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Ordered case authority and private exchange

Adopted: 2026-11-04. Qualified: 2026-11-07 for enabled LLR-008 operations, LLR-007 synthetic-v2 first consumer and the independent PEX-001 single-relay profile. Production issuance, full LLR-009 and P015-011 authoring retention remain separate.

Executive summary

LLR-008 owns ordered acceptance; LLR-007 is its first consumer. PEX-001 and the single-relay S010 profile have independent transport/privacy gates. Historical anchor validity, AuthenticSuccession, authority acceptance and current permission are separate results. None merges source identities or grants publication rights.

Context and decision

The implementation has three layers: pure whisper-core::case, an autonomous whisper-case-service SQLite owner, and stateless PEX family adapters in whisper-intake. The consumer owns a separate CaseKnowledge store and uses the same pure head-comparison/fold laws. Authority persistence uses temporal-event-log, exclusive writer locking, synchronous=FULL and external custody-fence time/revision heads; it does not use a second JSONL or checkpoint journal.

Only node:did:key authorities are enabled. Producer preparation refuses other principal kinds before exposing a commitment. The committed authority and local trust admit a key; a carried key never admits itself. Key rotation leaves old acceptances verifiable but cannot sign new acceptances for the old principal.

Registration and historical basis

Revision zero is an explicit continuity-key-signed registration and signed acceptance. It binds exact anchor evidence, authority, audience, original horizon and one basis: after, none-observed-closed, or none-observed-fresh. Reuse the pure P041 completeness predicate with use-specific trust. Fresh means an open epoch, a usable Collection status in the exact scope/minimum revision, and issued/at at least committed/at plus profile skew. Before refuses permanently; incomplete knowledge requires new evidence. Snapshot-relative LLR-002 history is unchanged.

A detached registration supplies the manifest certificate and status/closure roles separately from P035's unchanged detached material. P035 already binds the author and manifest certificate before and after commit. The verifier relies on the admitted witness for invisible body checks and never fetches that body. Disclosure of certificates and revocation lists needs current audience policy permission.

Registration is evaluated once. Later requests use its saved basis and head. Later verified Before evidence suspends effects immediately and causes terminal anchor-invalidated closure. Persist negative evidence even when the signer is unavailable; never mint fresh active status during suspension. Replay preserves old accepted facts. The consumer states whether it checked the basis independently or relies on an admitted authority's signed registration.

Order, replay and conflict

All operations have a table entry: register, succession, amendment, withdrawal, confirmation, closure, release-commit, abandonment and anchor-invalidated. ADC preconditions stay with their actual adapters; absent adapters refuse rather than supply permissive stubs. First succession requires AnchorAuthor; later succession CASes predecessor against the effective successor. Stale predecessor is retryable only after evidence changes, with a new request id. Other operations do not change the successor. Withdrawal after release does not undo an irreversible release.

Under the sole-writer lock: read head, evaluate, persist only unsigned preparation, sign, prepare reply in memory, atomically commit event/head/result/sealed reply, then expose. No signature-bearing candidate is persisted or logged before commit. Recovery resigns identical unsigned bytes only with unchanged head and valid TTL; a committed result is replayed byte-for-byte without signing or sealing again. Unauthenticated traffic reserves no request id. The outcome key is (case/anchor, request/id), bound to the exact request digest.

Conflicted requires signed contradictions: two events at one revision, two head identities at one status revision, or a lower revision issued later than a known higher revision by more than skew. An older/earlier presentation is stale-status, not conflict. A refreshed timestamp at an unchanged head is not equivocation. Local database rollback is a local integrity error. CaseKnowledge persists negative knowledge with the consumer decision; restart cannot restore old permission.

The recipient records whether registration relies on the admitted authority's basis or on an independently verified P035/completeness evaluation. If local policy withdraws authority-only reliance, current use refuses until explicit independent evidence strengthens that basis. This update preserves the existing head, negative knowledge and original horizon. A locally verified later Before proof commits its refusal and exact proof holds without an authority callback. It does not forge an authority-signed closure or alter the observed authority head. If verified Before evidence causes registration refusal, that refusal still commits the negative observation and its proofs, including at first admission. Later presentation of older positive material cannot undo this knowledge.

Recipient continuation decision

The recipient supplies its own saved exact source-status proof to presentation verification. It commits high-water knowledge, scoped source conflicts, proof holds and the final continue-case decision together. The local closed projection whisper-case-continuation-decision.local.v1 keeps case and source currency as separate axes; an allowed result requires both. This point-in-time decision grants no publication right and never merges source identities or counting units.

Original independently admitted registration completeness is not renewed on each use. Current policy still applies; later Before evidence remains terminal. A pair of incompatible signed revision-zero events is durable authority conflict. P015 source equivocation instead stays scoped to that status stream and retains its exact proof pair; it does not manufacture a conflict of the case authority.

A future signed source status can establish high-water knowledge, but no positive source result exists before its issued/at. The recipient checks its owned time and fence after persistence and withholds an expired positive decision. The effective case deadline includes any already known shorter same-issue lease. An effect owner rechecks time/fencing at execution; stored positive decisions are not permission caches. First source revocation/conflict has reserved negative-write capacity. A later negative-proof capacity failure records a bounded local suspension; subsequent use requires retaining the exact pending evidence. This is a dependency failure, not an authority or issuer assertion, and older input cannot clear it.

Saved results and audience reads

The closed whisper-case-result.v1 reports one accepted signed acceptance or a stable typed refusal, its retry class, exact request id/digest and decision time. A refusal is diagnostic, never portable negative evidence or authority. Positive claims rely on the embedded signed acceptance. The exact sealed result is stored with its outcome; replay neither reevaluates the request nor reseals the reply. Expired request/certificate material does not revoke the retained exact-request replay right. Delivery of its stored ciphertext remains limited by the separately committed handoff deadline; expiry does not trigger resealing or reevaluation. A changed authenticated request under the same scoped id conflicts; invalid traffic is rejected before it can reserve an id or reveal a saved result.

whisper-case-status-request.v1 is an audience-member signature over the exact case/authority, request id, short owner-checked interval and response-key digest. It uses orbiplex.whisper-case-status-request.v1\0 and canonical unsigned JCS. The key digest is SHA-256 of the raw exchange-scoped X25519 response public key. The current audience, independently committed authority and response recipient are checked before a cache hit or new signature. All did:key principal kinds in the admitted audience prove their own Ed25519 key; they are not authority signers. No transport peer becomes a reader by implication. New status and response preparation are budgeted; response encryption is preparation only, with no I/O.

Commands and audience reads share the scoped request-id namespace. Ordinary status signature work has a finite window budget and cache per current head. One signature and one prepared response for a terminal head may use reserved capacity; additional fresh read ids cannot consume the terminal storage reserve. Recovery of an unsigned command preserves signature-budget observations made by intervening reads. Saved refusals remain refusals after a budget window changes; a new authenticated request id is required for a new decision.

The authority's accepted-operation limit is derived from the finite case horizon, operation-window length and permitted operations per window, plus registration. Admission also reserves objects, events and bytes for negative knowledge for each admitted case. The byte reserve covers the complete bounded resolved negative-evidence token, including additional local status history, plus bounded snapshots/facts, control documents and one prepared response. The recipient reserves that complete token and its local refusal independently; carried role counts alone do not size it. Global physical-storage failures remain dependency failures, not a persistence guarantee from a logical reservation.

