M/M_A, custody, public proofs, AD atomic closure, executor and all four runtime cells remain open. ADC-004/005 stay todo. No formal campaign, model/VM or new runtime qualification was performed; historical evidence is unchanged.

ADC-001/005 actual original-port checkpoint (2026-11-17)

The Node AdmittedAdcOriginal now verifies the actual proven P035 registration observation, M/M_A bijection and exact original source certificate before freezing the existing ordered-owner basis. Canonical audience descriptors derive route-independent release IDs. The bounded private whisper-adc-original-basis.local.v1 descriptor binds the exact admission/original and complete manifest set through Schema Gate; it is neither a custody hold nor the public recipient proof.

Actual full/detached owner fixtures register through this port, reopen without live original/count adapters, replay the exact original registration and accept the first withdrawal from frozen state. Missing/changed/forged consent, foreign anchors and unavailable timing/completeness refuse. These component checks do not install the daemon's ADC execution path or qualify private source retention.

S026 atomic source preparation/holds, real P015 issuance, ADC-004 count/public statement, AD close, executor and all four runtime cells remain open. Parent ADC-001/004/005 statuses and historical qualifications are unchanged.

ADC-001/005 signed original-source binding checkpoint (2026-11-17)

The optional disclosure/original field carries C_M in signed protected signal v2/v3 and the separate detached anchor manifest. Both require the complete case commitment. P035 checks their exact equality before detached admission; the existing receipt commits the signed objects without adding a manifest list or private opening. An ordinary source without C_M cannot acquire ADC retrospectively.

The independently verified historical anchor carries C_M, the original source certificate digest/epoch and receipt acceptance time. The registered owner retains these claims; ordinary snapshot/input preimages remain unchanged. The original verifier binds that source to M and the complete exact M_A bijection. Historical publication-time validity is separate from current permission to sign or count.

Actual full/detached producer-to-anchor tests and snapshot refusal/roundtrip checks exercise this component. Source custody, S026 atomic preparation, real scoped issuance, installed original/count adapters, public commit, AD closure, executor and all four runtime cells remain open. ADC-001/004/005 stay todo; this checkpoint does not replace historical ADC-011/LLR-011 qualification or promote readiness.

ADC-005 bounded public release package

whisper-release-proof-package.v1 carries just the signed single-audience manifest, the detached P035 anchor and witnessed receipt, the receipt profile, and the approved payload with its independent opening. The receiver selects its own audience and locally admitted trust. The package contains no original protected signal, homeserver PDU, private acceptance, count, or private route. The public intent binds the exact package digest before commit.

whisper-embargo-release.v1 carries that package, the exact public intent and separately signed public commit statement in the executor-signed Agora record. Preflight checks the selected carrier with the upper bound on late statement and signature bytes. The journal fences the final bytes before handoff and retains them across restart. Carrier checks cover the stamped 49,152-byte SQLite envelope, the Matrix v1 49,152-byte author budget with stamped envelope limit, and the Matrix v2 36,864-byte author budget. Matrix carrier tests do not exercise admission by Synapse.

The development history uses a detached SQLite anchor and actual ordered owner. It verifies the released payload without acquiring the protected original or trusting a witness selected by the sender. Destination admission, native custody, AD handover and the four runtime cells remain open.

ADC-005 reserved AD handoff component

The private execution descriptor binds the host-resolved Agora route plan before commit. AD reserves that binding with the intent and handover deadline. A changed plan cannot admit the old intent. An already admitted execution retains its first plan and AD ID independently of later route resolution.

The journal fences the unknown outcome before submission. A lookup that proves absence before the deadline permits the exact same persisted artifact. A retained admission or durable tombstone fences the corresponding local phase. The adapter owns transport retry after admission. The in-process component histories cover a pre-admission write failure, replay after restart, and a lost response to a successful admission. Confirmation of delivery, daemon custody and the runtime matrix remain open.

ADC-005 signed abandonment component

The journal derives the executor claim from the retained private commit acceptance and local AD tombstone. It fences the exact signed operation, separate exchange and expiring reply key before preparing the private packet. A live packet replays byte for byte. After the request expires, a new operation can report the same tombstone and receipt. It cannot submit the release or recover an earlier result whose lease has expired.

