Przejdź do treści

Long-Lived Rumors and Historical Authorship

Created: 2026-10-27. Revised: 2026-11-06.

Based on: P013 domain map.

Status: proposed post-MVP clarification and feature; no runtime claim.

Summary

Nym certificates live at most 24 hours, yet a rumor may need to meet its twin a year later. A short certificate need not mean a short-lived statement. The design separates historical authorship, current admission, the counting window and the author's consent. Certificates are not lengthened to make rumors live longer.

Context and Problem

  • Fact. P035 requires a currently valid nym-authorship-proof.v1 at ingest. The proof is part of the signed canonical bytes, while relay/received-at is relay metadata outside the author's signature.
  • Fact. P041 refuses nym_certificate_expired, and redelivery ships a byte-identical envelope that is evaluated against the current policy.
  • Fact. This proposal stores the signed envelope byte-identically in Memarium with its lifecycle trace and privacy policy. No rule deletes it because its author's certificate expired.
  • Fact. P015 keeps contributions after natural certificate expiry at the counting authority. Phase 1 runtime publication time uses an authenticated admitted homeserver observation or a local receipt; portable historical admission requires the distinct evidence described below.
  • Inference. A gate that demands current validity refuses an old envelope, redelivery included. Replacing author/nym-proof would change the signed bytes and the record/id, so renewing the author's authority and preserving the original publication are separate operations.
  • Fact. Story 014's 10-minute epochs and 2-minute certificates are fixture parameters, not production lifetimes, and that story tests a dormant fact followed by a rumor, not two rumors a year apart.

The accepted private case execution contract freezes PEX and LLR-001/008/007 gates, ordinary v1 authorship, recipient privacy and positive SQLite/Synapse admission. Its adoption does not close those tasks.

Four Periods

Period Question it answers Owner
Nym certificate validity May this nym perform a new operation now? P015
Retention of the rumor and its verification material How long do we keep this historical statement and the means to check its origin? Memarium (P036) and the local rumor store
Correlation and counting horizon How far apart in time may reports be linked and counted toward one threshold? This proposal (pull windows, disclosure-condition windows)
Consent validity Does the author still permit disclosure, contact or association? Conditions, interests and room consents

No period is derived from another. A counting horizon may not exceed the retention of the evidence it counts, and recognizing a link between two rumors is not the same as counting them as two qualified sources in one epoch.

Historical Admission Evidence

  • Receipt at first admission. An independently admitted relay issues agora-admission-receipt.v1, binding exact author bytes, admission policy, decision and verification material. A Matrix time observation, even supported by a PDU, is not by itself evidence of the relay's complete admission decision. The phase-1 agora-publication-receipt.local.v1 remains a narrower local publication-time fact.
  • Storage. Preserve byte-identical records and receipts/proof material under their separate origin-bound payload and proof custody horizons. A counting or case horizon cannot exceed the evidence horizon it needs.
  • Historical verification. LLR-002 returns four separate tri-state axes: record authenticity, receipt authenticity, historical admission and current status. It evaluates the signed historical material under independently admitted trust; it does not simulate historical admission by running the live certificate verifier with an old clock. Neither authored/at nor bare relay/received-at is sufficient. Current revocation and current case permission remain separate. Source-bound v2 witnesses retain separate publication, original admission and attestation clocks. Attestation within the admitted commit budget is contemporary; later attestation is retroactive. LLR-002 treats the latter's admission time as [published/at, attested/at]: revocation within that interval yields unresolved, not proven. This is a derived verification law, never a receipt-selected strength label. The SQLite adapter binds exact retained JCS admission facts and the original local receipt under the original clock authority. It neither reconstructs facts nor executes admission again.
  • Admission after expiry. A gate may enable historical admission for archival or redelivery topics (P041-001). The default remains refusal.
  • No automatic recount. Historical admission makes an old rumor verifiable and storable; it does not make it count again. Counting follows its own horizon.

Meeting a Twin After a Year

Variant 1: re-contact (proposed default).

  • The author's own node treats its authored rumors as dormant records in dormant-fact matching (P078-014). A new rumor that matches an old one produces a notice to the author.
  • The author may author a new related signal under a fresh nym in the current epoch. By default it is not linked to the old record. An explicit reaffirms relation, which discloses an authorized continuation of the case, is a separate, warned choice backed by a case-bound succession proof delivered only to the chosen audience.
  • A third-party holder of the old rumor can reach its author only through a contact/ref the rumor carries; otherwise the match stays local.
  • The cost is explicit: an unavailable author yields no current confirmation.

Variant 2: cumulative long-horizon counting (deferred research). Counting across many epochs needs case-scoped distinctness or continuity that prevents one person under successive nyms from counting as several sources, without a public stable identifier. Candidates are issuer-retained case bindings for the case horizon, which lengthen issuer retention, or rate-limited blind tokens per participant and case. Consent must cover the whole horizon explicitly. This is the same gap as the first open question of author disclosure conditions.

Case Continuity Key and Case-Bound Succession

A later nym B may need to show that it continues a matter started by an earlier nym A: to reaffirm the old rumor, to amend its disclosure condition, or to be recognized as the authorized successor in this case. Signing with A's key a year later would require keeping A's private key that long. That contradicts the fresh key per certificate and the erasure rules of P015, lets a seized device prove authorship of old rumors, and turns the compromise of an expired key into a takeover path.

The design anchors a case-scoped authority to continue in advance. The idea comes from pre-rotation in KERI, where a controller commits to its next keys and a sequenced key event log records each rotation (background: KERI specification). Orbiplex takes a narrower pattern: one key committed at the start of a case and then used repeatedly, without a rotation chain for that key and without a key event log of its own. KERI's properties therefore do not carry over automatically. Compromise of the old nym key alone cannot take over a case, but compromise of the continuity key is critical and terminal for the case. Case events get a small ordering contract instead (case state).

  • Case continuity key. When the author publishes the first signal of a case, the Pseudonym Vault generates a fresh key pair for that case (Ed25519 in the explicitly closed Phase 1 suite), and the signal commits to it through case/continuity-key-digest inside the nym-signed bytes. The public key is revealed only when it is first used. The case is identified by the digest of exact signed author bytes, never the private record/id. P013-LLR-006 owns this commitment independently of ADC; ADC consumes it. The first signal may bind at most one original embargo condition with the same status/counting authority.
  • One key per case. The same key is the control key of an author disclosure condition: it signs amendments, withdrawal, release confirmations and succession. There is no second per-condition key.
  • Lifetime. The key lives until case/not-after, which may not exceed the retention of the original record. The author may delete it earlier, which ends the ability to continue or amend the case; the deletion is recorded as an erasure fact. The key enters the recovery bundle only if the author opts in, trading survival against seizure risk.
  • Succession artifact. Case-bound succession uses nym-succession.v2 (P015-004) with scope case and authorization mode continuity-key. The continuity key and nym B sign the same domain-separated bytes, which bind the purpose, the case/anchor signed-byte commitment, B's current certificate, the audience and a short validity window.
  • Verification. The verifier checks both signatures over one preimage, that the revealed public key matches the verified original case/anchor commitment, its historical admission (P013-LLR-002), and that B's certificate is valid now. The portable profile distinguishes a full-anchor check from reliance on an admitted detached proof. It also checks the case lifetime, scope, purpose, audience and not-after. The successor's signature counts only as proof of possession in this protocol (signature uses).
  • Authenticity versus authority. These checks show that the succession document is authentic. Whether B is still the authorized successor is a separate question answered by the case status: the succession must belong to the accepted case history, and a fresh status of an active case must still name it as the effective succession. The authority's acceptance places the succession in the history, and later acts of B do not require it to remain the head. An ordinary amendment therefore leaves B authorized, while a later accepted succession from B to C ends B's authority.