Accepted material identity

Succession acceptance binds the exact historical successor certificate, profile and status used for its decision. Let H be SHA-256 encoded as sha256: plus unpadded base64url and let every array below use JCS v1. Their order is fixed:

  • anchor-identity = H(JCS([author-nym, author/bytes-digest, continuity-key-digest, status-authority, canonical-case-not-after, federation, context-digest, profile-digest, receipt-digest, detached-witness-or-null]));
  • certificate-evidence = H(JCS([certificate-digest, profile-digest, status-at-acceptance-digest]));
  • succession acceptance inputs/digest = H(JCS([anchor-identity, succession-digest, certificate-evidence])).

All element digests address exact signed bytes. The registration acceptance's inputs/digest equals the original signed registration request's inputs/digest; its request digest addresses those exact request bytes. Another valid receipt cannot silently replace the receipt or witness admitted at registration.

The receiver verifies the original control at the signed registration acceptance time and the succession at its own exactly bound acceptance time, never at the artifact's self-declared issue time. Succession acceptance cannot predate registration, and a case status cannot predate the succession it names. These three timestamps share one authority's clock. Across the P035 witness/authority boundary, registration cannot precede the receipt's commit time by more than the profile's admitted clock skew; no new constant or lease extension is introduced. Current successor status remains a separate role and cannot replace the bound historical snapshot. Conversely, the authenticated historical snapshot is already known evidence: an explicitly older current role cannot roll it back. Historical and local observations are folded by the existing P015 scope/revision/negative knowledge laws before current source use. Exact status/certificate signatures are reused across roles, without caching a positive time-dependent permission. An expired current certificate or later revocation does not rewrite successful historical succession authentication.

Presentation profiles and budgets

LLR-007 freezes whisper-case-succession-presentation.v1; LLR-009 qualifies that frozen schema later. Carried supplies required proof bytes. Referenced carries succession, registration, both acceptances and case status and resolves other roles only by exact digest in an explicitly supplied local store. Missing is unresolved; bad carried evidence cannot be hidden by good cached evidence. No network resolver.

The role table in the presentation schema is normative. Anchor statuses have three slots in one scope. Successor status at acceptance and current successor status have separate slots/scopes, deduplicated if identical. One shared profile, two certificates, one receipt (including delegation), at most two anchor closures, one full anchor or manifest, one succession and four bounded control documents have a decoded maximum of 2,805,760 bytes (2740 KiB), including 32 KiB metadata. The second closure is conflict evidence, not a second successful closure.

Carried JSON is bounded by 4 MiB; referenced JSON by 64 KiB. The sealed PEX artifact is independently bounded by 5 MiB and must pass an encoded-maximum test. Each control document is at most 4096 canonical UTF-8 bytes. Total signature work is at most 32, including local resolution. Role maxima and sums are compile-time assertions. Oversize, foreign scope, cycles, substitutions and unknown uses refuse; never trim a signed status. P035 retains its own 2/4 MiB bounds and P015's private exchange codec remains unchanged. Large artifacts use AD streaming.

Privacy and owners

Every new case family requires relayed delivery without downgrade. The bounded S010 profile uses one relay with independently admitted per-hop INAC authority; only the final recipient opens the end artifact. Neither origin metadata nor a stable origin transport id reaches destination domain facts, logs, trace or metrics. Return handles bind recipient, family, deadline and byte budget. Retry rechecks privacy. Missing relay/onion provider refuses before transmission. The relay knows its neighbors and timing; collusion/global observation/onion guarantees are outside this profile. Gate D uses three loopback-only local processes.

PEX binary sealed profile

whisper-private-exchange-header.v1 is the closed JCS header of a binary artifact: "orbiplex.pex.v1\0" || u32be(header-length) || header || ciphertext-with-tag. The NUL is one zero byte. Header length is at most 464 canonical UTF-8 bytes. Ciphertext is binary, with one 16-byte XChaCha20-Poly1305 tag; it is not wrapped in another whole-artifact base64 layer. The maximum is 4,194,803 bytes, below 5 MiB. The structural header maximum does not imply that every combination satisfies the stricter family/time laws. All owners retain their narrower domain deadlines.

Family Recipient role Plaintext maximum Transport TTL ceiling
case-registration authority 4 MiB 900 s
case-request authority 4 MiB 900 s
case-result requester 16 KiB 900 s
case-status-request authority 4 KiB 900 s
case-status-response requester 4 KiB 300 s
case-presentation-carried audience 4 MiB 900 s
case-presentation-referenced audience 64 KiB 900 s

Every family requires single-relay hard-fail privacy. These TTLs bound transport custody, not domain authority or status leases. KDF info binds the codec domain, family domain and exact header; HKDF salt is the bounded opaque exchange handle. Use existing X25519/HKDF-SHA256 and XChaCha20-Poly1305 primitives. The header binds recipient-key digest, fresh ephemeral key/nonce, family, handle, issue/expiry and plaintext size. It contains no source node, peer identity, case/record id or public plaintext digest. Low-order keys, noncanonical bytes and mismatched independently expected family/handle/role/recipient refuse before plaintext release.

Requester reply keys must be scoped to an exchange and admitted from the protected request/workflow; an origin node key is not a private reply route. AEAD encryption authenticates bytes for a recipient, not sender authority. Domain owners still verify signatures, access and payload schemas. The codec owns no durable state and performs no handoff; an owner persists its exact prepared ciphertext before AD. Its component tests do not qualify a concrete relay, host admission or Gate D.

Portable registration input binding

Registration request and revision-zero acceptance inputs/digest equal the immutable anchor-identity defined above. The exact P035 receipt commits author, certificate, profile and admission-snapshot bindings. This input identity excludes evaluator trust, first-seen/provenance and later completeness observations; source, authority and recipient may independently admit different trust inventories.

The authority separately retains its basis-evaluation digest and exact proof references, which include the actual local completeness, trust and observations used for its decision. Signed AnchorBasis remains the admitted authority's claim; a consumer choosing independent evaluation applies its own evidence and trust. Later valid Before evidence remains terminal regardless of unchanged portable anchor identity. This correction affects the unreleased LLR foundation only; frozen P035/P015 evidence and earlier source pins are not rewritten.

Authority command carrier

whisper-case-command.v1 is the closed authority-input carrier for case-registration, case-request (succession), and case-status-request. It binds the family, signed-byte case anchor, random exchange handle, raw canonical base64url X25519 response public key, one exact base64url native control and carried digest-addressed evidence roles. It contains no route, peer, sender-node identity, URL or acquisition reference. The destination independently admits its own authority/trust policy; neither encryption nor a carried key grants authority. The native status-read signature also binds the exact raw response-key digest.

The evidence roles reuse the presentation's exact-byte role limits and resolution mechanics, with separate command completeness: registration needs full record or manifest, receipt, anchor certificate, profile and status. Succession carries only the profile, successor certificate and acceptance-time status; the authority uses its originally admitted fenced anchor claims, without reevaluating registration. Closures are optional registration conflict/completeness evidence. A status read carries no evidence. All supplied items are checked; a bad attachment is never hidden by another copy. Command resolution has no local-store or network fallback. Detached supplements remain separate LLR roles, without widening frozen P035 detached material.