The in-process history couples the real SQLite AD settlement and ordered case authority through PEX with controlled time. It rejects a foreign executor key, restarts at the control and packet boundaries, renews the expired claim and records an owner-signed acceptance after exact reply replay. This measures local components and their private handoff; daemon routing, host custody, authenticated closure readback and the runtime matrix are separate open gates.

ADC-005 source-barrier and stale-recovery development checkpoint (2026-11-17)

The case owner now separates publication predicates from acquisition of an RAII source barrier. Missing adapter support refuses. Signing/reply preparation are outside it; final time, retained pin and lease checks follow acquisition. The token lives through Store commit and its final fence. Full evaluation is not rerun under the barrier or when recovering a pending candidate. The owner supplies a 250 ms acquisition budget; real relay enforcement and durable instance/installation/file/scope/revision pins remain ADC-004 work.

Stale publication atomically deletes its candidate, records a bounded technical cycle/digest binding and charges the shared operation window. It changes no accepted head or signed outcome and cannot use settlement reserves. Restart preserves the three-cycle limit and cross-operation request-ID conflict checks. Cleanup failure blocks the owner until verified reopen. The same bytes can be reevaluated only after durable invalidation; the fourth stale-cycle attempt does not evaluate. Saved final results retain exact replay. Technical history uses existing finite Store limits and the case/replay horizon.

Typed local workflow responses and relay diagnostics distinguish transient evaluation-stale from terminal evaluation-stale-exhausted; neither is a signed case result. Five new component histories cover acquisition delay, fence lifetime, missing guard, cycles/restart/conflicts/budgets and cleanup failure. Their source pin/lock is synthetic, not real relay qualification. The inspected signer audit receives no signature or raw control. ADC-004 adapters, privacy proofs and actual execution remain open; ADC-005 stays todo.

The private snapshot now requires a guarded-publication contract marker. Older strict readers refuse the new shape; new readers do not upgrade old prototypes by default. Diagnostic regression passed 17,699 model/Rust comparisons, twelve independent histories and 330 scoped Rust tests, including 35 signed ADC owner histories (one existing exporter ignored). The marker-bearing owner suite passed again directly, 35/35; two focused daemon adapter tests passed. Schemas and source mirrors include positive local errors and negative case-result fixtures. No full runtime, new retained campaign or readiness claim is made.

ADC-005 frozen-registration development checkpoint (2026-11-17)

The existing case owner now has an explicit host composition entry, register_adc, which freezes the independently verified original, finite release policy and empty projection with registration. Ordinary registration does not authorize a later ADC retrofit. Pending registration recovers its exact policy/proof; restart or configuration changes do not renew it. The private pre-enable snapshot requires the policy, with no guessed migration. Default settlement/TTL checks run before preparation or signing. The current short-clock component fixtures explicitly choose a shorter test profile; they are not evidence for the default 60/60/900-second runtime profile.

Static handoff/reply shortfalls are retained permanent refusals; a shorter actual response lease is unavailable, not a consent refusal. A fresh final time and the actual sealed lease are checked before publication, using the registered TTL/horizon. First withdrawal needs no live count/original adapter. This shares the existing owner/candidate/Store/fence machinery. It does not qualify M/M_A admission, remote policy disclosure, the relay guard, real ADC-004 adapters, stale-cycle recovery or release execution. ADC-005 remains todo and all historical qualification scope remains unchanged.

Diagnostic checks passed 17,699 model/Rust comparisons, twelve independent specification histories and 324 scoped Rust tests, including 30 named ADC fixtures. One existing exporter remains ignored; the new strict policy roundtrip test passed separately. The runner requires the exact reviewed execution-name inventory, with missing/duplicate/substituted/ignored controls. Core/owner all-target Clippy and global retention checks pass. No new formal campaign, retained qualification or release-readiness claim is introduced.

ADC-005 executor-claim development checkpoint (2026-11-17)

The current pre-enable v1 request replaces remote-AD evaluation for abandonment with the executor's signed exact intent/receipt/submission claim, tombstone time and coverage binding. The owner authenticates an admitted actor independently of the supplied slot fields, then applies the revised active/committed/deadline law. It trusts the executor report; a coverage digest is not independent proof of AD absence. Owner phases are only committed/abandoned. Current private intent fields are not yet the recipient-safe public intent required by ADC-001.