Effects stay inside the case. continue-case lets B act for the matter, for example by reaffirming it. Succession never carries reputation outside the case, never renews a certificate, never adds a counted source and never merges two sources. A counting authority that receives a succession proof keeps counting source/ref values as before, because the proof establishes consent of key holders, not that A and B belong to one participant. Succession also does not stop a dishonest author from hiding continuity in order to count twice. Both gaps belong to P013-LLR-005.

Predecessor state Treatment
Certificate expired, continuity key retained Succession signed by the continuity key and B
Continuity key lost or deleted No succession. The council keeps no participant mapping after its retention, so there is no recovery path; the author can only open a new, unlinked case
Nym key A compromised or revoked A's key never authorizes case succession, and the separate continuity key is still required. A compromised continuity key is terminal for the case: the author closes it with that key if possible, and verifiers refuse succession after a closure

The proof shows that the key holders consented to the transition, not that one person holds both keys. Every recipient learns the link between A and B, and the scope limits the permitted effects, not that knowledge. Case-bound successions therefore travel only to their audience through the private exchange path, and the author's editor names who will learn the link.

Portable Case-Succession Verification

Proposed profile, 2026-10-28; post-MVP, P013-LLR-009. Apply P032's shared verification contract to Whisper's own evidence, alongside the other Whisper family profiles. Reuse exact-evidence access, verification mechanics and acceptance laws. P076 provides a qualified consumer example, not the common contract or a carrier for Whisper. Its grant status and authority resolver cannot establish case currency; P076-038 gains no Whisper scope. P015-004 remains the narrow pure MVP verifier; this presentation and its host path belong to the LLR continuation.

The proposed closed whisper-case-succession-presentation.v1 carries the following roles. Each signed artifact keeps its existing schema, domain and exact signed bytes; the carrier is not a new signature or a source of trust.

Role Minimum material and binding
succession The exact nym-succession.v2 with scope case, both signatures, the revealed continuity public key and the declared audience.
proof/anchor One of the two anchor-proof variants below, binding case/anchor, the original continuity-key digest, case/status-authority and case/not-after.
proof/certificates The original and successor nym certificates and the bounded public council/profile evidence their existing verifiers require. Expected roots and permitted profiles come from the receiver. Deduplicate identical evidence; a bare public key is not a certificate.
proof/acceptance The authority-signed whisper-case-acceptance.v1 for these exact succession bytes; together they identify the accepted succession event.
proof/case-status A signed whisper-case-status.v1 from the committed, locally admitted case authority, naming that event as the effective succession of an active case.
proof/source-status The signed nym/source status evidence required by P015 for the successor's current use, and any historical evidence required by the anchor verifier. Source status and case status cannot replace one another.

The full-anchor variant carries the complete original signed signal and its P035 receipt or profile-permitted verified Matrix PDU. It is available only to an audience authorized to see that signal. The detached-manifest variant, for a case that already has ADC, carries its separately nym-signed whisper-embargo-manifest.v1 and P035's signed manifest/admission binding. That receipt attests that the manifest's case key, authority and lifetime match the private anchor. The verifier checks the manifest and the admitted receipt signer; it does not claim to verify the unseen signal's signature independently. The manifest contains no anchor id; the later receipt binds it to the anchor, preserving the acyclic construction.

No embargo is required merely to have a case. A non-ADC case without an authorized full anchor or exact retained local proof yields missing anchor evidence for that receiver; v1 invents no detachable proof by deleting fields from a signed signal. A reference to an unavailable private body is not a self-contained presentation. Even the detached variant discloses case/nyms, condition metadata and timing: the builder checks the declared audience and disclosure policy for every included artifact before delivery. If the manifest is unsuitable for that audience, report unavailable rather than exporting it. Private keys, participant bindings and correlation text do not enter a public proof package. Use PEX-001's protected delivery for audience-limited packages.

Bounds and Representation

Initial v1 budgets to freeze and qualify in LLR-009: at most 65,536 encoded carrier bytes, 65,536 total unique decoded proof bytes, 16 evidence items, 8 levels of JSON nesting, and 32 signature checks including certificate/authority verification. Count nested and locally resolved evidence toward the same budgets; deduplication must not multiply work. These are proposed Whisper limits, not a consequence of P076's similarly sized carrier. Check size and nesting before expensive parsing/cryptography, and preflight the work budget. Oversize or unsupported evidence refuses explicitly, without truncating a certificate, authority proof or signed status to make it fit. Fixtures must demonstrate that the supported Phase 1 council profile fits these bounds.

Use role-specific closed fields and existing signed-artifact encodings. A small evidence table may share an exact artifact between roles; its byte digest is distinct from an Agora record/id. References resolve only inside the bounded presentation or an explicitly supplied local exact-byte store. Reject cycles, conflicting copies, wrong artifact families and unknown signing uses. No URL, mutable latest reference, network discovery or attacker-selected fetch is part of verification. Acquisition, when separately authorized, belongs to the existing owner and must produce a new explicit verification input. A locally complete view and a fully carried presentation have different evidence claims.

Preserve raw signed subdocuments when building and parsing; typed round-tripping must not insert defaults, discard extensions or reorder signed arrays. Reuse canonical-json, nym-core's per-use byte checks, P035's publication-evidence adapters and P015-004's two-signature verifier. Add only a Whisper presentation adapter and a verified anchor-binding value recording which proof variant was used; do not turn a detached receipt into SignalBinding for a body never seen.