The maximum decoded command is 1684 KiB, derived from shared role maxima plus 8 KiB control and 32 KiB metadata. The carrier ceiling remains 4 MiB (status reads retain their 4 KiB family ceiling); the shared complete-evaluation limit remains 2740 KiB/32 signatures, including independent local observations. Base64 and packet/seal framing retain their own bounds. These are structural ceilings, not a claim that contradictory closures or incomplete evidence are admissible.

A previously committed result may replay from possession of the exact native request control before expired proofs are resolved. A new command without complete material refuses without reserving an id. Saved replay never repeats historical verification, signing or sealing. Initial admission and current local negative knowledge remain separate owner decisions.

The destination adapter binds the admitted delivered AD header to the PEX family, random handle, exact interval and recipient before dispatching native command bytes. It receives no origin peer identity. Request/response associations are one closed profile table used by both source and destination. The deterministic return packet is prepared only from the authority owner's committed token: result bodies bind the exact native control digest; status bodies bind the case. Its lease is bounded by the stored inner ciphertext and original request, without resealing or extending either. AD treats the forward deadline as the return-capability ceiling; the response packet may expire sooner. Packet expiry removes its transport copy while the consumed-response identity remains until that original ceiling. Cleanup cannot restore the right to choose another response. Header framing establishes no native authorization or current AD policy by itself. Authenticated host installation and retained qualification remain separate from this source component composition.

Direct-profile custody before owner processing

For the separately adopted direct/minimal-trace execution profile, transport custody and native acceptance remain distinct. The existing authority owner may reserve exact command bytes with a private transport-accepted-owner-unprocessed receipt before dispatching a native operation. The receipt is a frozen custody snapshot, not proof of an active case. It does not escape through AD's reduced transport status or authorize a signed response.

Current authenticated sender/recipient-role and key-lease admission precedes any saved-result lookup and remains held across custody. Recipient, sender and exchange bind one exact offer and command; changing the native request id inside that exchange refuses. These transport keys do not reserve native case ids against other peers before native authentication. Exact bytes and the receipt share the existing domain store/fence commit; no parallel inbox database, transport retry worker or PEX record store is created. Pending requests use ordinary bounded capacity, leaving terminal reserves intact. Their deadline cannot exceed the native command or offered exchange deadline; duplicate reads never extend it.

The same owner also freezes exact unsigned recipient offers before protected signing, and exact signed bytes before disclosure. Recipient/sender/exchange bind the complete input, including the reply key and original absolute request ceiling. Retry after signer recovery, restart or a lost response never picks another issue time, recipient key or longer lease. Current local admission is mandatory before readback and effects. An unavailable signer leaves the original unsigned preparation; a failed signed commit withholds output. A previously committed offer replays without signing again, without granting native case rights. New offer requests fit the authority's adopted request TTL (at most 900 seconds); the offer and retained slot share the original absolute request deadline. The original request therefore remains expired after pruning. This bounded idempotency horizon does not promise perpetual exchange-id retention: a new host operation requires a fresh explicit exchange handle.

The reference P037 port fixes the internal caller, node-self key and whisper.exchange-key.offer.v1 policy tag through a closed selector of the existing internal node-control operation. Both domain and raw prefix refuse generic signing, including another otherwise authorized domain. External callers cannot invoke this internal operation; the native case-control type still refuses a recipient offer. Signatures retain the existing orbiplex.whisper-pex-key-offer.v1 prefix/JCS preimage. A wrapping configuration refuses; it does not try another framing. The direct opener uses the same protected agreement provider as the independently scoped relay path. No generic signing operation, new listener or private-key export is introduced.

The reference native authority now installs this component seam through a separately adopted, expiring named-peer direct profile and an operator-only offer preparer. The existing AD runtime's independently registered minimal receiver shares the authority's zero-capacity executor and store with its relayed role; there is no synthetic relay header or fallback from a denied relay. Peer-scoped receive reads only committed original offers and cannot mint or sign one. Its reduced transport result still means pending custody, not native acceptance. Native component tests supply bridge identity and structural command signatures; actual two-node direct AD/INAC, Memarium protected-signal custody and the new Gate A remain unqualified. Historical single-relay and synthetic-v2 case results retain their original scope.

Source workflow and requester-key lifetime

The S026 workflow commits an exchange-scoped random requester key and independent random handle before returning public preparation. Repeating the same immutable intent returns those values, never a replacement key. The native signed control, exact evidence and admitted response recipient are frozen before packet preparation. Current disclosure/privacy and owned time are checked both before commit and immediately before handoff; AD alone retries the exact saved packet. Transport custody is an independent fact and cannot regress a received result.

Short request keys/packets and historical result metadata have separate original horizons. Request expiry never extends the case horizon. A completed exact result may be read during the case/replay window without the requester key; this is historical information, not a cached current permission. The source verifies the native authority signature, exact request/case/operation, accepted time and registration-input binding after AEAD decryption. An unsigned refusal remains a bounded diagnostic and cannot preempt a later signed acceptance or establish negative case knowledge.

A private audience read uses the owned nym key, not the originating node key. Its closed signing intent binds the case, committed authority, reader, short original deadline and exchange-scoped response public key. The source first persists the unsigned request and observed time in its encrypted workflow. Signer or packet preparation failure resumes the same preimage; completed preparation replays the exact packet without signing or sealing again. The authority rechecks current audience membership even when its status cache hits. This separate read right neither requires nor revives publication authority. The protected host nym lease reuses the owned clock/fence and rejects rollback or expiry around signing.

A scoped operational-root lease may protect private source-workflow metadata and short requester seeds. It must not derive or recover the independent case continuity key. No private requester seed is serialized into domain JSON or exported by a generic signing API. Expiry and reference collection prove local application reachability only; they do not revoke filesystem copies or constitute forensic erasure. Explicit source-role adoption now installs that root lease and finite owner in the daemon. Its protected operator API accepts already signed controls. Complete host signing composition, recipient/audience adoption and retained PEX/LLR qualification remain separate work.

AD single-relay packet profile

The AD transport owner carries the end-sealed PEX artifact in a binary packet: "orbiplex.ad-relay.v1\0" || u32be(header-length) || JCS(header) || opaque-body. Local AD circuits and receive routes distinguish exchange/mode: request-response (the omitted legacy default) and explicit one-way. The latter requires an empty response family and zero response-byte budget, creates no return capability and reserves only its forward packet. Its opaque handle is an idempotency identity, not a response grant. The persisted mode/circuit digest prevents later policy changes from upgrading an existing one-way binding. Unknown or non-string mode values and contradictory fields refuse. This local policy extension leaves packet/header bytes, PEX profiles and existing request/response serialization unchanged. Audience presentations use the one-way profile; native authority requests retain scoped request/response. Destination admission returns no reply route for one-way, and source/relay/ledger checks refuse returns.