Valid early claims return a typed time deferral without candidate, result or operation charge, even at full ordinary quota. Bad binding is a retained refusal before that deferral. Expired bytes do not revive and future issue time is included in retry-at. The original slot receipt survives author withdrawal or amendment; closure freezes new claims and exact saved results remain replayable. The local operator workflow schemas v1/v2 preserve an explicit retry-at, without minting a signed case result. Full executor/remote deferral handling remains an execution integration obligation.

The model separates owner settlement from executor closure. Exact absent AD history proposes closure; only an exact completed closure establishes a local tombstone. Settlement and tombstone stickiness lift to finite histories, and concrete guard mutations cover receipt, authenticated actor and tombstone. Development checks cover 102 audited theorems, 53 named vectors and 4096 trace steps; actual axiom union is propext/Quot.sound. The actual Rust decision adapter covers 17,699 comparisons and twelve independent expected histories. The scoped Rust entry passes 318 tests including 24 signed ADC fixtures, with one existing exporter ignored; the daemon retry-at projection test passes for both local workflow versions. All-target core/owner and daemon-library Clippy pass. These are current worktree checks, not a new clean-source retained qualification or proof of crypto, AD closure, custody or filesystem recovery. Historical ADC-011/LLR-011 evidence retains its pins/scope; ADC-005 remains todo.

ADC-005 native environment checkpoint (2026-11-17)

The resumed implementation uses integrated Node d13029149 / Orbidocs 871068e3 as its base. P015-011's finite-authoring retention gate is now done in its separately qualified scope; ADC consumes that contract rather than reimplementing it. ADC's own source-custody use still needs qualification.

An initial pure host-policy implementation lives in node:whisper-core/src/case/adc_policy.rs, with eight offline contract tests. Defaults are 60 s minimum handoff, 60 s reply margin, 900 s settlement window, 5 s preparation budget and three stale cycles. Registration arithmetic requires TTL 125..900 s and release_end + settlement_window <= case/not-after. The executor chooses handover no later than request expiry minus reply margin. Static handoff/reply shortage is Never; shortening only by the available reply preparer is dependency unavailability. Canonical result schema and Node mirror carry adc-handoff-window-short and adc-reply-window-short; transport evaluation-stale is not a case-result reason.

The host-policy helpers are not yet installed in the owner. Policy snapshots, revalidation after guard acquisition, durable stale accounting, revised owner/executor models and actual release composition remain open. This checkpoint does not promote ADC-001/004/005 or supersede the qualified historical LLR-011 behavior. Time arithmetic is not a promise of delivery.

The owner component correction reserves one command result for each committed slot and checks that capacity before preparing a new commit. Ordinary commands cannot spend it; valid settlement survives a full command/operation budget and restart without accumulating preparations on signer failures. The owner's admitted principal is retained independently of its replaceable signer: fresh mismatched-signer decisions are unavailable, while exact history remains readable. Three added actual-owner fixtures cover these boundaries. At that checkpoint the synthetic abandonment port and old model were still in use. The executor-claim component above supersedes those boundaries; the full runtime remains open. The diagnostic comparison entry passes 15,636 model/Rust comparisons, eight independent specification histories and 304 scoped component tests, including 18 ADC owner fixtures. No new clean-source qualification or formal evidence campaign is claimed; previous qualifiers and proofs retain their scope.

The storage-quota extension adds a finite fenced hold per accepted slot, consumed only by its settlement or released by closure. Even terminal writes preserve other holds. Object/event/byte quota, exact pending-basis readback, rollback and process-kill boundaries are tested in the existing Store. Format two preserves verified no-hold v1 facts/head preimages during a metadata-only upgrade; active holds use a distinct root domain and predecessors refuse them. This is quota protection, not disk preallocation or a claim against physical I/O failure. It does not install registration policy, revise abandonment/model laws or qualify execution. The diagnostic entry passes 15,636 model/Rust steps, eight independent specification histories and 312 scoped Rust tests, including 19 ADC fixtures; one existing exporter remains ignored. The ordinary-path read-only observer recognizes both store formats, with 37 scoped Python tests. Historical qualifiers retain their source pins and bytes. See the current Node checkpoint.