Verification Order and Results

The verifier receives the expected case, operation and audience, independently admitted trust/profile inputs, explicit evaluation time and durable local status knowledge. Then:

  1. Bound and validate the presentation, resolve its exact local evidence and check all role bindings. Missing required material is unresolved; malformed, substituted or contradictory supplied material is refused. A valid cached alternative must not conceal bad evidence supplied in this presentation.
  2. Verify the original anchor binding historically at its admitted publication time, using the appropriate full or detached P035/P015 adapter. A sender's timestamp does not establish that time. A carried root or authority cannot admit itself; today's certificate check cannot replace historical admission.
  3. Verify the successor's current certificate/source status and call P015-004 with the verified key commitment, case lifetime, audience and current time. The two signatures establish AuthenticSuccession, not continuing authority.
  4. Verify the exact authority acceptance and fresh case status, including the same case/authority, active state, acceptance revision no later than the status head and case/current-succession equal to this accepted event. Compare against the receiver's retained head and negative knowledge before accepting any effect. A newer local closure, conflict or different successor cannot be replaced by an older attached active status.
  5. Return separate historical-anchor, succession-authenticity and current-case results, bound to the evaluated evidence and time. The effect owner rechecks the applicable time/status fences at its admission boundary; a saved positive result is not a timeless permission.

Case freshness remains LLR-008's 300-second bound, including its clock and rollback rules. P015's source-status policy remains separate. Share only the authenticated-head comparison described below: P076's union of revocation ids is not a case-history merge algorithm. Do not synthesize a signed status from several snapshots. Missing or stale currency defers current effects even when historical authenticity is established. An offline result cannot detect an unseen later revocation or an unreported key compromise.

For example, a package received at T can establish the old anchor's historical authorship and B's current case authority. Rechecking it after the status exceeds its freshness bound can still establish the historical result, but must defer the current effect. If the receiver already knows of a newer closure, even a still-fresh older active status cannot authorize B.

This current-succession check does not retroactively gate an ADC release already committed by its authority. That receiver verifies the historical release commit and its approved public proof package under ADC-005; it does not fetch a current case status to undo the commit.

Offline Acceptance

LLR-009 supplies a counting, network-denying resolver and an explicit local trust snapshot. Both full-anchor and detached-manifest cases must verify with zero fetches, with all positive proof bytes carried. In the detached case the private signal is absent and its retrieval is denied. This qualifies a verifier and its consumer adapter, not offline transport or unconditional authorization.

Negative fixtures cover missing anchor/receipt/certificate/acceptance/status; changed continuity key or case lifetime; wrong case, audience, signer or profile; unsupported signature use; expired successor; stale or future-dated status; substituted succession bytes; unknown self-supplied root; known revocation; newer local closure/successor; rollback/equivocation across restart; all resource bounds; and privacy-forbidden evidence. Missing local-reference evidence stays unresolved without a fetch. A valid cache plus an invalid carried artifact still refuses. A refreshed status at the same accepted head must retain LLR-008's non-equivocation behavior. Historical authorship can remain established while current authority is deferred or refused.

Case State and Currency

Signatures verified offline prove authenticity, not that no newer withdrawal or closure exists. Every act of the continuity key is therefore a case event in a small ordered contract. This is not a full key event log.

  • Requests and accepted events. The continuity key signs case requests: condition amendments and withdrawal, release confirmations, case closure and case-scope successions. Executors sign release commit and abandonment requests. Each request carries case/anchor (the digest of exact signed author bytes) and a durable request/id, but no revision. The authority gives a request its place in the order by accepting it: its signed whisper-case-acceptance.v1 binds the request digest, case/revision (a monotonic integer; the anchor is revision 0), case/previous (the digest of the previous accepted event, or of the anchor) and the evaluation inputs it used. An accepted event is the pair of request and acceptance. Only these header fields are shared across event kinds; each request keeps its own body and authority, following the reusable-data-abstraction rule of node:DEV-GUIDELINES.md.
  • One transaction per acceptance. For each request the authority, in one durable transaction, checks the current head and state, evaluates the request against them (for a release commit it counts under a recorded source status revision and reserves the slot), appends the accepted event and records the outcome under request/id. The order of durable acceptance decides between competing requests, not the time of signing, a click or arrival.
  • Status authority. The first signal of a case commits to case/status-authority beside the continuity-key digest. For a case with an author disclosure condition it must be the condition's counting authority, so counting and ordering happen in one place; otherwise the editor proposes the profile's projection authority, and the choice is always committed explicitly. The author node submits each event to it through the private exchange path. The authority serves a signed whisper-case-status.v1 with the head revision and digest, the state (active, closed or conflicted), the effective succession as case/current-succession (the digest of its event, with the successor nym), if any, and the issue time.
  • Freshness. An effect that depends on the case being current, such as an act of a successor or a reaffirmation, needs a case status no older than 300 seconds, the same bound as P015 source status. A missing or stale status defers the effect and never implies that the case is active. A release does not rely on a fetched status: its commit is itself a case event that the authority orders against withdrawal.
  • Competing requests are not conflicts. When requests race, the authority accepts one and evaluates the next against the changed state; it then accepts it at the following revision or refuses it. A withdrawal accepted after a commit is a valid, later event.
  • Lost responses. An outcome is durable and readable by request/id. Resubmitting the same request id returns that stored outcome without re-evaluation, so an executor whose commit response was lost recovers the same accepted commit, even if a withdrawal was accepted after it. Reusing an id with different request bytes refuses as an idempotency conflict. A new request/id is a new request.
  • Conflicts. conflicted means contradictory accepted histories: two acceptances by the authority with the same revision but different events, or a status that rolls back below a durable high-water mark. Relying parties that hold such evidence refuse both histories and treat the authority as faulty. The state is terminal for the case.
  • One current successor. The effective succession is the latest accepted succession event. Other case events, such as amendments, confirmations or release commits, never change it, and a later accepted succession replaces it. v1 supports no co-successors.
  • Disclosure. The status authority learns the timing of case events and the successor nym, so it necessarily belongs to the audience of every succession.

Signature Uses and Certificate Scope

The contextual certificate restricts nym publications to its exact topic key, record kind whisper-signal and schema whisper-signal.v2 (P015). The artifacts of this proposal must not widen that scope implicitly. Each signature has one declared use:

Signature Signer Use Requirement
Protected or related whisper-signal.v2 Nym Publication The existing contextual scope
Commitments inside a signal: signed manifest digest, case/continuity-key-digest, case/status-authority Nym, as part of the signal Part of that publication The existing scope; no separate signature
Release manifest Nym Domain-separated auxiliary authorization of the original condition and release payload Explicit P015-005 manifest-use profile; never interchangeable with a publication signature
Release payload None Authenticated by the digest committed in the signed manifest None
Correlation notice Nym A publication of its own kind Exact bound kind/schema/topic/disclosure-scope tuple admitted by P015-005
Successor acceptance in nym-succession.v2 Successor nym Proof of possession in a domain-separated auxiliary protocol A currently valid certificate, checked only by the succession verifier; never accepted by a publication verifier
Case events Continuity key Case control None beyond the anchor commitment
Disclosure attestations and case status Counting or status authority Authority claims Admission of that authority
Release record Releasing node The release act Node identity
Cover request None Authenticated by the peer session None

Invariants

  1. Succession proves authorization by key holders, never identity of sources; it changes neither source counts nor reputation outside the case.
  2. Historical validity, current authority, retention and consent have separate inputs. Offline authenticity cannot assert that a case is still active.
  3. No missing/deleted continuity key triggers council recovery or silent key substitution. Recovery inclusion is an explicit, separately warned opt-in.
  4. One case has one anchor, one committed status authority and at most one original embargo condition. Requests have one ordering owner and a durable outcome; contradictory accepted histories fail closed.
  5. Continuity-key compromise is terminal for that case. Without an independent recovery authority, a holder of the compromised key cannot prove which user is legitimate; closure requires reaching the status authority. An offline verifier cannot detect an unreported compromise.
  6. Two semantic authorizations remain distinct from the Phase 1 Ed25519 suite. P081's suite-neutral adapter does not silently upgrade this wire format.
  7. Portable proof cannot bootstrap trust, replace case currency with Messaging grant status, or disclose a private anchor to obtain self-containment.