The closed artifact-delivery-relay-header.v1 binds direction, random 32-byte base64url return handle, family, issue/absolute expiry and body size. Only forward may name a configured circuit; return and delivered forbid it. The canonical header maximum is 443 bytes, within the 1024-byte framing allocation. The whole packet ceiling is 5 MiB. No origin identity, endpoint, origin grant or causal trace is copied into the delivered packet. Circuit/neighbor knowledge remains private to the origin and relay; the destination config admits only a relay and families.

A configured circuit binds independently admitted hop targets and grants, separate forward/response size limits and a finite TTL. The relay atomically commits the exchange mode and exact onward custody in the existing AD ledger. For request/response it also binds one response to the authenticated destination, allowed family, original expiry and exact body; one-way has no such right. Same-byte retry recovers that plan; changed bytes conflict. The domain owner persists its exact prepared packet before enqueue, without regenerating its header/ciphertext on retry. The AD owner is the only transport retry owner.

Capacity accounts for live transport bindings and reserved logical ciphertext bytes, including one bounded response only for request/response. This is not physical database allocation. The explicit local classification of opaque transport bytes passes existing INAC egress policy at admission and retry; it never authorizes inner plaintext release. Receiver domain authentication/disclosure remains separate.

Maintenance logically expires prepared transport copies and return capabilities at the original deadline, without discarding domain history. Active transfers are withheld from sweeping. HTTP clients may not impersonate the authenticated INAC source adapter. First-hop acceptance is durable relay custody; success still requires the final domain's receipt. The maximum-size component composition uses an injected session boundary. A separate source probe (2026-11-05) uses production WSS/TLS/3DH in three independent loopback processes with real AD/INAC and explicit fixture-domain receipts. It covers source restart with exact prepared bytes, a lost post-custody push acknowledgement and bounded raw-store/trace privacy scans. These source probes do not close PEX-001/S010 or the full retained Gate D; the real domain adapter and the remaining family, route policy, expiry and negative vectors remain pending. An explicit restart-bound daemon courier profile now binds every relay hop to the owned node, requires finite capacity, installs the runtime before peer admission, and creates no outbound or domain permission. Authenticated INAC source provenance cannot be supplied through HTTP, including under an incorrectly configured source allowlist. This courier adoption is not a claim of installed authority/source/recipient workflows or completed Gate D. The L2 authority recipient now calls the existing protected P037 node DH port, checking its pinned principal/key metadata before and after agreement and its owned clock/deadline before exposing opened command bytes. The static key stays with the existing provider; the common crypto transcript is unchanged. Component coverage uses the real P037 engine with structural command fixtures, including cached-key rotation, revocation and post-call clock/expiry refusal. This port is now installed by an explicit restart-bound daemon authority role. Adoption supplies finite receiving routes, independent CaseAnchor trust and owner policy; it creates no outbound or implicit INAC permission. One lifecycle-owned native thread opens commands through P037, executes the actual SQLite/fenced dispatcher and enqueues the committed exact response into AD. Its rendezvous has no pending queue; a busy authority returns retryable and AD alone retries. Effect and reply ceilings cannot exceed the received PEX lease. Signed candidates and ciphertext stay withheld until the owner commit.

The authority now owns P015 source floors alongside its decisions, instead of relying on a caller to remember them. Positive knowledge is atomic with the acceptance using it; a verified issuer contradiction persists independently and cannot silently be healed by a higher revision. This source-axis refusal is not case-authority equivocation. Pending unsigned registrations consume case capacity. Host-triggered, one-case maintenance resumes pending negative closures when the signer recovers, independently from read traffic. Historical basis and saved exact replay keep their distinct semantics.

A source component probe uses the actual daemon, P035 producer, P037 and native owner for full/detached registration and prepared AD return. Its relay provenance is an explicit in-process ingress fixture and its v2 nym credentials/statuses are synthetic. It does not qualify real WSS audience delivery or an OS-denied cold consumer. The source is now independently adopted through a finite restart-bound profile, current disclosure/private-route policy and per-call unlocked S026 root lease. Its closed host-owned operator API checks session and current operator authority before Schema Gate, protected input or Vault; middleware cannot inspect or rewrite its namespace. Actual source handoff and signed-result receipt share the authority executor mechanism, with separate domain owners and AD-only retry. Component tests compose real Vault/P035/P037 with full/detached anchors; native authority and authenticated return ingress are explicit fixtures. Registration and succession still accept already signed controls. Native status-read and audience adoption are described below; complete host signing, active control adapters and the full retained gates remain pending. No tracker closure follows from these probes.

The native prepare-status-read adapter now composes the existing S026 owned-nym port. It freezes the reader, sorted audience hint and unsigned preimage before key use; Vault owns key possession and observed-time fencing. Membership remains an independent authority decision, not a consequence of the supplied hint or a publication certificate. Saved preparation replays without another nym lease, signature or seal. The actual Vault-mint/native-sign/AD-enqueue component vector uses explicit synthetic council discovery and makes no private status-response transport claim. Registration and succession signing composition remain open.

Prepared request handoff also rechecks the current named circuit against the owner's frozen domain recipient and forward family/direction. Another currently allowed route to the original authority cannot authorize a saved circuit that has been remapped elsewhere. This is an in-memory dispatch binding over existing saved metadata, without a wire change, new sealing operation or retry owner. AD independently retains current transport-policy enforcement.

The source workflow now persists an encrypted per-case head/negative view in the same transaction as the authenticated result and requester-key retirement. It shares the pure status fold and head comparator, not authority or recipient lifecycle. A bounded per-revision index retains signed acceptance contradictions after head advance. A later request cannot extend the original horizon or weaken the fixed skew basis. Old active results cannot override known closure/conflict; future signed knowledge is retained without earlier permission. Late terminal proofs independently block source effects without classifying ordinary old status replay as equivocation. Historical exact result reads remain available. Existing rows without this new projection do not synthesize current permission. This is source-owner component coverage, including restart and an injected failed commit, not private audience handoff or cold Gate C. Disclosure, audience membership and final effect authorization remain separate. Convergence review also found and fixed the recipient counterpart: a late signed terminal proof is held independently of its high-water head and blocks later positive decisions across restart. The first negative hold uses reserved capacity; a status beyond admitted future skew cannot create it. The original stale refusal and conflict taxonomy stay unchanged. No older head replaces the newer one. The convergence disposition retains the distinct source view within the existing S026 owner/store; no new persistence engine, PEX retry or case-history authority is introduced. Full provider/composition work accounting remains Gate E.

The S026 source now also owns a separate one-way audience lifecycle in its existing bounded SQLite/fence store. An exact opaque presentation token binds canonical bytes, reader, admitted policy and evaluation time before sealing. Its signed acceptance/status facts and source head commit together; preparation failure resumes the frozen basis, and exact committed packet replay never reseals. Current policy and a finite lease from the material-disclosure owner bound each handoff. A shortened lease or advanced source head refuses older prepared output. Closed evidence remains deliverable without granting a current effect. No reply key, return grant, PEX store or transport retry is introduced.