Implementation checkpoint, not release execution qualification. The current Node launcher has an explicit --native-only gate and a read-only JSON preflight in tools/matrix-fixture/synapse/native_preflight.py. ADC qualification requires bare-metal Linux, a local Unix-socket Docker engine and both exact profile images already installed. macOS refuses before Docker or fixture-state writes; missing virtualization detection, containers and uncertain observations fail closed. The launcher and Compose services prohibit automatic pulls. Missing software or images need a separate operator decision.

The measured macOS result is not-run/virtualized-runtime. Seven new gate tests and 23 existing fixture-setup tests pass offline without a service. This closes only the environment-gate implementation fragment. It does not qualify Synapse, payload custody, public proofs, owner revisions or release execution. The matrix axes remain Agora carrier (SQLite/Synapse) and custody (withheld/held-under-obligation). ADC-005 stays todo while required Synapse runtime cells are not-run; historical P035 evidence is not a substitute. The preceding stage-0 evidence is unchanged.

Pre-executor stage-0 corrections (2026-11-16)

Before ADC-005 enablement, correct the model/owner/AD prerequisites. The current model permits exact authoritative AD absence to restore unknown to committed strictly before handover expiry. Only the same accepted intent and execution identity may then be handed over. At/after expiry absence permits abandonment; unknown/unavailable never implies absence, and admission cannot be undone. Confirmations are stored per canonical audience and admitted only in confirm mode. Narrowing pre-authorized to confirm therefore requires fresh confirmation. Permanent withdrawn, occupied-slot and expired refusal codes have retry Never. Original retained registration verification is independent of live evaluation; a first withdrawal cannot require the current counter or AD service.

AD reuses its existing exact input/first-plan bindings for the release schema, refusing changed bytes under the same component/idempotency key. Volatile history cannot establish absence; ADC enablement requires complete durable SQLite. Missing historical binding or incomplete recovery is unavailable, not permission for another execution. Deadline/admission/absence serialization remains an ADC-005 integration gate, not a theorem about the pure model.

Independent specification vectors cover recovery-table obligations and explicit state edges in addition to model/Rust equality. Model-only executor witnesses do not qualify the absent runtime executor. Historical ADC-011 and LLR-011 reports retain their exact bytes and original scope; see node:docs/audits/P013-ADC-STAGE0-2026-11-16.md for corrections and current tests. ADC-005 remains todo until real ADC-004, source custody and executor acceptance.

ADC-005 live counter adoption checkpoint

The daemon can now select the local ADC counter for an already admitted case registration through explicit adoption of the live Agora SQLite index. The relay retains ingestion, migration and recovery. The companion reads the exact inventory and holds the existing short writer barrier through the case commit. The adoption binds the installation, file and named local instance. Replacing the index requires readmission. For Synapse the pin covers the local ingested index; freshness and homeserver completeness remain separate checks.

A focused owner test exercises real retained admissions, a frozen candidate, restart recovery without recounting and exact replay. ADC-004 and ADC-005 remain todo pending native registration and custody adoption, executed release and cold verification, and the runtime matrix.

ADC-005 native registration and key hold checkpoint

The native authority profile can explicitly adopt ADC registration alongside the adopted counter. The ordered owner authenticates the request and verifies the original source and exact per-audience consent. Before a candidate is written, the identity owner durably holds that exact signing key through the case horizon. Its bounded record keeps the greatest horizon for the current key. An interrupted attempt can conservatively leave a finite hold. Ordinary rotation preparation and identity bootstrap use the same lock, including when the case role is disabled. A caller's prepared time cannot end the hold. No entry stores private key material.

Fresh ADC decisions check the configured provider against the pinned authority before changing case state. Exact historical replay is independent of current signing and renewal of the hold. Component tests exercise the registration failure before candidate creation, same-byte replay, native rotation refusal, loss/reopen and monotone recovery.

The native registration probe also completes PEX/AD ingress and opens the authority's signed reply for FullRecord and DetachedManifest. Both use actual signed P035 receipts in a synthetic federation and the default ADC policy with the 900-second settlement window. The daemon saves the original binding, both audience manifest digests, the owner policy and the key hold. The hold still applies after shutdown. The relay provenance is a fixture at the native ingress boundary. Source/payload custody, native execution and cold verification, and the four runtime cells remain open. ADC-004 and ADC-005 stay todo.