Trade-offs

  • A case key allows continuation after nym expiry but retains takeover power longer. Separate custody and opt-in recovery trade availability against seizure.
  • A status authority simplifies atomic ordering but is an availability and trust dependency. Its outage defers current effects; historical verification can still work from retained proof.
  • Recipients learn a case's nym linkage. Scope limits use, not knowledge; no public chain or participant identity should be inferred from it.
  • Receipts and keys cost retention. Erasure can make a later historical check impossible; the result is missing evidence, not invalidity or fresh authority.
  • A bounded presentation reduces lookups but duplicates some evidence and can expire in transit. Detached proof adds reliance on the admitted receipt signer; an unavailable safe proof is preferable to revealing the private anchor.

Failure Modes and Mitigations

Failure Effect Mitigation / qualifying task
Lost/deleted key Continuation unavailable Explicit refusal, no hidden recovery; new unlinked case (LLR-006)
Compromised continuity key Case takeover risk Terminal closure when possible; no automatic successor recovery; show limitation (LLR-006/008)
Missing/stale authority status Current authorization unknown Defer effects; do not reinterpret historical proof as permission (LLR-008)
Contradictory accepted histories or rollback Authority untrustworthy Retained high-water mark and conflict refusal (LLR-008)
Receipts purged before retained bytes Authorship cannot be rechecked Co-retain verification bundle and bytes; diagnose incomplete evidence (LLR-003)
Lost response or restart Duplicate/re-decided event Durable request digest/outcome; reject id reuse with changed bytes (LLR-008)
Succession sent to wrong audience Unwanted nym linkage Recipient-bound AD/INAC; no public fallback (PEX-001/LLR-007)
Incomplete/oversize presentation or forbidden anchor disclosure No safe portable verification Typed unresolved/refused result; no silent fetch, truncation or trust import (LLR-009)

Open Questions

  • Cross-epoch source equivalence without durable participant linkage remains deferred to LLR-005; a case succession is not its substitute.
  • Availability/transfer of the case status authority beyond the single-authority v1 contract needs a separately reviewed design; outage currently defers.
  • An independently authorized recovery/compromise process would change the trust model and is outside v1. No authority is invented when a key is lost.

Implementation Recommendations

Use the shared-mechanism dispositions. One pure case fold and one transactional case owner serve every operation below; do not add separate current-state stores for succession and embargo. Suggested internal values retain the existing wire contracts:

CaseHead = (case_anchor, authority, revision, accepted_event_digest)
CaseRequest = { case_anchor, request_id, body: typed operation }
AcceptedCaseEvent = (request, acceptance)
StoredOutcome = (case_anchor, request_id, request_digest, exact_result)

The closed operation variants are amendment, withdrawal, confirmation, closure, succession, release commit and abandonment. Their signatures and preconditions stay operation-specific. fold_case_event(state, accepted_event) checks the chain and derives the next immutable state without I/O. In particular, an amendment does not replace the current successor and a withdrawal does not free an already committed release slot. A corrupt or incomplete chain is unavailable, never a newly active empty case.

The acceptance owner first authenticates the caller and exact request binding. Within its durable acceptance boundary it retrieves any saved outcome, refuses changed bytes under the same (case_anchor, request_id), or checks the current head and evaluates the new operation with explicit current time and evidence. It appends the accepted event, advances the projection, reserves any release slot and records the outcome together. A duplicate returns its stored result; it is not evaluated against today's state. Serialize competing requests or use an expected-head CAS; after a conflict, re-evaluate against the new head. Unauthenticated traffic must not reserve ids or read private saved outcomes.

Reuse S028 facts/projections and the recovery laws demonstrated by node:nym-issuer-service/src/revision_store.rs, without importing its issuer-specific database/key-provider coupling. Keep signing, media probes and network calls outside SQL write transactions. Prepared signatures/results may be exposed only after their exact input/head checks and durable acceptance; a failed CAS discards the candidate, not an already accepted event. LLR-008 owns fixtures for this seam, including a crash before result exposure.

Extract only the shared head comparison from nym-core::StatusCursor when implementing the case cursor: a verified scope plus revision and identity digest compares as initial, unchanged, advanced, rollback, equivocation or wrong scope. Scope includes the artifact family and admitted authority as well as the domain's context/epoch or case anchor; equal numeric revisions across scopes are unrelated. The identity digest differs by domain: source status uses its signed payload; case status compares the accepted-history head. Refreshing a case status's issue time without changing that head is not equivocation. Each adapter separately checks its timestamp, authority and semantic claims. P015 keeps cumulative revocations; LLR keeps chain validity and terminal conflict behavior. Persist the accepted high-water mark with the decision that relies on it; a pure comparison alone does not protect a restored database.

LLR-002 returns four separate tri-state results: record authenticity, receipt authenticity, historical admission and current status. Its first consumer is read-only Agora inspection, using P035's pure admission evaluator; the existing time-only port is a narrower projection. Do not call the existing live Certificate::admit with an old clock value to simulate historical verification. LLR-007 calls P015-004's pure succession verifier, then checks accepted membership and fresh case currency; it does not implement another two-signature verifier. Shared law fixtures cover wrong scope, same head with a refreshed status, rollback, same revision/different accepted head and restart; domain fixtures retain missed withdrawal, conflicting history and key loss.

Lean continuation and owner conformance

P013-ADC-011 owns the release model after S027-009-06; LLR does not create a duplicate proof tracker. Before new LLR-011 behavior is implemented, freeze the shared ADC preconditions and check the model gate. Reuse whisper-core::case, its head comparison, ReleaseOrder and the existing LLR-008 acceptance/outcome owner. Share proof mechanics with Messaging only where the laws match; current push consent and an irreversible accepted disclosure are different domain contracts.

LLR-011 supplies the durable owner before ADC-005's complete release execution. Its acceptance maps model transitions to Rust symbols, compares bounded traces and verifies actual atomic head/slot/outcome writes, exact replay after later withdrawal, stale-CAS refusal and crash recovery. Signature preparation/exposure must preserve the owner boundary. Model closure does not close LLR-011, qualify storage, or alter earlier LLR-008/012 evidence. Changes to the modeled contract require rechecking its proofs and the implementation correspondence.