Component composition uses actual P035/P037/PEX and the recipient owner for full/detached × carried/referenced × node/nym audience. It covers restart, lost preparation/final commit, current policy/lease changes, a later head, terminal history and expired current successor permission. Authority/transport ingress remain explicit fixtures. Native source-audience API and the real material-owner egress lease are not yet adopted; private AD delivery and cold Gate C/D remain pending. Indexed source controls reuse this owner's prior authenticated/fenced fact without repeating signature work or exposing a deserialized verified-token constructor. This does not close any tracker or qualify the full work budget.

The source-adoption convergence review shared the actual zero-queue executor and closed delivered-frame preflight across authority/source adapters. Stores, trust, root leases and domain admission remain with their distinct owners. Both consumers are recorded in the Node re-use index. The prepared-output persistence law remains a candidate for extraction when a real ADC-005 adapter exists. Cryptographic sealing already has two consumers (P015 and PEX); their separate byte contracts and shared primitives are assessed below.

The one-way AD regression covers memory/SQLite/reopen, response-reservation absence, mode changes at retry and finite expiry. The shared three-process WSS/3DH/AD/INAC probe separately observes an audience-family fixture at its recipient, no return output, source restart/exact-byte replay, lost custody ack and raw privacy scans. Destination control reuses the actual AD ReceiveRoute without origin/circuit fields. This remains fixture-domain component transport, not installed recipient/private-nym or full Gate D qualification.

The protected node-audience opener now binds the delivered AD family, role, handle, exact interval and recipient before the P037 key call. After decryption it checks canonical closed presentation structure and profile/family agreement. It grants no membership or action. The installed command port and audience port reuse one protected node-self agreement mechanism with separate principal rules; local recipient rotation is dependency loss, not case-authority equivocation. A real P035/P037 component composition reaches durable CaseKnowledge in all four full/detached × carried/referenced variants. Restart re-evaluates current input; a still-decryptable carrier cannot replay an expired permission. Source audience workflow, actual AD audience handoff and cold isolated qualification remain pending; no gate closes from this adapter composition. Native daemon mode: recipient now adopts the owned node's protected P037 key, independent receipt/authority/profile policy and actual CaseKnowledge. Only the two presentation families have admitted one-way routes; no response or outbound permission follows. The lifecycle-owned zero-queue executor holds the sole writer directly, with SQLite/FULL and a separate fence. Domain receipt records processing, including a saved refusal, rather than a reusable permission. The PEX lease is checked around decision work; no transport peer enters the case facts.

An explicit local source is either absent or existing Memarium custody. The latter resolves current classification and exact anchor bytes together with the holder's own first-seen observations. Missing proof remains unresolved; provider, policy and integrity failure cannot become successful absence. Capture disablement does not disable existing reads. Payload horizons/erasure and the omission of private detached text remain Memarium's law; no new payload store, acquisition operation or exported first-seen authority is introduced. Full/detached × carried/referenced native component probes use real daemon/P035/P037/Memarium and recipient persistence/restart with explicit authenticated-relay and authority-reply fixtures. Source/audience workflows and actual host signing, cold isolation and retained A–F qualification remain open. The current one-role incarnation configuration is an implementation limit, not a prohibition on participants acting in several roles. No tracker closes from this checkpoint.

The native recipient can now explicitly select protected S026 nym custody. Omission preserves the owned-node configuration/paths. A named custody profile, certification id and nym principal only locate a key: the current active local Vault must independently prove possession. Framing precedes provider access; AEAD/structure is followed by another custody check and a final owned-time check using the existing fenced watermark. Missing/retired keys do not remint or fall back to node identity. Read membership remains independent of publication rights. The temporary agreement uses the nym principal's Ed25519 public conversion, not P015's separate exchange-reply key. No raw DH/signing/export operation or root recovery slot is introduced. The custody profile neither admits a source certificate nor relaxes the strict case-context law.

Each nym scopes its own CaseKnowledge store and fence. Selecting another audience does not erase old state or reset its horizon; inactive-scope retention still requires qualification. Actual Vault framing/clock vectors and a native nym-domain composition reach real P035/authority/CaseKnowledge with controlled time and an explicit delivered-frame fixture. Full source audience/control composition, private transport, cold isolation and retained A–F remain open. This checkpoint closes no tracker and does not broaden hard-MVP or P015-005 claims.

The re-use review retained separate domain owners. The ADC-005 checkpoint concerns prepared-output transaction mechanics, not the already shared crypto primitives.

Memarium is the sole protected-record store. S026 workflow owns exact prepared requests; LLR-008 owns exact accepted results and sealed replies; CaseKnowledge owns consumer decisions; AD owns transport custody and retry. PEX owns no durable state.

Trade-offs and failure modes

A status lease is at most 300 seconds, shortened by policy, and never refreshed by receipt time. Missing/current-future/stale material cannot authorize. Authority acceptance implements the existing AcceptanceTimeVerifier for historical evaluation; current certificates/status and fences are checked separately at use. Same-context succession does not implement authority or context transition.

All dependencies are explicit: signer, store, AD/INAC and privacy provider. Missing dependency refuses new effects; saved results remain readable under access checks. Result reads require exact authenticated request bytes; status reads require signed audience proof bound to the response recipient. Other callers cannot discover case existence. Case authorization never depends on the transport peer identity.

Retention and effects

Acceptance is transactional-withheld; replay is an idempotent read; status issuance and AD handoff are irreversible-external. Exact output and audit precede handoff. Original case/not-after bounds all operations. Import/replay does not renew it. Finite policy budgets cover live cases, bytes, events, replies, work and replay. Reserve closure/invalidation/conflict capacity before registration. Expired replay returns expiry, not reevaluation. Ciphertext handoff retention and proof/history retention have separate horizons. Proof holds never prolong private payload life.

Withdrawal of a native runtime role does not suspend these horizons. Previously adopted physical owners remain subject to the same scope, time and revision fence and existing-only maintenance; cleanup cannot bootstrap fresh domain state. A bounded host locator catalog is not another domain fold or an authority source. Unknown unregistered history stays protected. A locator may retire only after verified domain/audit emptiness while the external fence remains. Active writers retain their ordinary maintenance and exclude inactive maintenance. This runtime mechanism is documented in node:whisper-case-service/README.md; its component checks do not close the independent clean-source A-F gates.

Open boundaries

P015-011 closed finite full-record case/non-case authoring retention on 2026-11-17; see the owning contract. Legacy rows keep unknown retention. Private detached readback and the exact replica isolation exception remain separate; primary retirement stays blocked. This proves neither global source-payload erasure nor root-recovery erasure.

P015-005, ADC runtime, LLR-009 full qualification, LLR-010 context/authority transition, onion routing and global/physical privacy remain separate. Synthetic v2 certificates in acceptance do not qualify production issuance. No power-loss, whole-machine rollback or global copy-erasure claim follows.

Implementation stages and acceptance history

The dated checkpoints below retain their then-current source and dependency scope. Current P015-011 full-record closure is stated above; it does not renew those historical qualifications.

Implement contracts -> pure core and PEX/S010 -> durable owners -> LLR-007 -> independent A-F acceptance. Review, fix and commit each stage on the feature branch; no merge or push. Gate C requires cold OS-network-denied consumers plus counting adapters. Gate D permits loopback only and proves actual admission rather than queue success. Qualifiers test mutations and extracted evidence. Before retaining evidence, apply current retention/retirement/external-retention policy and record owner, classification, inventory/hashes, holds, retention, recovery/replicas; unknown remains unknown. Source and evidence commits are separate. Done requires each owner's gate.