ADC-003/005 source custody at executor preparation

S026 source review can explicitly select the detached form with case.disclosure["source/detached"]. Its review digest binds the selection before any signature. The author needs the exact P015 detached and audience manifest tuples. The explicit signing operation fences the auxiliary and the protected signal with the private manifest set. The signal binds the exact signed auxiliary digest; both bind the same hiding commitment and case. P035 still owns witnessed admission and detached projection. Local readback of the signed auxiliary does not grant custody, register the case or count as a qualified runtime cell.

The P036 owner pins the receipt profile on opening reservation. The witnessed detached capture keeps the original horizon and can store the public proof without the protected signal. S026 can then prepare an exact encrypted registration with the already bound continuity key and protected consent. Authority-side admission and delivery across independent processes remain part of the runtime gate.

The S026 source owner constructs the protected package for one retained audience under independently adopted P035 trust. The source custody port must observe the owned author node in withheld mode or the named custodian's finite obligation in held-under-obligation mode. The source checks the signed holder and executor lists and requires coverage through the case horizon. It keeps the complete private original and other audiences at the source.

The executor first-write boundary checks and preserves the exact custody binding in its encrypted journal and rechecks the lease before commit to disk. Component tests connect the encrypted source and executor stores with a fixture custody port. The native host must still supply the actual custody observations, held handover and end-to-end delivery. ADC-003/005 remain todo and runtime qualification remains open.

Signed registration policy

The private ADC registration acceptance carries a signed adc/registration snapshot with the original commitment, the frozen release policy and the effective request TTL. The snapshot comes from the same fenced registration candidate as the case row. Recovery and exact replay preserve the original policy. Ordinary registration and subsequent acceptances omit the snapshot.

Before preparing an execution, the executor verifies the acceptance for the case authority, checks the case and original against its release proof and intent, and uses the snapshot for the handoff window. It pins the acceptance digest in its encrypted journal. Recipients of the public release receive the separate commit statement and the authorized release proof. The policy snapshot does not attest custody or complete any cell of the runtime matrix.

Source-local withheld preparation

The source role adopts explicit ADC execution routes by canonical audience and uses the independently adopted registration trust. The local operator can invoke prepare-adc-execution with a stable request ID, route, signed private proposal and the retained registration and manifest references. The daemon checks the local executor identity, verified registration, live finite Memarium proof lease and exact local route. It transfers the single approved payload and opening internally from the S026 owner to the fenced executor journal. The executor selects the handoff window from the signed policy and constructs the public intent and salted private descriptor. Only the internal P037 node operation signs the commit, within its reserved signing domain. The journal pins the exact signed bytes before an acknowledgment identifies the release and local phase. Exact replay returns the same exchange without signing.

The source-local withheld path now includes an explicit handoff-adc-commit for relayed PEX v1 and offered direct PEX v2. The journal fences the exact control packet and local AD reservation before enqueuing transport. Its exchange locator routes the private case result back to the executor. The response's transport custody is distinct from the signed owner commitment and the later release submission. Reply lease exhaustion records a lost outcome independently of current egress permission. For direct v2 the journal retains the exact recipient offer with the packet. The authenticated reply must come from the named case authority and match the durable direct exchange. After the accepted reply, handoff-adc-release reobtains the frozen audience, route and carrier from the executor journal. The host signs the verified Agora envelope with the admitted executor's node key. The journal fences the signed bytes before submitting the existing AD reservation. Retained admission returns the original AD run; established absence before the deadline permits submitting the same bytes. At or after the deadline the local ledger can persist a tombstone. The operation returns only its local phase and, when admitted, the AD identifier. Agora verifies the complete carried proof before SQLite HTTP admission or Matrix reception. It resolves the expected audience and history policy from local adoption, including the observed Matrix room on that carrier. The receiver reads only local observations concerning the carried receipt. The Matrix origin verifies the carried proof before atomically storing the publication with its adopted physical room, carrier and author bytes. Retry uses that room and never resolves an alias; an unpinned historical release request cannot be forwarded. Custody at a separate node and the four runtime matrix cells remain open. ADC-005 remains todo.

Optional Confidential Affiliation Review

Proposed post-MVP addition (2026-11-04), independently tracked as P013-ADC-010. The P015 profile owns the proof and privacy contract. Whisper consumes a scoped finding, not the author-to-participant mapping. This profile is optional for each signal author; it is not a prerequisite for ADC-000 or existing alpha/MVP gates.