Stage-0 follow-up corrects audience-specific confirmation, permanent refusal classes and separates retained original verification from live evaluation. See the pre-executor correction and node:docs/audits/P013-ADC-STAGE0-2026-11-16.md. Earlier qualified measurements remain dated historical results; ADC-005 execution remains open.

LLR-011 owner contract freeze (2026-11-16)

The component implements the five ADC controls through the existing private CaseRequest family and the closed whisper-case-adc-request.v1 union. Each body has its own signature domain and independently expected role: the original continuity key for amendment/withdrawal/confirmation, and an original-condition executor for release commit or its slot's abandonment. UUID request identity, case acceptance/result and authority custody remain shared LLR-008 contracts. No caller-assigned revision or generic signing permission is added.

An explicitly installed host AdcDomain verifies the immutable original condition/payload/audience/executor binding and current scoped source/AD facts. Its default is operation-not-enabled; disabled continuity custody remains use-not-enabled. An existing unconditioned case cannot gain an ADC condition. Real ADC-004 verification/counting and ADC-005 release composition remain open. The initial component fixtures use synthetic domain observations, the real SQLite owner, actual operation signatures and the dedicated authority signer.

The current case record retains condition, withdrawal, confirmation and slots. Unsigned preparation retains exact intent, counter basis and expected head. Head, slot, acceptance, exact outcome and response commit in the existing fenced transaction. A first refusal also retains immutable verifier admission, so replay authenticates the original executor without a new domain lookup. Author withdrawal does not require a counter/AD call. Its first emergency reservation remains usable after ordinary history exhaustion. Earlier accepted slots and outcomes survive withdrawal, amendment and abandonment.

Wire numeric inputs use unsigned Unix seconds / safe JCS integers; the pure Rust/Lean comparison also exercises full UInt64 boundaries. Frozen ADC-011 model and proof sources are unchanged. The owner comparison covers fresh amendment, withdrawal, confirmation and commit; actual signed owner fixtures cover replay, succession, abandonment, stale CAS, SQL rollback and process/fence interruption. The ordered abandonment wrapper additionally enforces active case/authority/head preconditions; the model's local executor step only changes its phase. No claim of full refinement or ADC-005 handoff implementation follows.

Current Node contract: node:whisper-case-service/ADC.md. The source-pinned component report qualifies clean Node ff7ded3f2 / Orbidocs 21ca896a: 15,623 differential steps, 290 Rust tests including 12 signed owner fixtures, real process interruptions at three fence boundaries and a repeated audit of all 73 unchanged ADC-011 theorems. Authenticated adc_outcome shares the existing result loader and remains readable through history retention without extending an expired response lease. The component gate is done; source custody, real ADC-004 proof/count adapters and ADC-005 release/AD composition remain open. Earlier LLR-008/012 qualification, MVP and public readiness are unchanged.

Long-Lived Rumor Tracker

The P035-019 boundary review requalified LLR-002 with shared authorization, staged publication and bounded evidence lifetimes at clean Node 9c914451 / Orbidocs c9ad549b: 645 tests and 15 mutation refusals, plus real OS-isolated inspection. Bundle 2adcd931dc1fd56ec479c4ad5159b3e698a6307c75bb191d9dcbf400860b433d passed extracted replay and fresh retrieval from both admitted stores. See node:docs/audits/ACCEPTANCE-P035-019-REVIEW-2026-10-29.md. Library-only foreign receipt ingress is not qualified. The older bundle below remains immutable history.

LLR-002's first consumer, read-only Agora inspection, passed P035-019's clean-source A–E gates on 2026-10-29, including a real cold OS-isolated process, independent trust, controlled evaluation and zero acquisition attempts. The retained bundle is 37a92f568fde09f5217e47c98eca0a7026a821551932f659abbed39adb2681cf; see node:docs/audits/ACCEPTANCE-P035-019-2026-10-29.md. Full-record history remains valid after certificate expiry while current status is invalid; detached authenticates the witness and leaves hidden-text history unknown. Other rows retain their own gates, including LLR-003 and P041 historical ingest.

LLR-009 includes P032's common verification-law fixtures and a convergence review with ADC-005's evidence-access/accounting path. Share the mechanisms when their contracts match, or retain a concrete reason for separation. Do not make either proof-package consumer wait for the other's runtime merely to extract a generic library; the later implementation owns that comparison.