Memarium now exposes a separate host-local finite disclosure lease for a concrete node/nym audience. It checks current private classification and the original material/profile horizons around provider work. Full-record requires the retained payload; detached leases only public proof material, never its private author bytes. Local case-knowledge inspection is not an egress decision. Real custody component vectors cover erasure, distinct horizons, exact expiry and a policy change during owner work. Native source-gate/API adoption now consumes this real port as described below; cold/transport gates and all tracker closures remain open.

Native source configuration now separately admits a closed optional audience policy: independently selected receipt trust, authority/profile sets and explicit end-recipient-to-one-way-circuit mappings. A nym principal is not its transport node. The declaration has finite cardinalities; duplicate recipient/family choices, missing mappings, return budgets and unsupported kinds refuse. Legacy source serialization is unchanged when omitted. This is an unreleased local configuration extension, without changing signed artifacts. It does not itself grant disclosure or outbound authority. The native audience API now separately adopts the real S026 one-way owner and current Memarium disclosure lease.

The authenticated operator workflow offers audience-begin/prepare/handoff/read. Preparation accepts direct nested presentation JSON, rejects duplicate fields and excess depth before Vault access, and binds exact bytes to independently admitted reader policy. Saved preparation resumes its committed evidence basis without new resolution, signature work or resealing. Each handoff checks current retained material/profile horizons, classification, source head and concrete recipient/ family/circuit mapping. Historical custody metadata is not a disclosure lease. Full payload erasure stops new full-record handoff; retained detached public proof has a separate horizon and never discloses private author bytes.

These additive unreleased local-workflow v1 extensions preserve legacy branches, signed artifacts and historical schema pins. Native component composition covers full/detached, carried/referenced and node/nym recipients using actual Vault, Memarium, P035/P037, AD enqueue and a durable receiver decision. Authority and relay ingress plus recipient key agreement remain explicit fixtures. Native host signing, private transport, cold-process A-F and independent tracker closure remain pending; transport custody alone proves no domain delivery.

A presentation's current successor assessment now folds all signature-checked anchor statuses from the exact same cumulative P015 scope, including holder-local custody observations. Different epochs remain separate. Weaker current-role attachments cannot hide that high-water or a later revocation. The recipient commits the effective source proof with its refusal and preserves it across restart, while historical succession authenticity and the shared signature budget remain unchanged. A refused cursor advance preserves the prior revocation proof, including when a larger revision omits cumulative revocations. This has full/detached and carried/referenced component coverage; independent native transport/cold gates remain open.

Native authority adoption now permits an explicit owned-node recipient attachment with independently admitted knowledge policy, witness trust and material source. The roles share one transport incarnation under its original finite combined route/config/AD budget, while retaining separate SQLite/FULL stores, fences and zero-queue workers. Closed PEX end-family selection dispatches to exactly one owner; refusal does not fall through. The existing strict presence parser keeps omission distinct from invalid null, and legacy declarations serialize unchanged. Standalone nym recipients remain supported. Source/recipient co-adoption is independently described below; authority/source co-adoption is not enabled. Component vectors cover admission, both real owner lifecycles and real authority registration while both are active. Actual private delivery to the authority audience, inactive-role retention and independent A-F remain open.

A source can now explicitly adopt an independent recipient through the same closed paired-role mechanism used by an authority. Its recipient declaration chooses owned-node or owned-nym custody, independent receipt trust, knowledge policy and local material source. Source responses and audience presentations route by the existing PEX end-family role, with no fallback, new queue or shared domain fold. Source and CaseKnowledge keep separate stores, fences and workers; combined transport routes and custody retain the existing finite budget. Missing adoption preserves the legacy profile; explicit null refuses. The actual-daemon dual-store vector and real protected nym recipient through the paired sink are component evidence with explicit authority/relay-ingress fixtures. They do not qualify private audience delivery, cold Gate C or PEX/LLR closure. Authority/source co-adoption remains unsupported.

The source owner now also stages unsigned registration before its dedicated continuity-key signer port. Exact carried roles, audience, original observed time, continuity commitment and independently admitted receipt-policy digest are frozen in that owner's encrypted metadata. The P035 token carries the actual policy identity; full author bytes or detached manifest and all non-payload roles must match that verified evidence. The shared signature budget includes finish's returned-signature check. Failure at custody or packet preparation resumes the same unsigned bytes; prepared replay performs neither anchor verification nor signing use. A policy change refuses replay rather than silently adopting new trust. Current disclosure and time remain separate gates.

Source and authority adapters share the historical registration projection, with independent adopted trust and local observations. Carried registration roles can be checked before the signed control exists, reserving its maximum size without a placeholder signature. This projection performs no I/O or trust admission; current key custody, disclosure and private transport remain separate host gates.

Public raw-control preparation cannot replace a frozen native registration or status-read attempt, including with a valid external control. Only the native owner operation enters the shared private commit boundary after its core finish verified the signature; binding checks there do not repeat cryptography. Full and detached component vectors compose actual P035, SQLite, PEX preparation and independent authority admission, with explicit policy/continuity-signer fixture ports. The native operator adapter now also composes actual S026 continuity custody, the shared P035 projection and current finite Memarium disclosure. It requires independent optional registration/trust; it accepts only public commitment, sorted audience and carried roles, without secrets, caller times, trust or signed controls. The provider owner remains held through preparation and AD enqueue. Saved native handoff checks key erasure/provider availability, original anchor/authority/horizon, policy identity and current disclosure; replay signs and seals nothing again. Contention remains retryable. Missing full/detached profile in an older encrypted native row is unknown and refuses this adapter. The unreleased local request schema is extended in place with exact mirrors; there is no signed-carrier change. Full/detached native vectors use actual random case keys, P035, Vault, Memarium and AD enqueue with synthetic v2 credentials and fixture authority opening. Successor signing, complete later source-local negative basis handling, private transport and cold gates remain open. No tracker closes.

The owned successor PoP port now checks compact bindings from the opaque prepared intent against the actual Vault nym's profile, context, epoch and known private status floor. It samples its own observed clock and retains the current managed recovery requirement. It does not require a decision-v1 publication grant for an independently admitted certificate, and publication keeps its strict separate issuer-decision guard. The real two-owner/P035 component vector uses a synthetic v2 certificate/discovery, checks both signatures, and refuses clock rollback or stale recovery. No wire/preimage changes, v2 issuer completion or native source succession-workflow/private/cold qualification follows from this internal port.

The source-owner succession preparation now persists only unsigned candidate bytes before its two narrow signing roles. Original owner time, predecessor, audience, anchor-policy identity and exact successor roles survive failures and restart. The checked certificate/status deadline also bounds prepared output and handoff; replay neither resigns nor reseals. Full/detached component vectors use the actual P035 producer, source SQLite and L2 PEX against the authority's A→B→C CAS, with explicit custody/policy fixtures and synthetic v2 certificates/statuses. Native source command adoption and the independent cold/private gates remain open; this foundation changes no signed wire artifact, case-authority claim or MVP status.