During confirm, the releasing author may inspect other signals or affiliation results only within their separately authorized view. Being asked to confirm a release grants no access to other authors' protected bodies, root identities or assessment inputs. The subject author of each checked signal must consent before assessment and separately authorize who may see which result fields. The releasing author's request for context cannot supply that consent on their behalf.

The purpose is to support a human decision about this payload and audience, not to certify absence of bait. Display relationship-confirmed, not-found-in-scope, indeterminate and the local not-assessed state with their P015 meanings and coverage/time limits. No badge means no conclusion, not independence; declining assessment carries no penalty. No finding automatically changes eligibility, source counts, rankings or publication rights. Any future counting policy would need its own explicit proposal and acceptance, not a UI rule.

For example, a confirmed employment relationship to the institution may describe both an interested spokesperson and a whistleblower with direct knowledge. The interface must not label either as deceptive. It may help the releasing author decide to proceed or decline under the existing confirmation contract. Absence of affiliation evidence does not make a coordinated trap safe.

Reuse ADC-008's editor/view, P015-007/008's verifier and result semantics, existing classification/redaction and authorization owners, and P013-PEX-001 for private exchange. Host-side read admission precedes projection; UI, Agent, exports, notifications and other clients must consume the same authorized projection. Do not add an Agora-indexed affiliation record or public proof field to the embargo manifest/release. The assessment result has its own narrower recipients; consent to release the rumor never widens access to that result.

Public labels are excluded from this first profile: even a minimal flag can identify the sole employee in a small group. Show only authorized granularity; otherwise withhold the result without exposing a sensitive reason. Respect P015 expiry, accepted withdrawal and correction through the existing lifecycle owners. An old signed finding is historical evidence, not a permanent live badge; already disclosed information cannot be made unseen. Never revive an erased issuer mapping to refresh a result.

The main trade-off is useful context versus an additional disclosure and trust concentration. The initial supported relationship/evidence scope and assessor recusal policy remain P015-007 open decisions. This profile does not introduce cryptographic protection against the assessor itself, nor does it resolve collusion or psychological intent. Safe context review remains possible without affiliation assessment, using material already shared with the deciding author.

Author Disclosure Condition Tracker

P035-019 freezes the minimum whisper-embargo-manifest.v1 proof input before this runtime: exact authorized publication-use tuple, certified nym key, profile and certificate digests, case continuity-key digest, canonical public authority principal and bounded case/not-after. P015-005 owns issuance authorization; LLR-006 owns the case key. The manifest precedes the signal, whose private fields must match; the receipt attests those checks. This prerequisite does not close ADC-001's condition/release/amendment contracts or any ADC execution gate. P035-019 qualified that synthetic detached producer and cold OS-isolated inspection on 2026-10-29. The witness attestation remains distinct from an independent hidden-body check; see node:docs/audits/ACCEPTANCE-P035-019-2026-10-29.md for the bounded claim.

All rows are post-MVP todo unless marked otherwise. The grouping row closes only on the composed Story 014 variant run.

ADC-001/005 also freeze and qualify the embargo row of the portable verification matrix: minimum public proof, exact bindings, numerical byte/item/depth/work limits and disclosure policy. ADC-005's completion requires a producer/consumer test with all allowed proof bytes carried, independently admitted local trust and a network-denying resolver whose fetch counter remains zero. Reuse P032's common law fixtures and compare evidence-access/accounting helpers with LLR-009 at whichever implementation lands second. That is a convergence checkpoint, not an execution dependency of ADC-005 on LLR-009.