ID Task Status Depends on Completion gate
P013-LLR-000 Controlled-clock twin acceptance todo P013-LLR-001–004, P013-LLR-006–009; P035-019; P041-001; P078-014; P015-004 A rumor admitted at T with a receipt; after its certificate expires, redelivery at T + 1 year is accepted by a historical-mode relay and refused by a strict relay with nym_certificate_expired. A twin at T + 1 year is matched on the author's node, and the author reaffirms in the current epoch with a case-bound succession proof delivered only to the chosen audience. Its LLR-009 presentation verifies with no proof fetch and keeps authenticity separate from current authority. Succession signed by the expired nym key outside its grace window refuses. The old rumor is not counted toward the current threshold, and disclosure conditions are unaffected.
P013-LLR-001 Four-period contract done P015; P036-004 Each period retains its named field/policy and owner. Independent host/P036 horizons remain separate from issuer identifying retention. The independent ordinary-v1 full-record SQLite/single-Synapse LLR-012 campaign qualifies opening, retained source receipts/custody, predecessor expiry and horizon refusal on both backends. Evidence: node:docs/evidence/private-case-continuity/2026-11-15-independent-gate-b/README.md. No detached ordinary or global historical-ingest claim.
P013-LLR-002 Historical verifier done P035-019; P015 Shared pure verifier; first consumer is authenticated read-only Agora admission inspection. Four tri-state axes, snapshot-relative history and interval-based revocation ordering, unknown compromise/missing material, role/window/profile-bound witness trust. Gate B requires a real producer/SQLite/readback/cold inspection process with controlled clock and OS no-egress; A/C/E qualify binding, history and compromise laws. Time-only Matrix evidence and unsigned local facts are insufficient. Memarium LLR-003 and historical ingest P041-001 remain separate.
P013-LLR-003 Admission evidence in Memarium done P035-019; P036 Bounded P036 custody retains exact bytes and proof references under separate origin-bound payload/proof horizons; redelivery carries proof beside signed bytes. Key destruction, recovery and cold offline consumers passed; external backups and parent P036 scope remain separate.
P013-LLR-004 Re-contact for authored rumors todo P078-014; P013-DFR-004; P057-015; P013-LLR-007 A notice when a new rumor matches an old authored one; a new related signal that is unlinked by default; an optional, warned reaffirms relation backed by a case-bound succession proof.
P013-LLR-005 Long-horizon distinct-source counting deferred P013-ADC-004; cryptographic review Case-scoped distinctness or continuity across epochs without a public stable identifier, with explicit consent duration. Candidates include a source-equivalence attestation by the issuer while both bindings are still retained, which would also allow exact author exclusion in later epochs. A proposal-grade review comes before any runtime work.
P013-LLR-006 Case continuity key done P015 v2 signal; S026 Pseudonym Vault Single owner of the case key commitment, Phase 1 suite, lifetime and uses. Generate one key per case in the Vault; commit case/continuity-key-digest and case/status-authority in the first signed signal, independently of whether ADC is used. One key for amendments, confirmations and succession; bounded lifetime, deletion erasure fact and explicit opt-in recovery. Fixtures cover missing key, wrong commitment, deletion/recovery exclusion and independent cases. ADC-001 consumes this contract; no execution dependency points back to ADC.
P013-LLR-007 Case-bound succession done P015-004; P013-LLR-002; P013-LLR-006; P013-LLR-008 owner (2026-11-07 component scope) Whisper use of nym-succession.v2 with scope case: two signatures over one preimage, the commitment check, historical verification of the anchor, a current successor certificate used only as proof of possession, membership of the succession in the accepted case history and a fresh case status naming it as case/current-succession, private delivery to the declared audience (verified local receipt for nyms actually co-held by the same S026 participant; external recipients through PEX, with no fallback), effects limited to continue-case with no source merging, closure handling, and refusal for each predecessor state in the table above. Call the P015-004 verifier; do not duplicate its cryptographic or mode/scope logic. The owner dependency remains the completed 2026-11-07 component scope; independent LLR-012 supplies ordinary-v1 SQLite/single-Synapse closure and negative predecessor readbacks. Evidence: node:docs/evidence/private-case-continuity/2026-11-15-independent-gate-b/README.md.
P013-LLR-008 Case state and currency done P013-LLR-006; P013-PEX-001; P013-LLR-012 (aggregate qualification) Case registration, succession, author closure, status, anchor invalidation and terminal knowledge use the single durable owner and recipient CaseKnowledge. Independent LLR-012 is the qualified aggregate Gate B basis; the 2026-11-07 owner component remains separately scoped. These historical LLR-008/012 proofs do not qualify ADC controls; subsequent offline owner qualification is separately recorded under P013-LLR-011. Evidence: node:docs/evidence/private-case-continuity/2026-11-15-independent-gate-b/README.md. No LLR-009/010 or global/release closure follows.
P013-LLR-009 Bounded portable succession verification todo P013-LLR-002; P013-LLR-006–008; P013-ADC-001; P015-004; P035-019 Qualify the LLR-007-frozen whisper-case-succession-presentation.v1 and its portable profile: exact signed subdocuments, both authorized anchor-proof variants, certificate/source evidence, accepted succession and current case status; explicit size/item/depth/work bounds and typed missing-proof refusal to authorize. Reuse P015-004, P035 adapters and LLR-008's case cursor. Retain zero-fetch evidence for full and detached variants with independent local trust; all negative/privacy/cache-conflict/restart cases listed above pass. No protected-body fetch, generic certificate carrier, source merge, or P076-038/MVP scope expansion.
P013-LLR-010 Case context transition todo P015-005; P013-LLR-008 Specify who attests transition; forward-only bounded steps; no preimage disclosure outside audience; successor status in the new context; no merging of source/ref values across counting domains. Golden/refusal vectors cover rollback to an old profile, foreign federation and replay. This does not block LLR-008/009 for one context, which claim no cross-context succession.
P013-LLR-011 ADC control operations in the case owner done P013-LLR-008; P013-ADC-001 (owner subset freeze); P013-ADC-011 Qualified clean ff7ded3f2 / 21ca896a: amendment, withdrawal, confirmation, commit and abandonment in the same fenced owner, plus authenticated historical read. 15,623 model/Rust comparisons; 290 Rust tests including 12 signed ADC fixtures; exact replay/refusal, successor preservation, stale CAS, reserved withdrawal, SQL rollback and actual process/fence interruptions. See the owner contract freeze and node:docs/audits/P013-LLR-011-OWNER-2026-11-16.md. The domain verifier defaults to operation-not-enabled; real ADC-004 evidence/counting, source custody and ADC-005 release/AD composition remain separate. Historical evidence and readiness are unchanged.
P013-LLR-012 Independent Gate B campaign and capture provenance done P013-PEX-001; P013-LLR-006; P035-019a/019b Qualify the 2026-11-14 independent Gate B contract from one committed producer and offline qualifier. Separate fresh SQLite/Synapse actors; actual v1 issuance, host prepare/sign/bind, source receipts, heads 0/1/2, B expiry before C on both backends, additional A expiry on SQLite, author-result body loss and exact retry/readback after later state/restart without new PEX/AD handoff, new A-to-C stale-predecessor, UI POST/CSRF abandonment with separate S026 erase/P036 release witnesses, missing Synapse receipt author-preparation refusal without effects and positive same-anchor/new-ID control, cold negatives, closure/sticky knowledge, full logical/raw-non-DB privacy and fresh live SSE. Named conformance witnesses must execute as ok; missing witnesses stay open. Discover and implement contract-compatible shared abstractions before the producer, then repeat convergence review. New campaign alone closes Gate B/LLR-008; frozen original subset remains historical and cannot fill gaps. Positive both-backend set <=16 MiB with XZ 128 MiB; refusal capsules <=1 MiB and campaign/profile totals <=4 MiB, not reset by campaign ID. Explicit area-history decision: 128 KiB; initial new unique controls <=56 KiB, entire campaign control history <=64 KiB. Qualify loose, extracted and fresh both-store material. LLR-008 done only after this gate; durable ADC stays LLR-011. Independent qualification and retained source/tool/both-store results: node:docs/evidence/private-case-continuity/2026-11-15-independent-gate-b/README.md; acceptance 2026-11-15. Historical subset bytes are unchanged.

Bounded acceptance, 2026-10-30

P013-LLR-003 passed its independent gate at Node db1153640f234cfa3e8c049e3e55ddbc5d93bc5f and Orbidocs d7a0eaaa3a5fb6e07ad4a849d994600842a6d938. The joint run passed 543 Rust component tests (one pre-existing ignored), four cold custody processes and five historical-store cases under measured OS network denial, separate HTTP/current-presenter checks, scoped Clippy and 14 qualifier mutations. Extracted replay and two-store retrieval agreed for bundle 8c2f6a078c6232997c0a66d365ad19119beedf2a2783b4ca106b258c52bfbd9c. Evidence: node:docs/evidence/portable-admission/2026-10-30-custody-qualified/README.md; audit: node:docs/audits/ACCEPTANCE-PORTABLE-CUSTODY-2026-10-30.md. V2 certificates remain synthetic; P015-005 certificate exchange, P036 parent tasks, LLR-009, remote-human presentation, external-backup erasure, simultaneous journal/provider rollback, media sanitization and release readiness remain separate.