The native source now adopts two-owner succession preparation. It uses independent source CaseAnchor trust, current finite Memarium disclosure, actual S026 continuity custody and an owned successor nym with current managed recovery. The source freezes the exact anchor-input and custody-selector bindings before signatures; the key provider independently enforces its original profile/context/authority/horizon. Full/detached native component vectors produce exact prepared PEX bytes and cover replay, altered inputs, key erasure and raw-control refusal. The successor certificate and council discovery remain explicitly synthetic; P015-005 is not implemented by these vectors. Succession transport/authority roundtrip, source-local later negative basis, retained signed material for audience assembly, inactive-scope maintenance and the independent cold/private A-F gates remain open. No tracker closes.

The source now retains native signed controls in a bounded scoped encrypted blob, committed atomically with its exact packet. Registration retains no anchor roles; succession retains only the three non-payload successor roles. Original case/replay holds outlive packet and reply-key expiry, and current-classification local result read exposes the optional assembly inputs without resigning, resealing or fetching. The new CaseWorkflow retains protected record/manifest bytes only through Memarium; the pre-existing P015 authoring replay journal is a separate implementation gap tracked by P015-011 before nonsynthetic rollout. Prototype/raw rows without this material remain explicitly incomplete. This is source workflow composition, not an independent presentation/private/cold qualification or a new permission.

The source's explicit later-anchor observation now has a separate local refutation fact, without inventing authority revision/closure. It retains encrypted exact non-payload proof dependencies under the original case/replay horizon. The evidence must match the source's frozen native receipt/time identity and adopted policy; another or unknown basis is unproven. New control effects and active audience presentation consult the local refusal; historical result reads and status reads remain separate. Finite source reservations include the full negative-token bound, so insufficient explicit prototype policies refuse rather than auto-expanding. Inactive-scope maintenance, ordinary-process cold/private acceptance and independent closure remain open. This source-owner mechanism changes no historical LLR-002 verdict and issues no signed authority statement.

Cached native source controls and audience effects now freeze a scoped Memarium exact-evidence witness with their original inputs. The witness covers this entry's proof sets per role, local first-seen facts and accepted cursor identity, without reading blobs/private text or verifying signatures. Duplicate/reordered references and unrelated journal, payload-read or time-fence activity do not invalidate it. A newly admitted proof or cursor identity makes cached prepare/handoff refuse anchor-unproven and requires a new bounded request ID. Missing prototype witnesses also refuse effects. Explicit later-anchor observation never renews an existing packet, witness or deadline. Historical local reads do not demand a disclosure witness; current custody, classification, trust, independent successor floors and original finite horizons remain separate. Public P035 detached material is unchanged. This is a local input-change guard, not a global knowledge epoch or current permission.

Co-held audience delivery decision, 2026-11-06

Adopted contract; runtime qualification remains pending. An audience nym held by this exact S026 participant owner receives the exact presentation through a verified local delivery. An external recipient uses the declared PEX relayed posture. The route follows actual private-key possession and the derived nym principal, never a configured label. A different local participant is a distinct owner and receives cross-owner-local-delivery-not-supported, without network traffic or a shortcut across participant boundaries. A locked or unavailable possession provider is not evidence that a recipient is external.

Both paths use the same closed presentation-family admission, limits, verifier, independently adopted recipient policy and CaseKnowledge mechanism. Local delivery has no synthetic AD header or peer identity. The local ownership proof is an opaque host value, not a caller-supplied flag. Route selection is a pure function of the verified ownership classification. A frozen local route never retries over PEX; a refused external relay never falls back to direct or local delivery.

The recipient commits a local-coheld receipt with the exact presentation digest, recipient nym, participant-owner scope and observed decision time in the transaction that records the verified recipient decision. Receipt replay is idempotent after restart and does not roll back newer knowledge. A refused continuation can still have a verified receipt: delivery is not current permission. Invalid presentation bytes produce the same refusal on local and remote paths and no receipt. The sender records delivered-local separately from delivered-ad. Existing AD queue or first-hop custody remains transport-custody; it is not end-recipient delivery. Local reception is a transactional-withheld effect; AD handoff remains an irreversible-external effect. Temporary source bytes retain their original handoff horizon; no new PEX store, retry owner or payload archive is introduced.

LLR-007 private audience delivery includes this verified local case. PEX-001's external delivery and privacy gate is unchanged. Acceptance must prove actual key possession, zero AD/network activity for local delivery, local/remote verifier and knowledge parity, other-owner refusal, exact-byte replay after restart, and no fallback. It must separately observe domain reception for an external recipient.

Whether the author's own node may be the case authority is a separate policy question. This decision creates no local authority fallback and no independent ordering claim for an authority controlled by that author. The suggested editor default requiring explicit consent for a self-owned authority remains unimplemented.

The recipient may already hold the exact presentation from an earlier admitted operation. Its immutable local receipt retains that earlier time; a later source operation can account for that fact without making it a new receipt. Sender route freezing applies per operation. A recipient may separately retain local and AD reception facts for identical bytes and reader, sharing one knowledge head.

Source local preparation encrypts exact presentation bytes under a separate workflow purpose, with its original handoff horizon. It does not call a PEX preparer. After a recipient commit and source-side crash, reconciliation can read the original opaque recipient fact within the case/replay horizon; it cannot redisclose an expired packet or restore permission. delivered-local requires bound evidence and has no AD delivery id. This is an explicit additive unreleased local-result contract change; historical schema pins remain unchanged.

Native recipient adoption may group a bounded set of owned nyms under one participant's knowledge owner. Configuration supplies only key locators and a negative owner boundary. Private-key derivation establishes possession. Duplicate selectors or Ed25519 identities mapping to the same X25519 key refuse adoption. The local and AD adapters share the same nonqueued owner, exact-byte verifier and negative knowledge; transport custody remains solely with AD. Earlier per-nym prototype stores cannot be silently abandoned when adopting a group. Their presence requires explicit reconciliation. This does not qualify inactive-scope retention or the clean-source private-delivery gate.

Explicit external domain reception (2026-11-06)

Legacy case-presentation-carried and case-presentation-referenced remain one-way. Their relay ACK establishes onward custody, never delivered-ad. Confirmed delivery uses separate *-confirmed families and whisper-private-exchange-header.v2. The presentation itself and its 4 MiB / 64 KiB bounds do not change. A random exchange-scoped response public key is part of the authenticated header; it is not a source-node route or identity. Legacy v1 header bytes and schema stay unchanged. The v2 header maximum is 542 canonical bytes; the complete PEX and AD frame remain under the existing 5 MiB ceiling without another payload wrapper or base64 layer.

whisper-case-reception.v1 is a separate recipient-signed reception fact. It binds the original exchange, confirmed request family, exact presentation digest, recipient, response-key digest, received-time observation and original handoff horizon. Its maximum is 663 canonical bytes, derived from the closed fields. It carries no participant/owner scope, source node, private record id or permission. The receiver's node/nym key signs the dedicated reserved reception domain; the transport peer cannot establish that key. Source verification uses its retained exact context and expected recipient, never a key selected by the receipt. received/at is sampled by the receiver before its decision commit; it is not a claim of physical durability by that instant. The fact grants no continue-case.