ID Task Status Depends on Completion gate
P013-ADC-000 Story 014 disclosure-condition variant acceptance todo P013-ADC-001–008; P057-017; P015 Gates A and B; P015-005; P013-PEX-001; P013-DFR-001–004; P013-DFR-006 One retained run of the variant proves S014-A12–A21 and its assertion-to-task matrix. Canary scans cover queries, Agora, AD copies, notifications and logs. Required cases include receiver verification without private-body retrieval, separate correlator and counting authority, two rooms versus two routes, later-epoch author present/absent, both commit/withdrawal orders, pre-authorized expiry, declined-prompt suppression, lost commit response and restart before AD hand-over.
P013-ADC-001 Freeze embargo manifest and condition contracts todo P015 v2 signal; P015-005; P013-LLR-006; P035-019 Private and single-audience manifest contracts, whisper-embargo-condition.v1, whisper-release-payload.v1 and amendment through whisper-case-adc-request.v1; apply the accepted continuation, including hiding commitments and registration bijection; acyclic manifest -> protected signal -> admission receipt construction, one anchor/at most one original condition, identical key/authority/case-lifetime commitments and closed public proof fields. P035 admission verifies their equality, supporting LLR-009's detached anchor proof without a new signature carrier. Preserve original condition identity through narrowing; widening creates a new case without silently withdrawing the old. Explicit authorized holder set; role-bound custody; per-descriptor consent. Golden and refusal fixtures cover offline verification without protected text, forbidden proof fields, substituted manifest/payload/authority/case lifetime, widening, unknown fields and expiry. LLR-006 owns the key contract; this row consumes it. Development component: reference-only source transfer now binds complete protected consent/payload to the existing S026 owner. Explicit detached source preparation binds the signed P035 auxiliary to the same reviewed original. The P036 profile-bound capture and S026 encrypted registration are checked together at the component boundary. Independent-process custody and clean-source runtime qualification remain required.
P013-ADC-002 Grouping rules, descriptors and similarity keys todo P013-DFR-001 Grouping rules in the vocabulary document with typed fields, canonicalization and rendering templates; whisper-correlation-descriptor.v1; the domain-separated key derivation with golden vectors; a version bump on every normalization change; warnings for local rules; the breadth choice rendered for the author. Reuse one vocabulary-bound normalization/key function for authoring, notice creation and holder validation; display rendering never feeds the hash, and semantic-model suggestions never bypass author approval.
P013-ADC-003 Correlator custody obligations todo P013-ADC-001; S018 The whisper-embargo-custody:v1 profile and its advertisement; classification-based refusal on every listed egress surface; bounded custody retention; a canary test for each surface.
P013-ADC-004 Counting and attestation todo P013-ADC-001; P015 Gate B; P013-PEX-001 Per-epoch counting with exact original-epoch exclusion and conservative N + 1 thereafter, with author-present and author-absent fixtures and UI effective-threshold explanation. whisper-embargo-attestation.v1 for proposal evidence, separate whisper-release-commit-statement.v1 and restricted signer domain for the public committed result, status freshness, publication receipt and counting at commit. The private proposal contract, restricted signing, real owner count and local source verification are implemented alongside the separate public statement and atomic owner publication. Relayed PEX proposal retrieval is wired and exercised at the component boundary. Direct source retrieval and source/custody/executor/cold-receiver runtime qualification remain required. Share bounded primitives between full-private and detached-public verifier paths; recipient verification never fetches protected text and explicitly trusts the admitted counter. Independently verifiable counts remain a separate open design. Reuse the contextual contribution evaluator with separate coordination/disclosure policies; qualify permutation/replay parity, duplicate sources and evidence-representative replacement without altering M4.
P013-ADC-005-00 Model, owner and AD prerequisite corrections done P013-ADC-011; P013-LLR-011 Repair exact-absence recovery, audience confirmations, terminal refusal classes, independent retained-original verification and exact AD submission identity; independently specified expected outcomes, axiom audit, actual owner and AD concurrency/restart tests. See stage-0 scope. 80 audited model theorems, 40 vectors, 15636 comparisons including eight independent expected histories, 293 core/owner and 176 AD tests. Executor and full ADC-005 acceptance remain open.