Custody boundary requalification (2026-10-30)

Boundary review requalification at clean Node febf8b33 / Orbidocs 6eb1f6b6 passed 593 component tests, one existing ignored case, four cold custody consumers and six isolated historical cases, scoped Clippy and 16 mutation refusals. Extracted replay and both-store retrieval agree for bundle 4c2dba4a43c2d6670f3c9397aa5164955d5b216931a96057f9932bc8f1a19600. Dedicated checkpoints, explicit provider replacement, current operator disclosure/private read, bounded local observations and independent historical sequences are covered. P036-005b full backup and publisher/key-destruction liveness remain separate. See node:docs/audits/ACCEPTANCE-PORTABLE-CUSTODY-REVIEW-2026-10-30.md.

The prior dated qualification remains unchanged. This follow-up preserves the bounded claim and does not close parent P036, P015-005 or LLR-009.

LLR-006 Custody and Composition Amendment (2026-11-02)

Status: accepted design; not an implementation-completion claim.

S026 owns random case-key custody and LLR-006 owns commitment, permitted uses and lifetime. A durable exposed fact precedes releasing the commitment to the signal or manifest producer. Only unexposed preparation may expire under short request TTL. Exposed unbound keys last to explicit abandonment or their original horizon; abandonment records erasure. Signing binds the key once to exact author bytes before those bytes are released. Admission is a separate later fact.

The host nym-authoring path obtains a typed preparation from S026, passes it to SignalPreview before review, and persists the signed result and case binding before returning it. ADC consumes that same preparation; it does not establish case identity. Full anchors use LLR-002 historical verification. Detached anchors use only P035's signed author-byte digest and manifest bindings, recording reliance on the admitted witness; no private record ID appears publicly.

Closed key uses and domains are succession (orbiplex.nym-succession.v2), amendment (orbiplex.whisper-embargo-amendment.v1), withdrawal (orbiplex.whisper-embargo-withdrawal.v1), confirmation (orbiplex.whisper-embargo-confirmation.v1) and closure (orbiplex.whisper-case-closure.v1), each NUL-terminated before canonical payload. Only succession is enabled here; other uses refuse use-not-enabled before custody. Both signing roles consume validated documents, not arbitrary prefixed bytes.

The provider uses a local random wrapping key with no mnemonic/root recovery slot. Default application recovery omits case secrets; explicit per-case opt-in is checked at export. Imported keys preserve their original horizon and newer local erasure knowledge. Erasure tombstones last at least until case/not-after. Whole-filesystem backups containing provider keys and earlier exports are outside the guarantee; a fresh host cannot infer unknown remote erasure.

A->B->B' uses the same original anchor and continuity key. LLR-008 checks the current predecessor and orders acceptance; the pure P015 verifier does not. Successor federation/context must equal the anchor's. Current authority expires with the successor certificate, and a new nym needs new succession; source/ref is not identity. LLR-008 capacity must account for horizon AND allowed renewal rate, not only epoch length. Its ordered acceptance and LLR-009 runtime remain open.

LLR-009's proposed 65536-byte carrier cannot carry a maximum 512-KiB P015 status. That conflict must be resolved and the supported Phase 1 profile measured before LLR-009 freezes. No truncation or hidden status fetch repairs this conflict. The LLR-006 acceptance composition separately bounds unique decoded material to 2 MiB, transport to 4 MiB and signature work to 32. It does not promise all component maxima fit simultaneously or establish the future LLR-009 carrier.

Case context transition boundary (P013-LLR-010, 2026-11-02)

P015 context is a counting/status domain, derived from federation, exact profile, issuer, topic class and similarity key. Profile policy edits and issuer rotation therefore change it. Case succession requires the anchor context and profile; LLR-009's same-context profile must not imply migration. New unlinked cases remain possible when the old context can no longer issue successor certificates.

P013-LLR-010 must decide transition trust, forward-only bounded history, private preimage handling, current successor status and replay without counting-source merging. Speculation, not an adopted mechanism: a council statement could attest profile/issuer transition and the already committed case authority could accept an exact previous/current-context transition for that case. No new signer, authority, preimage disclosure or runtime is authorized by this suggestion.

LLR-006 qualified custody composition (2026-11-02)

S026's case-key service now has a dedicated lifecycle stream, bounded shared owner checkpoints, random per-case DEKs and authenticated seed blobs. The ordinary Vault snapshot contains neither keys nor a mnemonic-derived key-recovery slot. Per-case recovery consent produces only a critical encrypted projection at managed export; import consumes it before local snapshot persistence. Newer local erasure and the original horizon win. Provider loss requires an explicit operator replacement bound to the journal's prior provider identity. Old entries remain unavailable, with original erasure/tombstone knowledge preserved; new unlinked cases work. Only an opt-in export can restore an old key. A healthy provider cannot be replaced. The stable owner lock lies outside the replaceable directory. The bounded S020 sweep retires keys after expiry; a paused scheduler delays unlinking, never authorization. Private lifecycle parents are mode 0700; no secret enters their facts.

The host's case intent precedes SignalPreview and its durable Exposed commitment. The same preparation binds an auxiliary manifest; ADC is optional. Case fields require the complete tuple, and embargo still requires that tuple. A completed binding marker permits readback of already released signed bytes after erasure; an incomplete first exposure still requires the active bound key.

The current decision-v1 applicant workflow does not issue v2 certificates. The bounded host gate injects a disclosed synthetic verified certificate at the certified-authoring boundary. It then uses the ordinary host kernel, sealed workflow store, case custody and SQLite/P037 producer. This is not P015-005 or LLR-007 runtime qualification. The protected successor Rust port is reserved for that separate consumer; no succession transport or case-history API is introduced.

LLR-006 passed its own B/C/D/E-composition/F-custody gate on clean Node 07bb9aaaf9ecd36bbdd85a36c0dc1aed183d9d0c / Orbidocs d03a1463b03c7ba37a8c1fce4e6f7edfa3e902af: 357 Rust tests, scoped Clippy, 22 ledger and 10 schema-sync checks, two cold consumers under whole-process network denial, 11 cryptographic and 10 repaired-inventory mutations. Full and detached anchors were evaluated after the original certificate expired; detached records its witness reliance. The common archive helper observed identical qualified results before/after safe extraction. Capsule: node:docs/evidence/portable-admission/2026-11-02-case-custody-qualified, archive SHA-256 376cdaba9095875100f7d687d70418312a108d34f14f83191a98e6993c2a2195. Node's dated acceptance/review records the source chain, time, bounds and exclusions. P015-004 retains its independent pure result. LLR-007–010, P015-005, ADC runtime, current authority, transport and release readiness are not closed by this gate.