The recipient CaseKnowledge owner must commit its reception/decision and exact prepared response before revealing the response. It owns that bounded response, not PEX. Replay returns the retained ciphertext without another sign or seal; AD alone retries delivery. The response ciphertext expires at the original handoff horizon without extending the retained knowledge. The source accounts delivered-ad only after verifying this end-recipient receipt. Missing return routing or a failed domain verification never falls back to one-way success, direct delivery or local co-held delivery.

Implementation status: schemas, closed family profiles, stateless codec, pure receipt verifier and restricted protected node/nym signing ports have component coverage. The node operation fixes its key, closed schema, internal caller and clock; the S026 operation requires actual nym possession and its key-use fence. Neither signature grants publication or current case permission. Recipient-owned atomic prepared-response persistence, original-deadline expiry and exact restart replay now have real SQLite/PEX component coverage. Failure to prepare/store an acknowledgement cannot suppress newer negative knowledge; optional output cannot consume terminal capacity. Native recipient return routing is connected through opaque committed output, with one-way/confirmed mode admission before key access and post-commit access, possession, time and stop checks. Source end accounting and ordinary external-reception qualification remain to be connected. This protocol foundation closes no PEX/LLR tracker or ordinary transport gate.

The source's optional local intent delivery/mode is explicit: one-way is the legacy default and is omitted from its normalized private metadata; confirmed selects the separate confirmed family. Existing operations cannot silently upgrade. On a frozen external route, confirmed mode requires the matching AD request/response circuit and one random exchange-scoped response key. The source retains that key only in a purpose-separated protected row until the original handoff deadline. A receipt must match the retained packet context and expected reader before delivered-ad; transport custody alone remains insufficient.

Actual custody classification still selects the route before effects. A frozen co-held route uses the verified local receipt, without a response key or AD return capability; the external confirmation preference does not force a trip through a relay or create an AD claim. Neither route falls back to the other. The additive unreleased local intent/result changes leave historical pins and legacy one-way wire bytes unchanged. Source mode/key/accounting implementation and qualification are pending.

Current qualified scope, 2026-11-07

The staged implementation notes above preserve the sequence of work; their pending native/cold gates are superseded by the independently qualified A–F results in node:docs/audits/ACCEPTANCE-LLR007-LLR008-PEX001-2026-11-07.md and node:docs/evidence/portable-admission/2026-11-07-case-continuity-qualified. LLR-008, LLR-007 and PEX-001 close independently for the enabled operations, synthetic-v2 first consumer and single-relay loopback profile. LLR-009, production issuance, ADC adapters, context/authority transition and the P015-011 source-journal retention dependency remain open. No earlier capsule changes. The runtime source pins are Node a23af72f14205efcbf6cb0598b3ff20535bc3084 and Orbidocs 81a651666067c859e7635bfcb1f1f44b29753d4f; later closeout documentation and diagnostic-reader commits do not rewrite those measured sources.

Author closure and review corrections (2026-11-07)

Author closure is a terminal continuity-key operation, independent of the current successor and its certificate. whisper-case-closure.v1 carries the anchor, request UUID, bounded request interval and the closed reason set author-ended / key-compromise-suspected. No predecessor CAS or successor signature applies. The authority retains the last succession in its closed head. A copied continuity key can stop the case, but cannot undo a closure. Erasing a local key is not closing the case: close first, then erase, because other copies may still exist.

The authority reserves terminal storage at registration. Closure bypasses ordinary command/rate budgets; terminal status still fits after closure. Failed signing or reply preparation cannot consume the reserve: this command keeps its unsigned candidate only in the sole writer's memory until the final transaction. Ordinary commands keep their durable unsigned preparation. Nothing signed, including its sealed reply, is exposed before commit. An uncertain commit invokes the same store fencing and reconciliation as other commands. A fresh retry before any commit may use a new decision-time sample; after commit exact replay never signs again.

The source operator uses begin with family case-request, prepare-closure, then handoff. The source's separately configured workflow admission and AD capacity remain dependencies; the authority's terminal reserve is not an unlimited source/transport reservation. Closure prepares no anchor evidence and does not require positive continue-case knowledge or a Memarium disclosure grant. Actual S026 key possession, original anchor/horizon, current operator and privacy policy remain mandatory. A terminal observation takes precedence over an incomplete positive presentation, including after restart.

All active PEX families now use the authenticated v2 header. The former v1 active schema was removed under the pre-release migration rule; frozen source manifests and retained capsules still bind their original bytes. The response-key location is explicit family data (body, authenticated header, or absent); it is not a second framing protocol. No P015 exchange codec or limit changed.

P015 seal_exchange and PEX sealing both reuse the crypto crate's X25519, HKDF-SHA256 and XChaCha20-Poly1305 operations. Their domain-separated KDF info, AAD/header and framing remain separate: P015's frozen bounded JSON/base64 envelope cannot be widened into PEX's binary frame and family budgets. Sharing those byte contracts would change protocol semantics, so no generic envelope abstraction is introduced. The distinct ADC-005 follow-up is transaction-borrowing prepared-output persistence when its second real domain adapter exists.

Only single-relay-hard-fail is enabled. Source adoption requires one admitted relay per destination; changing it requires explicit operator adoption. The operator-only workflow routes projection reports each destination, relay and privacy profile. The relay learns both neighbors, timing and sizes; collusion with the destination can link the author's node to the authority. Destination route privacy is not anonymity against that relay or a global observer. No direct or onion fallback occurs. P013-PEX-002 separately tracks the unexplained 40 ms polling liveness failure; passing at 200 ms is not its root-cause diagnosis.

P013-LLR-011 now implements the durable ADC control component in the same owner, behind an explicit default-disabled domain verifier. Its separate offline owner qualification does not enable ADC-005 release composition. P015-005 now explicitly depends on P015-011. Historical qualification remains attached to its original enabled scope. The boundary review at clean Node a002a1d2d / Orbidocs a9dbed36 independently qualified the expanded author-closure/native-header scope: 1031 tests, actual full/detached closure, cold terminal knowledge, mutation refusals and equal loose/extracted/two-store qualification. See node:docs/audits/REVIEW-LLR007-LLR008-PEX001-2026-11-07.md. PEX-002 remains open for observer-load liveness; the separately reproduced idle WSS read-budget defect was corrected without extending the result deadline.

ADC public result component (2026-11-18)

The experimental ADC release-commit request now signs its exact public intent and private execution opening as publication inside the existing 4096-B control. Only release-commit may carry it. The private Intent.proof is the public intent digest; it is not an observation/count hash or a Room proof. Retained M_A, exact execution binding and the fixed case authority are checked before counting.

An accepted release carries the separate outcome.release/statement. Its exact public bytes share the final owner Store/fence with the private result and slot; no signed candidate is exposed, and replay never creates another public statement. The maximum result is 11414 B, still inside the existing 16-KiB PEX result profile; non-release result bytes and the 4096-B control cap are unchanged. Before first ADC enablement, old private-only release results refuse rather than silently gaining a public proof. Source custody, release execution/AD closure, cold reception and full runtime acceptance remain governed by ADC-004/005. This component does not renew historical owner qualifications.