P013-ADC-005 Release execution todo P013-ADC-003–004; P013-ADC-011; P013-LLR-011; P070 Apply the accepted continuation: confirmation/commit/abandonment use whisper-case-adc-request.v1, with separate public intent, public commit statement and release contracts. Revise ADC-011/LLR-011 semantics and requalify; historical gates do not transfer. Public statement binds pre-commit intent, not its own final envelope or private owner revision. Qualify all four runtime cells, reserves, exact reply loss and bounded stale recovery. Slot/logical release id binds original condition and canonical audience digests; Agora record/id remains content-addressed. Same room/two routes uses one slot; two consented rooms use two; unauthorized room refuses. Atomic count/consent/slot acceptance, both commit/withdrawal orders, pre-authorized withdrawal/expiry after attestation, per-request outcomes, exact-byte replay, lost reply and crash before AD hand-over; AD unknown never means absent. Abandonment leaves the slot consumed. Offline recipient package verifies without the protected signal; closure evidence follows Story 014. Use LLR-008's acceptance owner; P013-LLR-011 owns durable enablement of these control operations and the shared prepared-output recovery laws; no parallel embargo case database or AD retry loop. After the ADC-011 model gate, compare new Rust behavior against the pinned model and qualify actual owner/AD crash boundaries; model proof alone does not close this row. The explicit source-to-S026 transfer, role-closed S026 author-control signing, atomic public/private owner publication, private slot receipt recovery, and fenced preparation of the commit and release envelope are implemented as local components. The detached package verifies under independent local trust in the cold component test. The reserved AD handoff, exact outcome recovery and signed abandonment run in the local component fixture. Native registration retains the authority key and now supplies the signed registration policy required by the executor. The local withheld preparation and relayed PEX v1 commit handoff compose the source, executor journal, private relay and owner result. The native release operation fences the signed Agora envelope before exact local AD admission. The independent SQLite HTTP and Matrix receiver gates resolve locally adopted audience, destination and witness policy before accepting the carried proof. The Matrix origin durably pins the approved physical room and exact carrier before dispatch. Direct PEX v2 proposal retrieval uses the same retained offer and ordered inbox as other case controls. Direct commit handoff retains the signed offer in the executor journal and uses the bound peer reply path. Custody at a separate node, live release delivery, authenticated closure readback and all runtime matrix cells remain open.
P013-ADC-006 Context-join proposals todo P013-ADC-002; P013-DFR-004 Content-free whisper-context-join-proposal.v1 from correlators to candidate authors, only under keyed-and-confirmed-joins; acceptance authors a related signal in the target context; model output stays advisory. A fixture proves that no context merges without the candidate author's act.
P013-ADC-007 Optional public correlation notice todo P013-ADC-002; P013-DFR-002; P015-005 whisper-correlation-notice.v1 is signed under an explicitly admitted publication tuple, content-free, expiring and discoverable through the term bucket. The editor warns about disclosure of the matter. Related signals point to the public notice record/id with a closed target kind; no hidden signal id is required or leaked. Tests refuse wrong kind/schema/topic/scope tuples and verify a notice-only reader can author a related signal.
P013-ADC-008 Author condition editor and status todo P013-ADC-001–002; P013-DFR-003; P057-017 Render N and its effective epoch threshold, public criterion and proof disclosure, window, concrete audiences, mode, authorized holders, notice and coordination participation. Keep condition, proposal and per-slot execution states separate. Declining suppresses that proposal across restart; no renewed prompt without an explicit retry or consented bounded policy. Show widening as a new independent case and withdrawal as effective only after authority acceptance.
P013-ADC-009 Sealed pre-threshold confidentiality deferred P013-ADC-004; cryptographic review A mechanism in which no correlator can read protected material before N sources exist, for example threshold or escrow-style encryption. It needs a separate, proposal-grade review.
P013-ADC-010 Optional private affiliation context at disclosure confirmation todo P015-007–008; P013-ADC-008; P013-PEX-001 Reuse the bounded result verifier and one host-authorized projection for UI/Agent and other consumers. Acceptance includes separate consent by the checked author, no-consent/unavailable paths with no penalty, no access to protected peer bodies, employee-as-whistleblower and employee-as-interested-party cases without an intent verdict, limited coverage/expiry, swapped-result refusal, small-group identification risk and no leakage through Agora, release proof, exports, logs or notifications. Existing counts and release authority stay identical with the feature absent, refused or unavailable; authorized context informs only the human confirmation decision. Offline synthetic fixtures qualify semantics without claiming live affiliation verification; private delivery composes the separately qualified P015-008 path.
P013-ADC-011 Lean release-ordering model before ADC-005/LLR-011 / Whisper domain owner done S027-009-06 pilot review; P013-ADC-001/004 contract freezes; P013-LLR-008 contract Meet the model gate: reviewed executable state/assumption map, checked reachable-history proofs for consent/order/narrowing/slots/replay/handoff/successor preservation, positive witnesses and guard-mutation counterexamples. Reuse S027 proof discipline and existing case laws without sharing domain authority. Pin contracts, model/toolchain and existing Rust fixtures; the subsequent LLR-011 owner comparison/qualification is separate, and ADC-005 executor/AD qualification remains open. No dependency on their completed runtime, no alpha expansion and no change to historical qualification.