Case recovery boundary review (2026-11-02)

Recovery of ordinary nyms and optional case keys has separate results. The default account policy reports every included/excluded key digest and never makes expired, locally erased, lost or corrupt case material a prerequisite for nym recovery. require explicitly refuses if any selected case cannot be transferred. Busy owners are a bounded, retryable refusal before producing a partial export. Integrity of the complete case projection (AEAD, scope, duplicate identities and bindings) is checked before any case-key write. Provider or projection refusal remains visible and audited; no omission is silent. Projection-only reapplication is idempotent and does not reseal nyms. Import preserves all local erasure facts and original horizons.

LLR-008 acceptance must compare the declared predecessor with the effective successor at its head; with no previous succession it requires anchor-author. A stale claim returns stale-predecessor / evidence-change, not an equivocation. P015's case-history-required alone authorizes nothing. LLR-008 remains outside this slice.

Corrected boundary qualification (2026-11-02)

LLR-006 independently passed its own gate after the boundary review on clean Node 57c4026384a5024839117ca64fbabb72e0df216e / Orbidocs ce27aa027bc74a87bf22010ae0c61c41b0142bf8: 376 scoped Rust tests, required regressions and qualifier mutations. The ordinary qualifier returns the same result on loose and extracted bytes; archive SHA-256 496b92ee09877d6247926fe4d12b111e22fef301721d2194b4feb7b40e3d7bf9. See node:docs/audits/ACCEPTANCE-SUCCESSION-CUSTODY-REVIEW-2026-11-02.md for exact inputs, times, limitations and the preserved unqualified first pure attempt. The original capsules are unchanged; current authority, LLR-007–010, P015-005, transport and release readiness are not implied.

Adopted ordered-case implementation contract, 2026-11-04

The case-authority contract supersedes the proposed 64 KiB all-evidence budget and rollback/conflict wording above. It adds explicit revision-0 anchor registration, late invalidation, node-only authority, separate CaseKnowledge, carried/referenced roles and separate historical/current successor statuses. LLR-007 freezes the presentation schema; LLR-009 retains its independent qualification gate. No runtime completion is claimed by this contract adoption.

Scoped ordered-case qualification, 2026-11-07

The following is the historical 2026-11-07 component-scope checkpoint. The 2026-11-14 ordinary-v1 Gate B review reopens the aggregate LLR-008 milestone as partial for LLR-012; see the scope correction.

LLR-008 was complete for the enabled register/succession/status/terminal-knowledge operations; ADC release, amendment and confirmation adapters remain disabled. LLR-007 is complete as its first synthetic-v2 consumer. This does not close LLR-009's separate presentation qualification or P015-005 issuance.

Clean Node a23af72f14205efcbf6cb0598b3ff20535bc3084 and Orbidocs 81a651666067c859e7635bfcb1f1f44b29753d4f passed 21 scoped commands / 960 tests. Three ordinary loopback-only daemons completed full and detached A→B→C, registration and status roundtrips, both actual co-held nym receptions and the external recipient's signed reception. After restarting all actors, exact result replay and referenced C delivery passed. Eighteen committed receiver facts and six independently checked signatures establish domain reception, not queue entry. The co-held route uses actual same-participant S026 keys, never label equality or an AD delivery claim. Other-owner and missing-custody refusals remain covered.

Cold recipients used independently admitted trust and fixed observed times, macOS whole-process network denial with a negative listener probe and acquisition counters. Positive/negative replay and 24 supplemental restart/closure/current certificate-expiry decisions made zero proof acquisitions. The supplemental producer uses real P035/P037 with explicitly synthetic credentials/custody and a signed closure fixture, not a production ADC transaction. The ordinary native producer uses the real P015-006 status lifecycle. Neither backdates the system clock.

Eight repaired/unrepaired evidence mutations refused; unchanged original bytes, loose/extracted qualification and retrieval from two local stores were checked. Evidence: node:docs/evidence/portable-admission/2026-11-07-case-continuity-qualified, bundle df2b93b09ef03cb1881a0647a2d7d5b0e0b2ce1611fa04fcf2d3f30c007df054; review: node:docs/audits/ACCEPTANCE-LLR007-LLR008-PEX001-2026-11-07.md. The first complete-profile detached observer timeout is retained separately as an observed refusal, with full qualification not applicable. Reducing controller poll traffic to the versioned 200 ms did not extend the 20 s result/reception budgets.

No onion, colluding-relay resistance, physical-host independence, release readiness or global copy erasure follows. The pre-existing protected authoring replay journal is an explicit P015-011 retention dependency before nonsynthetic rollout; the new case workflow does not duplicate protected payload into its proof holds. Context and authority transitions remain LLR-010. Hard-MVP scope is unchanged.

Author closure boundary review (2026-11-07)

The continuity key can terminate a registered case through whisper-case-closure.v1. It binds case/anchor, request/id, closure/reason (author-ended or key-compromise-suspected), issued-at and not-after; its single signature uses orbiplex.whisper-case-closure.v1 plus NUL and the canonical document without signature. No predecessor or successor signature is required. The registered continuity key is the authority for this operation, independently of the current successor and predecessor CAS.

From Active the operation produces Closed and preserves historical current-succession. It bypasses ordinary rate/command budgets using one bounded reserved terminal preparation/result. Exact replay returns the committed bytes; changed bytes under the same request ID refuse. Closed is terminal for subsequent new requests. An unavailable signer cannot invent a signed closure; an unsigned candidate can be retried under the sole writer and current time/head checks. The author-side operation requires the authenticated local operator and bound S026 continuity custody. Erasing that key is not closure: an attacker may still hold a copy. Close the case before erasing the local key.

Closure is independent of ADC. LLR-011 owns the remaining durable ADC control operations. The previous retained capsule qualifies only its recorded scope; the clean-source review at Node a002a1d2d / Orbidocs a9dbed36 qualified actual author closure, both race orders, replay, exhausted ordinary capacity, wrong-key refusal and recipient restart with older still-fresh Active material. Its 1031 scoped tests, native full/detached runs, cold consumers and two fresh local-store qualifications are recorded in node:docs/audits/REVIEW-LLR007-LLR008-PEX001-2026-11-07.md. The review catalogue is node:docs/evidence/portable-admission/2026-11-07-case-continuity-review-qualified, bundle e4614aa9faa3282e7fa70a180ddd1cf5a8353b616c5877f6c660f43ca2e1d2a8. The idle WSS read-budget regression is fixed; PEX-002 retains the separate concurrent-observer liveness gate.

Verification lifecycle of ordinary-v1 anchors (2026-11-12)

P035-019a/019b own the separately adopted SQLite-v1 and Matrix observation witness bridges. These do not modify a source profile or turn the local phase-1 receipt into a portable proof by relabeling. LLR-002 and case registration require the exact policy, source evidence and independently granted witness use. Unknown or missing material remains unresolved. Ending new bridge issuance does not end historical verification: keep its policy, verification keys and source evidence through the latest affected case/not-after, under their explicit custody owners. The four-period audit must account for this dependency separately from certificate expiry, issuer identifying-data retirement and current consent.